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 Abstract 
This thesis examines the League of Nations’ project for Austrian financial reconstruction 1922-
1926. By 1922, the First Austrian Republic (1918-1938) was experiencing enormous problems, 
including hyperinflation. Little confidence existed that the country could survive as a unified 
and independent entity. In this context, the Economic and Financial Organisation (EFO) of the 
League designed a financial reconstruction scheme for Austria. The scheme was the first such 
project carried out by an international institution and this thesis explores its genesis, attributes 
and impacts. 
 
This thesis argues that this programme came into existence less, as is sometimes argued, 
because of the work of idealistic internationalists at the League of Nations, and more because 
the governments, diplomats and officials of certain powers, particularly France, but also Britain 
and others, wished to see Austria survive because they regarded its continued existence to be 
an important part of upholding post-war European order, and furthering their interests and 
diplomatic strategies. Furthermore, the support of financial elites was crucial in successfully 
launching the scheme, and representatives of these groups were centrally involved in the 
design and implementation of the programme via the EFO’s Financial Committee. The 
programme reflected their beliefs about the proper operation of finance and economics, and 
introduced to Austria orthodox financial measures that had a mixed, in many ways negative, 
effect on the Austrian economy and on Austrian prospects for stability. This thesis explores the 
often neglected political and social impact of the programme, such as the detrimental effects of 
unemployment, and the tensions generated between central government and the regional 
governments of Austria, particularly the City Government of Vienna. Ultimately, a programme 
that was created as an extension of the peace settlement worked in some respects to 
exacerbate the difficulties that would lead to crisis in Austria and in Europe in the 1930s.
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
In his memoir, written in the context of his flight from Europe as a refugee and shortly 
before his suicide, Stefan Zweig produced an idealised portrait of fin de siècle Habsburg 
Austria as a land basking in a ‘golden age of security’.  He looked back to his youth and 
recalled a ‘serene epoch [in which] individual freedom was at its zenith’. Zweig depicted 
Vienna as a citadel of culture, where people had a ‘fanatical love of art’ and lamented 
that: 
the world in which I grew up and the world of today, not to mention the world in 
between them, are drawing further and further apart and becoming entirely 
different places… all the bridges are broken between today, yesterday and the 
day before yesterday.1 
Zweig’s memoir creates a dramatic sense of caesura between pre-First World War 
Austria and later eras. He reflected upon the ‘pale horses of the apocalypse [which] 
have stormed through my life: revolution and famine, currency depreciation and terror, 
epidemics and emigration’. It was the First World War and its immediate aftermath that 
presented for Zweig the first traumatic break with what he regarded as the lost 
civilisation of the Habsburg era. Zweig’s perceptions may not have been as universal as 
he assumed,2 but nevertheless, his portrayal of the contrast between pre and post-war 
Austria dramatizes the bereft and desperate condition of Austria in the aftermath of 
the First World War, a country characterised by Stephen Beller, echoing Austrian 
novelist Robert Musil, as a ‘land without qualities’.3 
 
                                                          
1 Stefan Zweig, The World of Yesterday, trans. Anthea Bell (London, 2009). First published in German as Die 
Welt von Gestern (Stockholm, 1942). 
2 Zweig talked of ‘those of us’ and ‘our generation’ and ‘we [who] have experienced more history than any of 
our forefathers did’. His perceptions were rooted, however, in his background as an intellectual Viennese 
bourgeois, and in his experiences as a Jew and a liberal of Nazi takeover, and consequent exile from Austria. 
3 Stephen Beller, A Concise History of Austria (Cambridge, 2006), 197. Musil’s novel was A Man Without 
Qualities, trans. Sophie Wilkins and Burton Pike (London, 1997), published in German between 1930 and 1943 
as Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften. 
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Conditions in post-First World War Austria were highly unstable, and, as the writing of 
Zweig and other Austrian authors reveal, traumatic for its inhabitants.4 The newly 
empire-less country, previously the dominant entity in an imperium of some 52 million 
people, now contained only 6.4 million inhabitants. Vienna was a ‘giant city in a dwarf 
state’.5 The war, the defeat and the collapse of the monarchy and the empire created 
an almost overwhelming multitude of problems for Austria; refugees, political unrest, 
demobilisation, trade problems, shortages, Spanish Influenza, TB and starvation 
amongst them.  At this stage, it was commonly felt within Austria itself that the new 
country was lebensunfähig: unviable.6 By 1922 inflation was running at over forty per 
cent a month and a desperate Chancellor Seipel toured Europe, according to Maurice 
Fanshaw, ‘practically (offering) Austria in return for financial assistance’.7  
 
This thesis explores the significance of the events that followed, as, in an 
unprecedented move, the League of Nations determined to help Austria. This was the 
first ever intervention by an international organisation in the reconstruction of a 
country’s finances and represented a major extension of the League’s remit. The 
scheme for Austria, which ran until 1926, was designed and implemented by the 
League’s Economic and Financial Organisation (the EFO). It involved the provision to the 
country of a League-backed international loan, measures to ensure currency 
stabilisation and a balanced budget, and the appointment of a League High 
Commissioner – the Commissioner-General – to oversee the programme in Austria and 
enforce budgetary discipline. The programme succeeded in halting inflation, and the 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Joseph Roth, The Emperor’s Tomb, trans. Anthea Bell (London, 2013), first published in 
1938 as Die Kapuzinergruft; Stephan Zweig, The Post-Office Girl, trans. Joel Rotenberg (New York, 2008), 
published in German as Rausch der Verwandlung. 
5 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London, 1999), 106. 
6 Discussions about the un-viability of Austria were common at this time: see Helmut Gruber, Red Vienna – 
Experiment in Working-Class Culture 1919-1934 (Oxford, 1991), 22; Bruce F. Pauley, ‘The Social and Economic 
Background of Austria’s Lebensunfähigkeit’, in Anson Rabinbach (ed.), The Austrian Socialist Experiment: Social 
Democracy and Austromarxism, 1918-1934 (Boulder, Colorado, 1985), 21-37. 
7 Fanshaw was an early commentator on the League’s work in Austria from 1922. Maurice Fanshawe, 
Reconstruction: Five Years of Work by the League of Nations (London, 1925), 136. Hyperinflation can be 
defined as an inflation level that exceeds a level of around 50% per month. Steve H. Hanke and Nicholas Krus, 
date Austrian hyperinflation from October 1921, see ‘World hyperinflations’, in Randall E. Parker and Robert 
Whaples (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Major Events in European History, (Abingdon, Oxon, 2013), table 30.1, 
372-373. 
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collapse of the Austrian state seemed to have been prevented. The apparent 
effectiveness of the League’s work in Austria vindicated the nascent organisation and 
particularly the role of the EFO, which was not officially at this stage a permanent part 
of the League’s apparatus.8 
 
The work of the League of Nations on financial reconstruction in Austria was thus a 
critical event for both Austria and the League, and also, this thesis argues, a significant 
moment in interwar history, as its apparent success established a template for 
responses to economic and financial difficulties in the interwar era. The perception in 
the international community was that the programme for Austria had been successful, 
and thus its predominantly orthodox economic and financial precepts appeared to 
receive endorsement.9 This thesis shows, however, that the impact of the scheme for 
Austrian reconstruction was complex and in some respects destructive of Austrian and 
European stability. 
 
As the first major occasion of international post-war financial reconstruction, the story 
of League intervention in some ways represented a dawning era of internationalism: a 
new international institution pioneered a novel method of international intervention in 
order to support a just-founded nation. My research reveals that this internationalism, 
in the context of the Financial Committee of the League (who were instrumental in the 
design and execution of the scheme), was an internationalism that sought the 
establishment of small-state, balanced-budget, gold currency finance and economics. In 
this sense, the League programme for Austria reflected continuities with the pre-war as 
much as it did a new era. The scheme was labelled a ‘reconstruction’ at the time, and in 
                                                          
8 The EFO was called at this time the Provisional Economic and Financial Committee and consisted of two 
committees and their secretariats (known in the League as sections). It was not until 1924 that the word 
‘provisional’ was dropped from the title of the organisation and it was officially named the Economic and 
Financial Organisation. The EFO comprised a Financial Committee, an Economic Committee and their 
corresponding sections. There was complete continuity between the Provisional Committees and the EFO and 
for simplicity I will refer to both as the EFO. It was the Financial Committee that was responsible for the 
Austrian scheme.  
9 I use the term ‘orthodox’ in relation to finance and economics to mean commitment to balanced government 
budgets, a limited role for the state in service provision and economic enterprises, and fixed currency values 
backed up by gold.  
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many ways it was an attempt to re-establish pre-war economic values – albeit pursued 
through novel ‘internationalist’ means – as much as it was an innovation or a decisive 
break with the past. This thesis argues that these apparently ground-breaking steps in 
post-First World War Europe still reflected elements of traditional power structures and 
pre-war values, but that the use of new institutions and methods did lead at times to 
innovative developments in the means by which these developments were pursued.  
 
This case study also reveals that international institutions such as the League 
sometimes pay insufficient attention to the effects that their work has on recipient 
nations and their people.10 In investigating these elements, new and often absent 
voices are added to the story, such as those of local Austrian politicians and ordinary 
Austrian citizens. Through these sources, the at times detrimental effects of the 
programme on employment levels, service provision, state- and nation-building and 
political polarisation in Austria become clear: when a wide range of sources are 
considered, the view that the League’s work in Austria was an unquestionably positive 
development becomes very problematic.  
 
Despite its significance as the first post-First World War case of inflation that reached 
crisis point, and the first financial intervention by an international institution, the 
hyperinflation crisis in Austria is not a widely remembered or studied event. In contrast, 
Germany’s hyperinflation in 1923 has an infamous status in common historical memory 
and has been the focus of considerable scholarly attention.11 The earlier and similar 
Austrian experience is not much known about, and nor is it the subject of substantial 
historical research, never mind controversies of the sort that have occurred in relation 
to Germany in 1923. Research into Austrian history is not a large field outside the 
country, and the interwar situation in Austria is often relegated to the status of a 
                                                          
10 For more recent examples, see Ha-Joon Chang, Bad Samaritans – The Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations and the 
Threat to Global Prosperity (London, 2008).   
11 See, for example, Gerald D. Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the German 
Inflation (New York and Oxford, 1993); Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, The German Inflation, 1914-1923 (Berlin and 
New York, 1986); Ian Kershaw (ed.), Weimar – Why did German Democracy Fail? (1990); Martin Broszat, Hitler 
and the Collapse of Weimar Germany (Lemington Spa, 1987). 
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footnote in German history, although there are a few Anglophone histories of Austria.12 
The historiographical focus on Germany is understandable, but in some respects 
anachronistic. In the early 1920s, the crisis in Austria was the subject of enormous 
attention at international conferences, allied meetings, and in the Treasuries and 
Foreign Offices of the leading powers. Events in Austria were seen as hugely important 
at the time and critical for the establishment of the post-war order: as one British 
official commented to the foreign secretary, ‘the disappearance of Austria as a body 
politic would signify the definite failure of the Peace Settlement’.13 For French diplomat 
Paul Cambon, an independent Austria was ‘crucial’ in the post-war efforts to contain 
Germany – containment being a central ambition of French foreign policy at this time.14 
This study addresses the relative historiographical neglect of Austrian hyperinflation 
and the League’s response, and thus restores Austria to the centre of events in Europe 
in the early 1920s, as they were at the time.  
 
The tendency to overlook the Austrian crisis of 1922 can be seen in some of the general 
histories of the interwar and twentieth century Europe, which give scant attention to 
events in Austria in 1922. Eric Hobsbawm, for example, does not mention it at all and 
Robert Boyce only alludes to Austria in a brief discussion of the work of the Financial 
Committee of the League.15 Even a study of twentieth-century Austrian history 
                                                          
12 Although, of course, many of the histories of Nazi Germany do include Austrian history as the country was 
incorporated into the Third Reich in 1938. Steven Beller’s Concise History of Austria is a general and rather 
brief overview whilst Barbara Jelavich’s Modern Austria – Empire and Republic 1800-1980 (Cambridge, 1987), 
is a much more substantial survey. F.L. Carston focusses specifically upon the period before Nazi annexation in 
his The First Austrian Republic 1918-1938 – A Study Based on British and Austrian Documents (Vermont and 
Aldershot, 1986). Charles A. Gulick’s study is still a very comprehensive account: Charles A. Gulick, Austria: 
From Habsburg to Hitler (Berkeley, 1948). Austromarxism and Austrofascism have attracted scholarly 
attention. See, for example, Tim Kirk, ‘Fascism and Austrofascism’ in The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A 
Reassessment, Contemporary Austrian Studies 11 (New Brunswick and London, 2003) 10-31 and ‘Ideology and 
Politics in the State that Nobody Wanted - Austro-Marxism and Austrofascism and the First Austrian Republic’ 
Contemporary Austrian Studies 20 (2011), 81-98; Rabinbach (ed.), The Austrian Socialist Experiment and 
Gruber, Red Vienna.  
13 Note from Mr Lindley of the Austrian Section of the Reparations Commission to Earl Curzon, November 3, 
1920, the British National Archive, Kew (TNA), T160/57, 14/10/20 – 23/12/20. 
14 Pierre Paul Cambon (1843-1924), cited by Peter Jackson, Beyond the Balance of Power – France and the 
Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War (Cambridge, 2013), 242. 
15 Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 (London, 1994); Robert Boyce, 
The Great Interwar Crisis and the Collapse of Globalization (Basingstoke, 2009).  
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produced by Austrian historians fails to give coverage to the events of 1922-1926.16 In 
the light of recent publications, it can no longer be said that the history of international 
organisations is neglected.17 The League of Nations itself is a central focus in Patricia 
Clavin, Glenda Sluga’s and Susan Pedersen’s recent work and a key element in the 
studies of Mark Mazower.18 Despite this recent trend for historical research into the 
League, however, Clavin argues that the economic and financial work of the League still 
constitute a largely ‘lost history’,19 and historians of the League of Nations often 
overlook Austrian stabilisation, a curious omission perhaps, given the perception of one 
contemporary League insider that the ‘importance in the history of the League [of the 
Austrian reconstruction scheme] can hardly be overstated’.20  
 
Some historical works do consider the issue of Austria and the League’s stabilisation 
programme. Zara Steiner’s survey of the politics, economics and diplomacy of the 
1920s and early 1930s includes events in Austria in 1922 and the League and Britain’s 
response. Anne Orde also gives the event a clear focus within the context of British 
policy in Eastern and Central Europe after the First World War.21 In these works, 
however, the case of Austria is not a major theme, and nor is it the subject of wide-
ranging archival research. Nathan Marcus’ unpublished thesis from 2012 examines 
Austrian hyperinflation and the impact of League stabilisation in detail, using 
documents from the League as well as Austrian sources. Marcus examines the Austrian 
stabilisation scheme in relation to Austria’s later banking collapse after 1931, and so 
                                                          
16 Rolf Steininger, Günter Bischof and Michael Gehler (eds.), Austria in the Twentieth Century (New Brunswick 
and New Jersey, 2002).  
17 International institutions have only, as Glenda Sluga points out, attracted ‘belated historical interest’, Glenda 
Sluga, ‘Editorial – the transnational history of international institutions’, Journal of Global History, 6 (2011), 
219-222.  
18 Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy – The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946 (Oxford, 
2013); Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia, 2013); Susan Pedersen, The 
League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford, 2015), and Mark Mazower, Governing the World – The 
History of an Idea (London, 2012) and No Enchanted Palace (Princeton, 2009).  
19 Clavin sees, for example, Peter Yearwood’s major history of the League’s role in British policy as typical in 
that it does not even cover its financial and economic work despite the strong British presence within the EFO, 
and these aspects of the League’s work are certainly not the focus of Sluga’s volume, nor Mazower’s. Peter 
Yearwood, Guarantee of Peace: The League of Nations in British Policy, 1914-1925 (Oxford, 2009). 
20 W.M. Hill, The Economic and Financial Organisation of the League of Nations. A Study of Twenty-Five Years’ 
Experience (Washington, 1946), 28. 
21 Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-1933 (Oxford, 2005), 278-290; Anne 
Orde, British Policy and European Reconstruction After the First World War (Cambridge, 1990). 
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examines the programme’s broader relevance to the interwar period. Marcus does not 
examine the ramifications of the League’s programme for questions of the Austrian 
state’s legitimacy, nor does he look at provincial responses, and he does not seek to 
investigate the impact of events on the League. Although he does investigate the 
impact of League actions upon Austria, his analysis is mainly restricted to the impact of 
the scheme in strictly economic and financial terms. He also does not consider the 
significance of who the League’s personnel were and what interests they represented.22 
All of these questions are central to this thesis. 
 
Some Austrian historians have examined League intervention from the Austrian 
perspective, although much of this scholarship is not very recent.23 Austrian historians 
have often been condemnatory of League policies in Austria, in marked contrast to 
most League historians. Siegfried Mattl, for example, characterises League actions in 
the 1920s and the organisation’s later 1930s intervention as deflationary and politically 
destructive. He even labels League intervention the Finanzdiktatur.24 Herbert Bachinger 
and Karl Matis, along with Karl Ausch, also regard the programme as responsible for 
creating depressive conditions in Austria.25 Peter Berger has more recently examined 
the role of League official Meinoud Rost van Tonningen in Austria the 1930s26 as well as 
                                                          
22 Nathan Marcus, Credibility, Confidence and Capital: Austrian reconstruction and the collapse of global 
finance, 1921-1931, unpublished Ph.D thesis (New York University, 2012). Marcus finds that the League 
scheme was successful in stabilising Austria, and that the League played a key role in Austria. He also contends 
that ultimately insufficient reforms to the Austrian economy and failure to obtain longer-term funds for 
Austria meant that the League’s work did not see long term stability come to Austria. My thesis supports 
aspects of Marcus’s findings and challenges other parts of his argument, whilst also offering other 
perspectives.  
23 Austrian historiography in the decades after the Second World War often served the purposes of the state 
and its attempts to nation-build and deal with the legacy of the Nazi ear. For a discussion of this, see Peter 
Thaler, ‘National History – National Imagery: The role of History in Postwar Austrian Nation-Building’, Central 
European History, 32/3 (1999), 277-309. See also Thomas Angerer, ‘An Incomplete Discipline: Austrian 
Zeitgeschichte and Recent History’, Contemporary Austrian Studies, 3 (1995).  
24 Siegfried Mattl, ‘Die Finanzdiktatur, Wirtschaftspolitik in Österreich 1933-1938’, in Emmerich Talos and 
Wolfgang Neugebauer (eds.), Austrofaschismus – Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934-1938 
(Vienna, 1984), 133-159. Mattl’s deployment of this term should be seen in the context of the ‘Austrofascist’ 
dictatorship that ruled Austria at the time. 
25 Karl Bachinger and Herbert Matis, Der Österreichische Schilling – Geschichte Einer Währung (Graz, 1974); 
Karl Ausch, Als die Banken fielen – Zur Soziologie der politischen Korruption (Vienna, 1968), 115-191. 
26 Peter Berger, Im Schatten der Diktatur – Die Finanzdiplomatie der Vertreters des Völkerbundes in Österreich, 
Meinord Marinus Rost van Tonningen, 1931-1936 (Vienna, 2000). 
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exploring some aspects of the League work there in the 1920s.27 Unlike some of the 
earlier Austrian historians, Berger does not regard League intervention as entirely a 
foreign imposition, as he points out that there was support for League actions from 
some conservative sectors in Austria. John Deak provides some endorsement for this 
view by focussing upon the role of Chancellor Ignaz Seipel.28 Berger is slightly more 
positive than many other Austria historians about the impact of the 1920s scheme, 
although he does concede that League actions had a ‘restraining impact upon Austria’s 
economic growth’.29 Very little attention is given to considering evidence on the effect 
of the programme on political or social conditions in Austria by these authors, however, 
even though they acknowledge these issues.30 Jens-Wilhelm Wessels’ much more 
recent work is interesting but also limited in this respect as he investigates the impact 
of interwar economic and financial policies (including those of the League) on a set of 
major Austrian corporations, and reflects upon the impact that specific policies, as 
opposed to structures, have upon economic development.31 
 
Some historians with a more international or economic perspective have recently 
turned their attention towards the work of the EFO. Patricia Clavin, in particular, goes a 
long way to address the fact that the League’s EFO has largely been, as she says, ‘an 
organization without a recorded past’.32 She contends that the economic and financial 
operations of the League were a very important (and overlooked) aspect of its work, 
                                                          
27 Peter Berger, ‘The League of Nations and Interwar Austria: Critical Assessment of a Partnership in Economic 
Reconstruction’, in Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Alexander Lassner (eds.), The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Era in 
Austria: A Reassessment, Contemporary Austrian Studies 11 (New Brunswick and London, 2003). 
28 John Deak, ‘Ignaz Seipel (1876-1932) Founding Father of the Austrian Republic’, in Gunter Bischof, Fritz 
Plasser and Eva Maltschnig (eds.), Austrian Lives, Contemporary Austrian Studies 21 (New Orleans, 2012), 32-
55, and ‘Dismantling Empire: Chancellor Ignaz Seipel and Austria’s Financial Crisis, 1922-1925’, in Günter 
Bischof, Fritz Plasser, and Peter Berger (eds.), Contemporary Austrian Studies 19, From Empire to Republic: 
Post-World War I Austria, Contemporary Austrian Studies 19 (New Orleans, 2010) 123-141. 
29 Peter Berger, ‘The League of Nations’, 80. 
30 This is illustrated when Berger describes the outcome of the League’s intervention in Austria in the early 
1930s as ‘doubtlessly [sic] impressive’ shortly after mentioning that unemployment rates ran at 21.7% after 
League intervention, nominal wages fell by 5% and the burden of tax, meanwhile, increased for the poorest 
sectors of society whilst decreasing for the richest, ibid., 84. 
31 Jens-Wilhelm Wessels, Economic Policy and Microeconomic Performance in Inter-War Europe – The Case of 
Austria 1918-1938 (Stuttgart, 2007). Wessels concludes that underlying economic structures have a greater 
impact on economic development than individual policies. In Austria, he regards the key problem as being the 
reliance upon un-modernised traditional heavy industries. His assessment thus raises some interesting 
questions for anyone trying to assess the ‘success’ or otherwise of the League’s policies in Austria.  
32 Clavin, Securing the World Economy, 2. 
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and were a crucial means by which the League sought to advance the cause of 
international peace. Clavin focusses predominately on the EFO after 1927, and I build 
upon her work to focus in-depth on an early example of its operations. Examining 
Austrian financial reconstruction between 1922 and 1926 thus enables more of the ‘lost 
history’ of the EFO’s role in international affairs to be recovered. 
 
Much of work on the project for Austrian financial reconstruction examines it from a 
rather narrow perspective, as the programme is either only briefly considered, or only 
one area of it is explored. Gary Ostrower looks at the scheme only fleetingly in his study 
of the League, whilst Katharina Erdmenger considers Austria and the League as part of 
her study of the relationship between the British and officials in Geneva.33 As in the 
case of Steiner and Orde, she examines primarily the role of the British, a crucial 
element of the story, but one which overlooks the critical perspectives and input of the 
Austrians and other relevant parties (such as, for example, J. P. Morgan Co. bank). 
Nicole Piétri’s early study explores the programme very much from the perspective of 
the League,34 and Frank Beyersdorf also briefly outlines the scheme, and explores the 
role of the League and its efforts to promote a narrative of success for the scheme.35 
Beyersdorf, who does not examine the record in Austria, is positive about the impact of 
the scheme and the role of transnational networks in facilitating it.36 
 
With respect to the question of relations between the central state and the Austrian 
regions, historiography on the programme for Austrian reconstruction also does not 
consider in much depth its significance in the light of its effects on provincial politics, 
and the tensions it generated between the central federal state and regional and local 
government. Jill Lewis does make mention of but does not explore in detail the tensions 
                                                          
33 Gary B. Ostrower, The League of Nations from 1919-1929, (New York, 1996), 100 and Katharina Erdmenger, 
Diener zweier Herren? Briten im Sekretariat des Völkerbundes 1919-1933 (Baden-Baden, 1998).  
34 Nicole Piétri, La Société Reconstruction Financière de L’Autriche 1921-1926, (Geneva, 1970).  
35 Frank Beyersdorf, ‘‘Credit or Chaos?’ The Austrian Stabilisation Programme of 1923 and the League of 
Nations’, in Dan Laqua (ed.), Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the 
Wars (London, 2011), 134-157. 
36 Decorzant also depicts a positive and benign role for transnational networks in the establishment and 
effective operation of the EFO, Yann Decorzant, ‘Internationalism in the Economic and Financial Organisation 
of the League’, in Dan Laqua (ed.), Internationalism, 115-133. 
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between the League and the Seipel government on the one side, and the government 
of the City of Vienna, who pursued very different political and financial agendas during 
the time of the League’s work in Austria, on the other.37 This thesis uncovers the ways 
in which the internationalist project of the League came into conflict with the radically 
alternative programme of the socialist government of Vienna, and in doing so 
illuminates the ideological aspects of the scheme in the context of the politically 
polarised interwar period. Examination of the tensions and conflicts between the 
League, the central government and the provincial administrations, which included the 
City of the Vienna, also serves to illustrate an often overlooked aspect of the work of 
international organisations, that is, their effect upon local or regional situations, and 
not just their interactions with central government or countries as whole entities. In the 
Austrian case, a scheme that was supposed to assist in the creation of a stable and 
united future for the country had some negative effects in exacerbating centre-regional 
conflicts and tensions.  
 
The studies that there are on League intervention in Austria 1922-1926 tend to 
examine matters either from the League perspective, and, therefore, as part of the 
history of international institutions, or from the perspective of the history of Austria. 
This thesis integrates examination of the impact of events on Austria with consideration 
of the importance of this moment for the League, whilst it also investigates the 
significance of events in Austria for international politics, economics and international 
diplomacy. In doing so, various aspects of scholarship are drawn upon, including the 
work of transnational, international, political, economic and social historians and 
economists. Thus, this thesis not only enriches our understanding of the League, but 
also draws together different perspectives and areas of research on the interwar 
situation, and illuminates the intersection of political and economic issues of this 
period.  
 
                                                          
37 Jill Lewis, ‘Conservatives and Fascists in Austria, 1918-34’, in Martin Blinkhorn (ed.), Fascists and 
Conservatives, (London, 1990), 98-117. 
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A significant part of this thesis examines the role of transnational networks working 
through the League of Nations. Whilst drawing upon transnational histories, I move 
away from the characterisation in some League histories of transnational networks as a 
necessarily positive ‘internationalist’ force.38 Transnationalism here is defined as flows 
of ideas, goods, people or money that occur across borders, or work that occurs across 
borders, involving the cooperation or collaboration of actors from a variety of states. In 
the case of the work of the EFO at the League, a multinational group of actors worked 
together in a non-national setting to design and implement the programme for Austria. 
Underpinning the work of some transnational historians is sometimes an assumption 
that ‘experts’ working across borders, such as those at the League and involved in the 
EFO, represent a kind of transcendence of national interest for the benefit of the 
common good. Similarly, ‘internationalist’ impulses are often regarded as by definition 
a positive development, a countervailing force opposed to negative dynamics of 
nationalism or imperialism. Akira Iyrie, one of the originators of the recent 
transnational historical focus on internationalism and international organisations, 
seems to view internationalism as un-problematically positive.39 A startling example of 
why this assumption of the benign internationalism of experts may be false can be 
found in the person of Rost van Tonningen, a Dutch national and League official based 
in Austria. He worked on the EFO programme for Austria between 1923 and 1928 and 
led the later League intervention there between 1931-1936. Rost became a Nazi 
sympathiser whilst still a senior League employee based in Austria, and was later a 
leading light in the Dutch fascist movement.40 While Rost is not a major preoccupation 
here, his example serves to illustrate that transnational assumptions may not always be 
correct.  
 
                                                          
38 Beyersdorf ‘‘Credit or Chaos’?’ and Decorzant, ibid., reveal this tendency. 
39 Akira Iyrie, Global Community – The Role of International Organisations in the Making of the Contemporary 
World (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2002). 
40 Rost remained in Austria 1926-1928 after the Commission General had departed overseeing the residual 
parts of the League programme. Rost committed suicide in captivity in 1945 before he could stand trial.  
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Some scholarship has complicated the depiction of the meanings of 
‘internationalism’.41 In investigating the networks involved in the EFO’s programme in 
Austria, I add to this by showing how economic elites, acting in their own material 
interests, may operate in a transnational manner that sometimes goes beyond national 
interests. They may be working on programmes that could be regarded as 
‘internationalist’ in the sense that they enmesh nation-states together through 
political, financial, economic, social and ideational connections, but I also examine the 
interests that were represented by these interactions. This is an area that some 
international political economists have also fruitfully explored.42 
 
I also seek to build upon the work of economists, such as Elmus Wicker,43 who have 
examined some of the effects of the League’s programme for Austria, by adding to 
economic analysis of social effects and the actual experiences of and reactions to 
events of ordinary people. As Francesco Boldizzioni argues, economic analyses that 
overlook these aspects are in some respects impoverished.44 Furthermore, historians of 
international institutions do not always explore the impact of their work on recipient 
countries, and this is true of most of the histories relating to the Austrian case.45 I 
examine the impact of the Austrian financial reconstruction scheme economically, 
politically and on society. 
 
                                                          
41 Internationalism can have different meanings, as Jessica Reinisch explores in ‘Internationalism in Relief: The 
Birth (and Death) of UNRRA’, Mark Mazower, Jessica Reinisch, and David Feldman (eds.), Post-War 
Reconstruction in Europe – International Perspectives, 1945-1949, Past and Present Supplement 6 (2011), 258-
289. 
42 See, for example, the work of the Amsterdam School. The work of Kees van der Pijl of the Amsterdam School 
is rooted in historical research: Kees van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations (London, 
1998). He traces the impact of a group of diplomats, civil servants and statesmen (or in the case of Cecil 
Rhodes, adventurers) that he terms the Rhodes-Milner group on political and economic policies and 
diplomacy, and reveals their transnational links and influences. 
43 Elmus Wicker, ‘Terminating Hyperinflation in the Dismembered Habsburg Monarchy’, American Economic 
Review 76/3 (1986), 350-364. 
44 Francesco Boldizzoni, The Poverty of Clio – Resurrecting Economic History, (Princeton, 2011). 
45 Partly, this is much of the history of the international institutions is conducted from an intellectual history or 
history of ideas perspective, and partly because in studying international or transnational history, the 
relevance of national histories can be overlooked. Both Mazower and Sluga’s recent work focus on the history 
of the ideas: Mazower, No Enchanted Palace and Governing the World, and Sluga, Internationalism. 
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Whilst I investigate here an international institution engaged in what could be 
characterised as transnational work, I also explore the role of national interest. A 
common perception is that the EFO acted as a proxy for particularly British but also 
sometimes French national interests, and this study also looks at these aspects of the 
story.46 The work of Miklós Lojkó, for example, examines the British role in terms of the 
notion that Britain sought to further its strategic and economic position with respect to 
central Europe via such programmes.47 In contrast, Peter Jackson has recently 
uncovered evidence that France’s foreign policy in the 1920s did not always simply 
amount to the pursuit of traditional balance of power politics, but also contained within 
it strains of internationalist thinking.48 The Austrian case is an instructive example of a 
policy that reflected both the tradition balance of power politics in pursued by Britain 
and France in Eastern Central Europe, fused with what might be considered a more 
‘internationalist’ (although not necessarily high-minded) concern for restoring the 
international financial system.  
 
In addition to the transnational and national perspectives, this thesis follows Clavin’s 
example in seeking to place the history of EFO within the broader context of interwar 
politics and economics. In focussing on this early example of League work, I both 
investigate the EFO’s work separately from the prism of the Depression and collapse of 
international order in the 1930s, and also elucidate the possible connection between 
events immediately post-World War One and the roots of political and economic 
breakdown in the 1930s. Here, the work of economists of the interwar period is highly 
relevant, and I explore the Austrian case in the light of debates in economics regarding 
the causes of the Depression. Barry Eichengreen contends that the Depression was 
caused in large part by a destructive ‘gold standard mentality’ which originated in the 
pre-war era and reflected a desire to return to what was perceived to have been the 
                                                          
46 Steiner, Mazower and Orde tend to portray what occurred as having been primarily directed by the interests 
of the British, and as being primarily to their benefit: Steiner, The Lights that Failed; Mazower, Dark Continent 
and Orde, British Policy. 
47 Miklόs Lojkό, Meddling in Middle Europe – Britain and the ‘Lands Between’, 1919-1925, (Budapest, 2006). 
48 Peter Jackson, Beyond the Balance of Power – France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the 
First World War (Cambridge, 2013). 
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stability and prosperity of that period.49 As Endres and Fleming discuss, there is also a 
debate between economic theorists regarding the nature of the League of Nations’ 
economic thought around the extent to which the League’s economic and financial 
specialists maintained adherence to economically and financially orthodox doctrines 
such as balanced and low government budgets and tight monetary control in the 
interwar era, and the extent to which there was innovation in their ideas. I test this 
debate in the light of the early example of the scheme that the League designed for 
Austria.50 I ask how far this early example of League action was a reflection of the 
orthodox ideas about economics and finance that dominated in the pre-war era, and 
argue that the League’s scheme did represent these values, although coordinated 
international action such as occurred in the Austria case was to some extent something 
new. Furthermore, this thesis shows how in Vienna, these values were challenged and 
in conflict with the policies of the regional government, but the apparent success of the 
Austrian scheme meant that it provided a template for further international and 
transnational diplomacy.  
 
The next (second) chapter of this thesis examines why the decision was taken to 
attempt the financial reconstruction of Austria via an international organisation, and 
how it was that this scheme was successfully launched when others had foundered. 
Whilst precedents existed for international / transnational cooperation in the 
restructuring of a nation’s finances, to have the League design and organise such a 
scheme was innovative.51 As no such plan had previously been attempted, it was not at 
first clear that the League could or should get involved, and indeed other methods of 
giving assistance to Austria, such as the provision of foreign bank loans through more 
conventional private channels, were explored before League control and oversight was 
                                                          
49 See Boyce, The Great Interwar Crisis and Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters – The Gold Standard and the 
Great Depression (Oxford, 1992) in particular, and also Clavin, The Great Depression in Europe (Basingstoke, 
2000). The gold standard was a monetary system in widespread operation prior to the First World War and 
largely restored in the interwar period in which some currencies were convertible into gold at a fixed rate. This 
maintained the value of currencies and their value vis-à-vis each other. If a currency was tied to a gold 
standard currency at a fixed rate (as in Austria), a de facto gold standard was created. 
50 See Anthony Endres and Grant Fleming, International Organizations and the Analysis of Economic Policy 
1919-1950 (Cambridge, 2002), particularly chapter 1.  
51 Precedents include a scheme in Greece in 1893-1898 and one in China in the 1890s.  
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definitively determined upon. The decision to award the League the scheme and its 
successful promulgation by the organisation is sometimes depicted as resulting from 
the effective operation of transnational networks and the idealistic enthusiasm of 
certain key League officials for the scheme. I show how the role and support of certain 
allied powers, particularly France and Britain, was critical to the inception of the 
scheme, along with the involvement of banking interests, particularly the Bank of 
England. Indeed, transnational networks cannot be separated from these interests, and 
their involvement raises questions about how and why the decision to give the League 
the central role occurred, and the extent to which the League’s role really represented 
a distinctive innovation. How far was the new institutional context a new means of 
conducting international politics and economics, or the pursuance of established 
methods in a formally reconfigured manner? Whilst acknowledging that the resort to 
an international organisation was in some respects innovative, I argue that use of the 
League did not entirely represent a break with the past: it had simply become the best 
(or perhaps only) means to pursue the reconstruction of the pre-war economic order in 
Austria that most of the politicians, bankers, and League financial and economic 
‘experts’ sought. In this sense, what appeared to be an indication of a new world of 
international economic cooperation was just the most efficacious method of recreating 
pre-war economic and financial standards such as fixed values for money and balanced 
budgets. The innovative use of the League did confer, however, some novel benefits 
upon the scheme that assisted in its effectiveness. The appearance of at least some sort 
of neutrality that use of the League provided helped the scheme to be accepted within 
Austria and by other important actors, such as the international money markets and 
international bankers.  
  
The third chapter investigates the nature of the scheme designed for Austria. I examine 
who was involved in shaping the decision-making, what ideas and interests they 
represented, and the assumptions that influenced the programme’s form. I show that 
the Financial Committee of the EFO had a particularly important role in designing the 
scheme. They regarded the most critical goal for Austria to be obtaining a stable 
currency that would ultimately be fixed to gold, and this was understood as tied 
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irrevocably to budgetary discipline. Therefore, the central features of the plan revolved 
around ending the creation of money for the purposes of government expenditure and 
cutting government expenditure. There may not have been any other options for 
Austria, in the sense that the country had little room for manoeuvre in its negotiations 
with the League and other avenues for assistance had been exhausted.52 I argue that it 
was not inevitable, however, that the problems of Austria be assessed in the manner 
that they were, nor that the solutions offered take the form that they did.53 In 
examining the decision-making behind the scheme, I seek to move beyond the polarity 
of a depiction of on the one hand apparently benign transnational efforts, and on the 
other, of the capture of the EFO by British interests. I investigate the work of League 
‘experts’ in shaping the policies that emerged.54 Study of this area helps to build upon 
the work of Clavin and Wessels, who emphasise the specific role of the secretariat in 
the operation of the EFO, and also allows reflection upon the role of these experts, an 
area of recent historical interest.55 The work of the EFO was an early example of expert 
economic advising, and it reveals the influence that functionaries can have on historical 
events.  
 
The fourth chapter of this thesis relates to the impact of the League’s work on Austria. 
From the perspective of Austria, with respect to currency stability and the acquisition of 
the funds necessary to enable the government to keep the country afloat in the short 
term, the scheme achieved its aims. From the League perspective, the programme was 
widely regarded at the time as a great achievement. Currency reform and loans were 
                                                          
52 See Clavin, Securing the World Economy, 29. Peter Berger ascribes more agency to Chancellor Ignaz Seipel, 
arguing that League intervention and the League programme was what he wanted, and not just because the 
country was so desperate: Berger, ‘The League of Nations’. 
53 Zara Steiner challenges the idea (as did some contemporary Austrian economists and politicians) that there 
were no other policy options for Austria and claims that Austria’s real problem was the absence of a 
restoration of its pre-war trading patterns, rather than primarily the currency and inflation issue, Zara Steiner, 
The Lights that Failed, 283. 
54 The term ‘experts’ may be a useful shorthand to refer to those who, qualified and experienced in relevant 
fields, provide technical advice to governments or international bodies, but it implies a kind of bureaucratic or 
scientific objectivity that sometimes serves obscures the often political and partisan work that such people 
engage in. 
55 Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessels, ‘Transnationalism and the League of Nations: understanding the 
work of its Economic and Financial Organisation’, in Contemporary European History 14/4 (2005). See also 
Decorzant, ‘Internationalism’ and Timothy Mitchell, The Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics and Modernity 
(Berkeley and London, 2002). 
23 
 
obtained and Austria apparently ‘saved’. League literature at the time portrayed the 
scheme as a triumph: for W. M. Hill ‘the success of the scheme is well known’, whilst 
historians of the League also often present it in this way: for Beyersdorf, the 
programme was ‘a great success’. 56 It was a ‘successful’ scheme, however, that 
resulted in a severe unemployment problem, (the level of which was at times the 
highest in the world), a very damaging stock market bubble and bust in 1923, repeated 
economic and financial difficulties throughout the second half of the 1920s and early 
1930s, culminating in a banking collapse in 1931, which pre-dated that of Germany. 
Furthermore, economists, who have pointed to positive and negative features of the 
impact of the programme, do not often consider the human impact of the statistics and 
numerical evidence that they examine: they may discuss levels of unemployment, but 
make no attempt to hear the voices of those affected.57 In deploying Austrian as well as 
League sources, I build a rounded picture of the various impacts of the League action in 
Austria. I consider the implementation of the scheme, and examine the impact on not 
just currency stabilisation, but also on trade, unemployment, government services, and 
the ways in which these had social effects. I seek to recover some of the overlooked 
experiences of non-elite groups in Austrian society, such as those of women and the 
working class. As Marcus points out, the story of Austrian reconstruction is generally a 
very male and bourgeois one.58 Examining the economic and social impact of the 
scheme in Austria allows the inclusion of the experiences of a wider range of social 
groups.  
 
The next (fifth) chapter investigates the connections between the political and the 
economic / financial through consideration of the scheme’s impact upon the Austrian 
polarised political scene. Historical research has often focussed upon the conservative 
support for the scheme (in the shape of primarily the Christian Social Party) and 
                                                          
56 Hill, The Economic and Financial Organisation of the League, 28; Beyersdorf, ‘‘Credit or Chaos’’, 148. 
57 See, for example, Elmus Wicker, ‘Terminating Hyperinflation in the Dismembered Habsburg Monarchy’, 
American Economic Review 76/3 (1986), 350-364, which examine unemployment levels.  
58 Marcus, Credibility. There were no women operating in a decision making capacity within the EFO at this 
time, and all the major politicians and bankers involved were male. 
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socialist opposition (from the Social Democrats or SDAP).59 I examine this dynamic, but 
also seek to consider the relationship of events on debates on Austrian unviability, and 
the impact on the nascent, arguably non-existent, Austrian ‘nation’. I also demonstrate 
the effects of the programme on state building in the Republic, and upon perceptions 
of the legitimacy of this new state. In this chapter, I also reveal an overlooked aspect of 
the significance of the programme for Austrian reconstruction – that is, its impact upon 
the tensions between regional and national power in the Austrian state. Provincial 
leaders were concerned that the programme would result in a reduction of their 
powers and prerogatives, and in the City of Vienna, in particular, there developed a 
conflict between the League-articulated vision of ‘reconstruction’ following orthodox 
principles, and that of the SDAP government of Vienna, who promoted a radically 
different utopian socialist ‘reconstruction’.  
 
In the sixth and concluding chapter I consider the overall impacts of the League’s work 
in Austria 1922-1926 in the light of the subsequent decade. I show its relationship to 
later events in Austria, such as the Austrian banking collapse of 1931 and League’s 
subsequent re-involvement in the country, the establishment of the Christian Social / 
fascist dictatorship, and the ‘civil war’ of 1934. In Chapter Six I also demonstrate the 
longer-term significance of the scheme for the League of Nations itself. As Berger says, 
the legacy of League involvement was much less problematic for the League than for 
Austria.60 The scheme was seen to have established the credibility of the League and 
the feasibility of co-ordinated international action in financial and economic matters. 
The scheme marked an expansion in the remit of the League, whose founding charter, 
after all, made only scant reference to economic matters. At the time of the 
intervention in Austria, the EFO was only a ‘provisional’ part of the League and its work 
in Austria was the major factor in the permanent establishment of the EFO.61 I show 
                                                          
59 The Christlichsoziale Partei and the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs. The Christian Socials 
were conservative, Catholic, and represented predominately rural areas and also business interests. Not all 
parts of the Christian Social Party were pro-League reforms, and the radical right nationalists in the Pan-
Germans were generally hostile. The Social Democrats were socialist, and represented primarily the urban 
working class. 
60 Berger, The League of Nations’, 73. 
61 See Decorzant, ‘Internationalism’.  
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how the work of the League in Austria impacted upon the institution’s future work. The 
League’s intervention in Austria was the first of a number of similar schemes, and was 
regarded as an important precedent in establishing the principle of the intervention of 
international organisations in countries’ economies and the foundations of what would 
become, after the Second World War, institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund.62 I investigate the extent to which apparent success in Austria strengthened the 
position of the League in these areas in the 1920s, and how the League’s programme 
was in many respects a template for other schemes, like that in Hungary in 1924. It 
influenced the shape of the Dawes Plan for Germany (1924) and set a precedent for 
international efforts in financial stabilisation. Furthermore, I argue that the apparent 
success of the scheme, at least as far as many non-Austrians were concerned, helped to 
solidify support for certain economic and financial doctrines, and show how this related 
to later events, such as the economic and financial crises of the late 1920s and early 
1930s. 
 
The wide range of sources that I have deployed for this project include the literature on 
international institutions, the history of Austria and the politics and economics of the 
post-war reconstruction and interwar period. Other works on the role and significance 
of experts, and the nature of state and institutional power are also of relevance. 
Important contemporary sources are the archives of the EFO at the League of Nations 
in Geneva. The documents there include official volumes providing records of meetings, 
conferences and memoranda relating to the work of the EFO in Austria, as well as the 
papers of senior members of the secretariat, such as head of the Economic and 
Financial Organisation, Sir Arthur Salter, and his predecessor, Frank Nixon. The official 
papers are of significance in revealing the content and nature of discussions, and the 
input of various individuals, but of perhaps greater importance is the less mediated 
material contained in the personal papers of the crucial figures within the secretariat. 
These help to illuminate the processes and thinking that shaped the discussions and 
content of meetings, conferences and official memoranda and reports. The officials’ 
                                                          
62 See Louis Pauly, ‘The League of Nations and the foreshadowing of the International Monetary Fund’, Essays 
in International Finance, 201 (Princeton, 1996), 1-47.  
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papers reveal the existence of private meetings, unofficial correspondence, debates 
and arguments, attempts to shape (even bully) the League, and information on the 
League’s attempts to monitor and influence the views of Austrians. The papers also 
draw together material from a variety of different sources, containing as they do 
personal correspondence relating to Austria, notes from national civil servants and 
bankers, records of interactions between Austrian groups and the League and other 
governments, and records pertaining to private meetings, including with banks. There 
are also political reports and memoranda, newspaper clippings, statistical reports and 
documents relating to preparations of conferences and committee meetings.  
 
For tracing the impact of the League’s work, the monthly reports of the League of 
Nation’s Commissioner-General Zimmerman in Vienna are an important source, 
although they were generally produced with a view to promoting a positive account of 
progress. They do contain, however, a wealth of information about the operation of the 
programme and the financial and economic situation in Austria. The statistics used in 
these reports were produced by Zimmerman’s staff, often using information provided 
by Austrian government ministries. Other important sources are those in Austria, 
including newspapers, such as Neue Freie Presse, Arbeiter-Zeitung, and Reichspost, 
records of parliamentary debates, party, state and other archives and the personal 
records of Austrian political figures of the time. There was a varied and lively 
newspaper culture in Vienna, and a very active political scene. A rich variety of archives 
in Austria contain material of relevance, including the State Archive, which holds 
foreign and finance ministry records, some other governmental records, intelligence 
reports, and information about political parties. The Parliamentary Library contains the 
records of parliamentary debates, and the Historical Institute of the University of 
Vienna’s Women’s Collection contains some ego accounts from the period. The 
Institute for the Study of the Worker’s Movement has valuable information relating to 
the reactions of the Socialist party. 
 
The provinces of Austria each have their own archive, and I have drawn upon diverse 
material from these including records relating to local parliamentary debates, 
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documents about the reconstruction programme, and the personal documents of some 
politicians. The housing developments of city of Vienna form their own tangible record. 
I focus on the archives in the provinces of Salzburg, Upper Austria (in Linz), Styria (in 
Graz), the Tyrol (in Innsbruck) and Vienna. Salzburg, Styria and the Tyrol are interesting 
as major centres for reactionary politics in the interwar period, whilst Vienna and Linz 
had strong Social Democratic movements. These provinces represented (and represent) 
a cross section of different conditions and political situations across the country.63 
 
British government archives relating to the Austrian project also contain insights into 
the operation of League processes and reflections on the British perspective. British 
officials had a particularly critical role in the project and there were frequent 
communications between the Treasury and Foreign Office on the matter. Otto 
Niemeyer of the Treasury was also a member of the Financial Committee of the League, 
as was Sir Basil Blackett. People in these departments also communicated with other 
interested parties, such as the Bank of England and League officials, and records of 
these communications also exist in the archive. The comprehensive reports upon the 
situation in Austria produced by the British Legation in Vienna for the Foreign Office 
also provide valuable insight into events in Austria. The British archives contain a great 
deal of information about the situation in Austria at the time and whilst British officials 
were not neutral in their understanding of the situation, they were at least outsiders in 
Austria, outsiders who were close to the action and who analysed the situation.  
 
The French Foreign Ministry archive, and the archive of the Banque de France provide 
an important corrective, however, to the tendency to privilege the perspective of the 
British. French diplomats, politicians and bankers were intimately involved in designing 
the programme, and their support for, and promotion of it was crucial for its success. 
                                                          
63 For example, as in Carinthia and Burgenland, there had been issues around borders at the end of the First 
World War in the Tyrol. Like Lower Austria, Upper Austria was fairly industrial. In the Tyrol and Salzburg, as 
well as Voralberg, there had been some consideration at the end of the war of the possibility of seceding from 
Austria. Similarly to the Tyrol, Carinthia had a mainly, although not exclusively rural economy. The Tyrol also 
attracted many tourists, as did Vienna. 
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Additionally, banking archives, such as those at the Bank of England, and those of 
Rothschild Bank, London, also contain useful material, as key participants and backers 
of the League’s scheme, such as Sir Montagu Norman, were based in these institutions, 
and important discussions and meetings about the programme occurred within and 
between these organisations and individuals. Finally, many of the participants in the 
League’s work in Austria produced memoirs or analyses that are of relevance in 
uncovering events and revealing the League perspective. The accounts of Sir Arthur 
Salter are particularly useful.  
 
I have produced all translations from German and French from documents or secondary 
material, unless otherwise stated.  
 
Overall, this thesis makes an important contribution to the history of international 
financial diplomacy and interwar Austria. I investigate the question of what the 
League’s scheme for Austrian financial reconstruction was, and what its impact was. I 
argue that although the programme was the first example of the use of an international 
institution to pursue such a project, it in many ways reflected the interests, or 
perceptions of their interests, of significant European powers, and an attempt by 
financial elites to restore the financial and economic values of the pre-1914 era. The 
means of pursing this goal were to a large extent novel, however, and, as such, the 
programme was a significant advance in the role of financial and economic ‘expert’ 
advice, which also reflected the enhanced role and status of central banks in the post-
First World War era. These experts and central bankers were not, however much they 
might have perceived themselves to be, neutral, technical actors, but represented a 
certain world view and certain interests, which were reflected in the League’s plan for 
Austria.  
 
Furthermore, I argue that in examining the effects of such prescriptions, a narrow 
analysis, often based upon technical data and statistics, has been used by economists 
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and some historians, and that this analysis often reflects the limited perception of their 
role held by the architects of the Austrian programme. This thesis broadens the analysis 
of the impact of the scheme in Austria by considering not just matters reflected in 
statistics, but also the effects upon the Austrian state and Austrian society in terms of, 
for example, service provision; experiences of unemployment; the responses to the 
programme from trades unions, representatives of war veterans, newspapers, the 
public and politicians, and in terms of how the programme affected the legitimacy of 
the new and fragile Austrian Republic. Innovatively, the effects upon the central-
provincial relations are also considered, and I demonstrate that with the policies of the 
Viennese provincial government, the values and precepts of the League’s programme 
for Austrian financial reconstruction came into conflict with a radically different 
alternative notion of reconstruction.  
 
It is the contention of this thesis that when looking at the consequences of programmes 
such as Austrian financial reconstruction, it is necessary to give a wider view of its 
economic and financial effects, including its effects on society, rather than, say, just 
examining the level of stability that the new currency achieved. I show that in the 
Austrian case, the ramifications of some effects, such as high unemployment, caused 
suffering and also political reaction and concern. I argue that the programme had far 
reaching consequences both in Austria and without. It demonstrated that coordinated 
international action on financial and economic cooperation was possible, but it also 
created conditions which in many ways were not helpful for the creation of legitimacy 
and stability in Austria, and also provided a model for international financial diplomacy 
that contained some problematic elements that exacerbated and even created the 
profound financial and economic difficulties experienced in Europe in the 1930s. 
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Chapter Two 
Why the League? 
‘Austria is a running sore in Europe’s body of politics, its infection growing more 
venomous with the passage of time’ 
From ‘The Condition of Austria’, a report by the Special Correspondent of the Chicago 
Daily News, 7 September 1922.64 
‘We wished to build on the shattered foundations of the older world a new and 
better one, with not only stable peace but increasingly assured prosperity’ 
Sir Arthur Salter’s description of the League of Nations in the early 1920s, in Slave of the 
Lamp – A Public Servant’s notebook (London, 1967), 173. 
 
In August 1922, following a plea from the Austrian Chancellor, the conservative Catholic 
priest Ignaz Seipel,65 the decision was taken by the powers victorious in the war to ask 
the League of Nations to implement a scheme for Austrian reconstruction. The scheme 
represented an unprecedented intervention in a sovereign state, and, as such, was a 
landmark in international relations. Other attempts to assist Austria at this time had 
failed, and the League’s success in launching the scheme was a vindication of the 
nascent organisation. The institution’s role in promulgating Austrian reconstruction was 
portrayed by some at the time and by some recent historians as a triumph for 
internationalist officials and experts in Geneva, and the scheme is also widely depicted 
as an innovation in international and financial affairs. However, an analysis of the 
circumstances surrounding the League’s adoption of the scheme reveals that less 
idealistic and innovative factors also contributed to the decision to award the League 
the programme, that is, the perceptions of some leading powers and economic elites of 
their interests. Using an international organisation to mediate Austrian financial 
reconstruction proved more effective than other solutions proposed at the time, as it 
had the benefit of giving the scheme the appearance of a kind of neutrality. The 
‘neutrality’ that the League’s involvement appeared to represent served to partially 
obscure Great Power and financial interests, and thus make the scheme more 
                                                          
64 Cutting in the League of Nations Archive (LNA), S97, Mr Nixon’s Files.  
65 Ignaz Seipel, 1876-1932. Seipel had been part of the last Habsburg cabinet. Before that he had taught Moral 
Theology at Salzburg University.  
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efficacious. Whilst the involvement of an international institution in this scheme was a 
distinct innovation, the plan in Austria was also reflective of attempts to enhance 
British and French power and restore orthodox finance. The scheme was thus partially 
an attempt to preserve pre-war powers and pre-war values, enacted via novel means.  
 
This chapter analyses the reasons why the League was awarded the scheme, the 
motivations of those involved, and how it came to be successfully launched. 
Explorations of Austrian financial reconstruction often only include cursory examination 
of this.66 Nathan Marcus does, however, describe the process leading to the adoption 
of the League’s programme for Austria in detail but does not focus upon the role of 
finance and banking interests.67 Nicole Piétri also describes the process from the 
perspective of the League.68 This chapter addresses these issues and argues that the 
decision-makers who were instrumental in getting the scheme adopted and the 
financial elites whose support was critical were motivated to assist Austria in order to 
support the peace settlement and the new European borders, and in order to advance 
their programmes for the creation, or recreation, of financial and diplomatic order in 
Europe. Furthermore, certain key individuals at the EFO were keen for the League to be 
involved, whilst for its part, Austria seemed to have run out of other options. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
66 See, for example, Yann Decorzant, ‘Internationalism in the Economic and Financial Organisation of the 
League’, in Dan Laqua (ed.), Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the 
Wars (London, 2011), 115-133; Peter Berger, ‘The League of Nations and Interwar Austria: Critical Assessment 
of a Partnership in Economic Reconstruction’, in Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Alexander Lassner (eds.), 
The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A Reassessment, Contemporary Austrian Studies, 11 (New Brunswick 
and London, 2003), 78, and Nicole Piétri, ‘L’oeuvre d’un organisme technique de la Société des Nations – Le 
Comité Financier et la Reconstruction de l’Autriche’ in Graduate Institute of International Studies (ed.), The 
League of Nations in Retrospect – Proceedings of the Symposium Organised by the United Nations Library and 
the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Berlin, New York, 1983), 319-342. 
67 Nathan Marcus, Credibility, Confidence and Capital: Austrian Reconstruction and the Collapse of Global 
Finance, 1921-1931 (unpublished thesis, New York University, 2012). 
68 Nicole Piétri, La Société des Nations et la reconstruction financière de l’Autriche 1921-1926, (Geneva, 1970). 
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‘You can thank your stars you do not have to live in Vienna’ – Austria 1918-192269 
The Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, who served along the Galician 
front during the First World War, continued to wear his army uniform for a number of 
years after the end of the conflict.70 He had left his academic position at Cambridge 
University to return to Austria in order to fight in the Austrian Imperial Army, and 
although, as heir to one of Europe’s largest fortunes, Wittgenstein was hardly an 
average Austrian citizen, his wartime experiences as a member of the regular forces 
reflected the experiences of many Austrian soldiers. Wittgenstein’s action in continuing 
to wear his army uniform – the uniform of an army that had disintegrated, which had 
fought along a front in a region that had been dismembered, at the frontier of an 
empire that no longer existed – hints at his disorientated and bereft mind-set post-war, 
and his condition was mirrored by that of many veterans.71 But the trauma of the 
defeated and returning soldiers of the defunct empire, soldiers whom Peter Melchior 
calls ‘the strange undead’, was but one aspect of the troubles encountered by post-war 
Austria.72 Defeat and the collapse of empire proved disastrous for Austria. In the wake 
of these twin shocks, the country struggled to absorb demobilised soldiers and refugees 
from former Imperial lands and experienced acute disruptions to trade, the chaotic 
break-up of its currency, extremely high rates of inflation, huge shortages of raw 
materials and food stuffs and political unrest. Instability and privation were 
experienced across the former Habsburg lands, but according to one League of Nations’ 
source, ‘the country which… suffered most from the disintegration of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire (was) the new Republic of Austria’.73 
 
                                                          
69 Sir William Goode to J. T. Davis, 9 November 1919, the Parliamentary Archives, London (PA), LG/F/197. 
70 Born in Vienna, 1889, died in Cambridge, 1951. 
71 See Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein – The Duty of Genius (London, 1990). Wittgenstein suffered from 
depression post-war and renounced his fortune and decided to become an elementary school teacher. These 
actions should not necessarily be assumed to be those of a disturbed mind. 
72 Peter Melichar, ‘Die Kämpfe merkwürdig Untot: K.u.K. Offiziere in der Ersten Republik’, Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften, 9/1 (1998), 51-84. See also Maureen Healy, ‘Civilising the Soldier in 
Postwar Austria’, in Nancy M. Wingfield and Maria Bucur (eds.), Gender and War in Twentieth-Century Eastern 
Europe (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana, 2006), 47-69. 
73 ‘The Work of the League for the Financial Reconstruction of Austria’, 3 August 1921, LNA S101, Mr Nixon’s 
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Conditions for ordinary people were extremely difficult. Hunger and starvation afflicted 
the populace, and public health crises also occurred during the Spanish Flu epidemic of 
1918-1919 in the form of an epidemic of tuberculosis. The liberal Vienna-based 
newspaper the Neue Freie Presse investigated the situation in 1919 and their report 
gives some sense of the scale of the problems of disease and hunger. ‘Today we have to 
reckon with a number of at least 350,000 to 400,000 people who require treatment for 
tuberculosis… As a result of malnutrition a bloodless generation is growing up with 
undeveloped muscles, undeveloped joints, and an underdeveloped brain’.74 Despite 
international relief efforts and some improvements in the world trade situation, the 
crisis in Austria did not abate at the start of the new decade: forty times as many 
bodies were buried daily in the city in early 1920 than had been the case pre-war.75 In 
the same year, a British intelligence report focussed on the desperate conditions for 
ordinary people in the country: ‘workmen work little, partly because they are 
underfed… the children and middle classes suffer from under-feeding. Seventy-five per 
cent of the children are rickety; more than fifty per cent tubercular; sixty-seven per 
cent of the deaths among young persons from 16 to 20 years old are due to 
tuberculosis’.76  
 
The economy struggled to cope with the disruption of war, defeat and loss of empire: 
post-war industrial production was down 60% on its pre-war level, whilst agriculture 
was down 50%.77 During the war, the value of real incomes had reduced substantially.78 
By 1921, the Austrian currency, the Krone – which had emerged from the First World 
War reduced in value by one third, and depreciated further as the empire fragmented 
                                                          
74 Neue Freie Presse (NFP) article cited by John Maynard Keynes, in The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
(London, 1919), 234, footnote 1. The article was from 31 May 1919.  
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and successor states switched to new currencies – was also in crisis.79 In October of 
that year, monthly price increases reached hyperinflation levels.80 At this point, the 
Austrian Ambassador to London, Georg Freiherr von und zu Franckenstein,81 
highlighted the issue and its consequences to the Governor of the Bank of England, Sir 
Montagu Norman:  
the Austrian currency and finance have actually broken down… [the Krone] 
ceases to fulfil the function of money, not only abroad, but also in Austria 
herself…. Cereals have been bought for a few weeks, although they have not yet 
been paid… Manufacturers and business men are deprived, through the 
depreciation of the Krone and the uncertainty as to the further development of 
affairs, of the basis required for business transactions. It is to be feared that a 
panic might arise at any moment.82 
The currency crisis added to the problems of shortages and food supplies, as the 
collapsing value of the Krone made the purchase of the imports required to keep the 
country alive difficult, and the instability and uncertainty of the situation in Austria 
hindered attempts by the government to obtain private credit. 
 
Some of the reports of Austrian immiseration at this time may have been somewhat 
hyperbolic, designed as they sometimes were to illicit support for foreign assistance to 
Austria (in the case, for example, of Franckenstein’s account), but nevertheless, 
                                                          
79 The currency union was dissolved in a rather chaotic and disadvantageous manner: see Peter M. Garber and 
Michael G. Spencer, ‘The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Lessons for Currency Reform’, Essays in 
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circumstances were undoubtedly extremely difficult for the country.83 Defeat, loss of 
empire and the material conditions in the country produced a very unstable social 
environment. Crime and violence were rife, as the author of Die freudlose Gasse (The 
Joyless Street), himself murdered by a member of the National Socialist party in 1925, 
depicted.84 Indeed, material, social and psychological circumstances were sufficiently 
serious that the question was raised in Austria and abroad as to whether Austria could 
even continue to exist. At this stage, it was commonly felt within Austria itself that the 
new country was lebensunfähig, that is, unviable.85 In late 1920 British Ambassador 
Lindley reported that there was in Vienna a ‘growing conviction that Austria will not be 
able to exist as a political entity’, whilst in March 1921 the Neue Freie Presse ran a large 
feature on Die Frage der Lebensfähigkeit von Oesterreich (‘the question of the viability 
of Austria’).86 Ambassador Franckenstein warned Sir Montagu Norman of the ‘danger of 
the collapse of the State’.87 In 1922, the Austrian legation in London, in an appeal to 
Prime Minister David Lloyd George, stated that ‘the continued existence of Austria has 
become doubtful’.88 Similarly, the British section of the Reparation Commission (an 
international body based in Vienna established to assess the level at which the 
reparations due from Austria should be set) expressed the view that without 
international assistance ‘Austria will disintegrate’.89 They felt that there were ‘most 
                                                          
83 It is interesting that a report on the condition of Austria by K. Riis Hanson in July 1921 produced a less 
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serious doubts as to the possibility of ensuring the continued existence of the present 
Republic of Austria as a political entity’.90 Later this sentiment was echoed in a public 
call for international assistance from the head of the Austrian League of Nations Union, 
who wrote in 1922 ‘this is our last appeal, the signal of a sinking ship.’91  
 
And it was not just in Austria, where the loss of its empire and the absence of a sense of 
national identity made concern about the country’s viability almost inevitable, but also 
around Europe, that fears about Austria’s continued existence were expressed. In 1921, 
for example, C. E. ter Meulen, a Dutch banker and member of the League’s Financial 
Committee, wrote to Sir Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, of his 
worries about the sustainability of Austrian existence.92 At a similar time, the British 
cabinet were informed by civil servants that ‘in the absence of some assistance (Austria 
will) fall into a state of dissolution’.93  
 
The sense of unviability was created partly by the scale of the problems that the new 
and defeated state faced and also by a view that Austria without an Empire was not a 
sustainable economic unit, having lost its hinterlands and trading bloc as the successor 
states erected high tariffs against Austrian trade. Coal was a particular problem, and 
shortages of it hindered Austrian industrial production. New Austria had been left with 
20% of the industrial steam boilers of the old Empire, but only 0.5% of its coal fields.94 
The inflationary crisis added to this impression of the country’s unviability, as the 
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currency became progressively ever more worthless. Another more psychological factor 
was that the breakup of the Habsburg Empire left many Austrians facing a crisis of 
identity in the sense that any ‘Austrian’ identity, such as it was, was closely connected 
with the possession of the Empire, and the existence of the imperial army. In this new 
state, which could seem to be only a pale echo of what had once been, there was no 
equivalent ‘national’ feeling as existed (and was being at this time hastily 
manufactured) in the successor states of the Empire.95 
 
In this context of Austrian desperation, efforts were made continually within Austria 
and sporadically by others to alleviate Austria’s position. Much of the assistance was in 
the form of short-term relief, such as a British loan to Austria for £250,000 in early 1922 
for the purchase of food stuffs. Between 1919 and early 1922, around £40 million in aid 
and loans for basic provisions were granted to Austria primarily by Britain, France, and 
the United States through Herbert Hoover’s American Relief Administration, along with 
some contributions from Czechoslovakia and Japan.96 There was a clear understanding 
early on of the depth of Austria’s difficulties: even the peace treaty with Austria, the 
Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919), contained reference to the need to provide 
financial assistance to the Austrian state. This awareness was also reflected in the fact 
that no attempt was ever made to collect reparations from the country in view of its 
fragile condition, despite the Treaty of St. Germain containing a ‘war guilt’ clause and 
reparations provisions similar to those in the Treaty of Versailles.97  
 
A more comprehensive financial and economic settlement for Austria was required if 
the country was to ever stabilise. As H.R.G. Greaves, a political scientist at the LSE and 
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early academic investigator of the work and significance of the technical, ‘expert’ 
aspects of the League, wrote in 1931: ‘the policy of relief… was nothing more than a 
policy of palliative and continual postponement of the real problem’.98 With this in 
mind, a number of schemes for Austrian reconstruction (outlined later in this chapter) 
were designed. The League’s scheme was the last in a sequence of plans to attempt to 
stabilise the situation in the country. As early as 1919, both Sir William Beveridge, then 
working at the Ministry of Food, and British diplomat Sir Francis Oppenheimer, who 
visited Austria and reported on the conditions of Austria for British Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George, suggested that economic and financial reconstruction for Austria 
would be required.99 Various proposals were then explored between 1920 and 1922 by 
the Austrian government, other countries and concerned individuals, like Sir William 
Goode of the Reparations Commission. A more general League programme, the Ter 
Meulen Scheme (named after the banker who designed it), aimed at stimulating 
lending around the world, failed, along with various plans of British, French, Dutch and 
Austrian officials, bankers and diplomats. None of the schemes proposed gained 
sufficient support from foreign powers and the international banking and financial 
community to succeed, and the crisis in Austria dragged on into 1922, which saw the 
Austrian government, for the fourth year in a row, request emergency assistance with 
basic food provision from the international community, as its budget deficit ran at 40%.  
 
Following Seipel’s August 1922 appeal to the Supreme Council of the ex-allies, during a 
month in which hyperinflation ran at 129%100, the League of Nations was appointed 
officially by Britain, France, Italy and Japan to organise a scheme for Austrian 
reconstruction. The League’s response to the Austrian crisis was shaped primarily by 
the view that the country’s fiscal crisis, which left it unable to afford to pay for basic 
requirements and struggling to obtain credit, was central to Austria’s problem. Thus, 
the resuscitation of Austrian finances was regarded as critical to Austrian survival and 
the scheme for Austria was one of specifically financial reconstruction. The EFO plan for 
                                                          
98 Greaves, The League Committees, 80. 
99 Memorandum by Sir Francis Oppenheimer relative to the situation in Austria, June 1919, printed for the War 
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Austria entailed the provision of loans for the country, raised via the international 
money markets and from the Austrian public, the repayments of which were overseen 
by the League, whose leading members acted as guarantors on the loans in order to 
increase confidence in the scheme. The security for the loans were various Austrian 
assets, such as the customs receipts and receipts from tobacco sales. In return for 
assistance in obtaining loans, the Austrian government was compelled to cease printing 
money, cede control of the mints to an independent bank (with the aim of returning 
their currency to a fixed-value gold standard) and eliminate their budget deficit - that is, 
they had to introduce monetary control and austerity.101 A League of Nations 
appointed Commissioner-General was dispatched to Vienna to enforce budgetary 
discipline and control the monies raised from the foreign loans.102 In effect, Austria 
temporarily lost sovereignty over its economy in return for foreign assistance with 
restoring the confidence of investors to lend to Austria and in the negotiation of large 
loans. By 1923, this plan for Austrian financial reconstruction had been successfully 
launched and the loans publicly floated.  
 
Why the League? The absence of alternatives  
Why was the League handed the mandate to design and enact the scheme for Austrian 
financial reconstruction, and why did this scheme came to fruition, when other plans 
had failed to get off the ground? At the time, after all, it was not clearly established 
that the League had a financial remit, as the League’s financial and economic 
committees were only provisional and the Covenant of the League made only one brief 
mention of economic issues in Article 23, point (e).103 Previous international efforts at 
financial reconstruction, such as foreign involvement in the economy of Greece 
between 1893 and 1898, were not undertaken in an institutional setting. Thus, a 
League-organised scheme to restore Austria was not the inevitable, nor necessarily the 
                                                          
101 The term ‘austerity’ was not used as short-hand for fiscal retrenchment and cuts in the 1920s in the way 
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most obvious path. Moreover, the victorious powers could not even be sure that the 
League was likely to be able to put its scheme into practice. As Austrian Finance 
Minister Victor Kienböck said, ‘there were no prototypes’ for the programme for 
Austria.104 And in the words of Maurice Fanshawe, an early commentator on the 
League’s economic and financial work, ‘at this time confidence in the League’s ability to 
solve a great international question like this was but slender’.105 
 
Part of the reason that the League of Nations ended up as a prime mover was that 
other plans to assist and stabilise Austria were blocked or exhausted. The Austrians 
attempted to generate their own solutions to their problems, but did not meet with 
success. The Government sometimes negotiated directly with bankers, for example, as 
in May 1922, when the finance minister spoke to J. P. Morgan and Co. regarding the 
possibility of a loan.106 However, the failure of some foreign governments to release 
their claims (usually referred to as liens) on Austrian assets, such as those that arose 
from potential reparations or loan payments, as well as continued Austrian financial 
and trading problems, rendered obtaining direct assistance from private banks difficult. 
An attempt by the Austrian government to offer some valuable tapestries, the 
Gobelins, as security to the House of Morgan was somewhat farcical. Morgans rejected 
the offer, stating that it might create a ‘pawnbroking impression’.107 As the Austrian 
Legation in London informed British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, by 1922, the 
scale of problems in the country was an impediment to assistance from bankers: 
Ambassador Franckenstein recounted that ‘foreign bankers, who a year ago were still 
willing to grant… a loan, today declare that it is impossible to do so’.108  
 
                                                          
104 Victor Kienböck, Das österreichische Sanierungswerk (Stuttgart, 1925), 7.  
105 Maurice Fanshawe, Reconstruction: Five Years of Work by the League of Nations (London, 1925), 136. 
106 Letter from Thomas Lamont of J.P. Morgan to Arthur Sweetser, 31st October, 1922, LNA S106, Sir Arthur 
Salter’s papers, No. 3. Austria. 
107 House of Morgan cited by Stephen A. Schuker, ‘Money doctors between the wars – the competition 
between central banks, private finance advisors, and multi-lateral agencies, 1919-39’, in Marc Flandreau (ed.), 
Money Doctors: History, Theory, Policy - The Experience of International Financial Advising, 1850-2000 
(London, 2003), 58. Morgans were prepared to support the French franc in March 1924, subject to certain 
conditions – see Chapter Six.  
108 The Austrian Legation in London to David Lloyd George, 7th August, 1922, TNA T160/584, Part 1. 
41 
 
In the view of Chancellor Seipel, another major obstacle blocking the possibility of 
Austria finding its own solutions to its problems of currency, shortages, budgets and 
trade, was that the two largest banks in Austria acted to prevent the country obtaining 
foreign credit, as they obstructed negotiations in order to ensure that any finance deal 
suited their interests. The Anglo-Austrian Bank and the Länderbank (Bank of the 
Austrian States) had been closely tied with British and French financial interests before 
the war, and after it they were converted into British and French corporations. The 
banks were aligned with the Bank of England and the Banque de France, and both 
worked to ensure that the national and financial interests of their countries were 
looked after.109  
 
In this, the banks’ policies reflected a major obstacle that plans for Austrian 
rehabilitation faced. Britain, France and Italy were all anxious to ensure that any plan 
did not damage their interests in Austria and their diplomatic and strategic position, 
and blocked attempts to provide a more comprehensive solution for Austria for this 
reason. The Loucheur Scheme of 1921, designed by French politician (and French Prime 
Minister Georges Clemenceau’s economic advisor at the Paris Peace Conference) Louis 
Loucheur, was one such plan. The scheme, which would have seen French banking and 
business interests take a dominant role in the Austrian economy, did not find support in 
either Austria or Britain, owing to fears that the plan would amount to little more than 
a French annexation of Austria. This reflected a feature of British foreign policy in the 
region at the time, as Anne Orde shows, namely, a desire to prevent French influence 
and alliances spreading.110  
 
An indication of British attitudes regarding the question of Austrian alliances can be 
seen in a note from Otto Niemeyer of the Treasury and Financial Committee of the 
League to the British Chancellor, Austen Chamberlain: ‘the question is not now really 
financial. It is political. Is Austria to be eaten up by Italy or united (under French 
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auspices) with Bavaria?’111 For Britain, neither of these possibilities were desirable. 
Even British officials at the League were concerned: Frank Nixon, director of the EFO’s 
secretariat prior to Salter, wrote in 1921 to Sir Basil Blackett at the Treasury that ‘we 
must prevent… an active French policy’.112 Nixon had a clear view of the strategic 
concerns of Britain and France with regards to Austria writing that, ‘in fact, both 
England and France are looking five or ten years ahead. England sees the danger of 
France creating discord by trying to encircle Germany, France sees the danger of 
England dissociating herself from Europe and setting up Germany as a counter-balance 
to France, thereby also perpetuating political trouble’.113 Here, we gain an insight into 
the ways in which France and Britain regarded Austria as a potential arena for the 
pursuit of their strategic goals in Europe, and how mutual suspicion over these could 
obstruct action over the situation in Austria.  
 
Italy too was keen to protect its own interests, particularly around its borders with 
Austria. This was a sensitive issue in the febrile post-war era in the country. Irredentist 
Italy, riven with political instability and division, stirred up by the nationalism of figures 
such as poet and militia leader Gabriele d’Annunzio, was resistant to the League’s initial 
attempts to help Austria. Like Britain, they did not wish to see Austria join the Little 
Entente (the French-backed alliance of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia) and 
were suspicious of Austrian moves to obtain money in Prague, Paris or London.114 
Another difficulty for Italy was that she was Austria’s largest creditor and as the primary 
force of occupation within Austria, had the first claim upon Austrian resources. Italy 
even pushed in 1921 for the right to extract extra funds from Austria to cover the costs 
of ‘liberation’, that is, occupation. Italy thus had significant doubts regarding the 
League’s scheme, as it entailed a suspension of all external claims on Austria, and yet 
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their agreement was vital for the project’s success.115 The great powers at times acted, 
then, as an obstacle to progress in Austria, and hindered the chances of Austria 
attaining a solution to its difficulties.    
 
It was not just concerns about their power and influence in the region that motivated 
other European powers to obstruct proposals for Austrian reconstruction. Another plan 
for Austrian rehabilitation did not gain traction because of economic factors. The 
proposal of Sir William Goode, a British representative on the Reparations Commission, 
involved a massive aid programme to Austria. Sir William – a ‘high-minded Irishman’ 
according to pro-government Viennese newspaper – was a very popular figure in 
Vienna, as he based himself in the city for the duration of his work on the Reparations 
Commission and was very sympathetic to Austria’s plight.116 Goode had also worked on 
food relief for Austria at the end of the First World War. The occasion of his departure 
from Austria in 1921 indicated the high degree of esteem in which he was held in 
official circles. Tributes were paid to him in Parliament and this ‘clean-shaved, elegant 
gentleman’ was given the privilege of observing proceedings from the Presidential Box, 
reported the Neue Freie Presse.117 Goode’s programme was viewed positively in 
Austria, but Allied powers would not countenance the comprehensive economic 
support and assistance that the plan entailed, partly because of the expenditure it 
necessitated, particularly in the context of war debt, and partly because such an idea 
was considered to be a breach of notions of sound, orthodox, responsible finance. As a 
Treasury official wrote to Sir Basil Blackett incredulously ‘it seems that Sir William 
Goode is in fact asking us to commit ourselves to finance Austria indefinitely’.118  
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A further plan which might have been of assistance, the Ter Meulen scheme, which was 
intended to stimulate international trade, also foundered.119 The Ter Meulen plan 
envisaged that a League-appointed commission of bankers and businessmen would act 
as a conduit to direct foreign finance towards stricken nations, with the assets of 
countries who applied to the scheme to act as security. The involvement of the League 
would, it was hoped, help to produce the confidence to get borrowing going.120 The 
scheme did not, however, really address the un-creditworthy status of potential 
applicants, nor provide borrowing on particularly favourable terms. No country ever 
made an application to the Ter Meulen Commission. According to Myers, states who 
might have applied to the scheme were deterred by the sense that their application 
would have defined them as ‘impoverished’.121 The Ter Meulen plan had, however, 
importantly established the idea in the minds of governments and banks of the 
possibility of League involvement in matters of international finance.  
 
Raising finance for Austria was the primary focus of the schemes outlined above, but 
many at the time and some historians since, such as Zara Steiner, have felt that most of 
Austria’s problems were not so much caused by currency issues or the size of the 
government budgets, but were more a result of trade problems. Oppenheimer and 
Beveridge had been clear of the importance of trade to the Austria as early as 1919.122 
Chancellor Seipel highlighted the issue in a speech to the League of Nations in 
September 1922.123 Attempts to improve matters in these areas also failed, however. 
Trade obstructions erected in the aftermath of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire were very slow to be reduced, and international conferences and agreements 
on free trade, such as that in Brussels in 1920 and Porto Rosa, Italy, in 1921, did not 
succeed in improving the situation for Austria.124 Austria attempted to take the 
initiative itself in negotiations with Czechoslovakia and Germany on bilateral trade 
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agreements in 1922, but were thwarted when France and Italy withheld vital credits to 
the country until the Austrians agreed that they would undertake no moves of this 
nature without their consent. The Treaty of St. Germain contained within it a 
stipulation that Austria could not change its status without the unanimous agreement 
of the members of council of the League of Nations, and it was under these terms that 
France and Italy justified their interference. Their fears, respectively, were of a trade 
agreement as a prelude to a wider political association with Germany, and of an 
extension of the Little Entente.125 
 
So, the post-war diplomatic, economic and ideological context in Europe made arriving 
at a comprehensive solution for Austria difficult, and the question arises as to how the 
League scheme was successfully launched in this context. In investigating this, some 
recent historiography has situated events within a narrative of transnationalism and 
idealistic internationalism. In these accounts, the operation of transnational networks 
of bureaucrats and financial experts are regarded as central to the adoption and 
enactment of Austrian financial reconstruction. Transnationalism relates to movements 
and interactions across borders, and when examining the work of international 
institutions, implies networks of people working in transcendence of narrow interests 
in the common international good. For Yann Decorzant, for example, fundamental to 
the successful adoption of the League’s scheme was ‘the emergence of a transnational 
community of experts whose economic and financial perceptions transcended national 
interests’.126 Beyersdorf gives a similar account and Marcus writes that League experts 
had a ‘common commitment to subjugate narrow national interests in favour of 
Austrians and a better future (which) produced an unprecedented spirit of international 
cooperation, which helped Austrians terminate hyperinflation and begin reconstructing 
their economy’.127  
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This kind of idea of an idealistic animating spirit in the League’s work can be found in 
the memoirs of Sir Arthur Salter, head of the Secretariat of the EFO at the time of 
Austrian reconstruction. Salter wrote that there were hopes in the early 1920s at the 
League’s headquarters in Geneva that the League could build ‘on the shattered 
foundations of the older world a new and better one, with not only stable peace but 
increasingly assured prosperity’.128 The League’s work in Austria seemed to be part of 
this new world of international cooperation within which (rather heroic) transnational 
and internationalist experts and officials played a decisive role. Despite the desperate 
condition of Austria, there were, according to Salter, at the League’s headquarters ‘a 
few men there who thought that there was just a chance of success’ for a programme 
of Austrian reconstruction.129 Sir Arthur recounted a picnic on Lake Geneva that he took 
in 1922 with Jean Monnet, at this point the Under Secretary General at the League, 
later a leading light in the establishment of what has become the EU, and Basil Blackett 
of the British Treasury and League’s Financial Committee, during which the three made 
the decisive resolution that the League should act to assist Austria. In this account, the 
role of the League and the dynamism and idealism of its officials were the critical 
factors in the League obtaining and successfully launching the scheme. 
 
Whilst not discounting the impact of the work of transnational officials and financial 
experts, some of the recent transnational history, as well the accounts of League 
officials and supporters at the time, may reflect the ‘wishful thinking’ that Mark 
Mazower has recently argued has characterised some of the histories of 
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internationalism.130 Ultimately, as well shall see next, the League of Nations was 
awarded the scheme for Austrian financial reconstruction less because of the energetic 
work of its idealistic employees, and more because the victorious powers did not want 
to allow the peace settlement or Austria to fail.  
 
Why the League? The role and motivations of European powers 
The actions of, in particular, British and French governments and officials were critical 
in ensuring that the League’s scheme for Austrian financial reconstruction came to 
fruition. Mazower suggests that an overlooked question in the history of international 
organisations is why powerful countries such as Britain and France ‘should have 
invested time and political capital in building international institutions at all’.131 This 
question can be applied to the situation with respect to Austrian financial 
reconstruction. It was their decision (along with Italy and Japan) to have the League 
manage the programme, and British and French officials and politicians worked to 
ensure the successful launch of the scheme. Both countries engaged in great efforts to 
urge for the lifting of the liens that various countries had on Austrian finances, lobbying 
vigorously for this and, in Britain’s case, repeatedly bringing the issue up with the 
Americans, as Balfour did on a trip to Washington in 1921.132 America finally lifted its 
claims on Austria for a period of twenty years in 1922, something that was vital for the 
possibility of obtaining financing for Austria. Balfour also worked to persuade the Italian 
government to accept the scheme, meeting privately with the Foreign Minister Carlo 
Schanzer to convince him of the case.133 Furthermore, British and French governmental 
guarantees to underwrite the loans to Austria were crucial for the successful floatation 
of the loans, as only with this sort of guarantee would private banks undertake to 
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organise public subscription for the loans, and the investor confidence exist to ensure 
that people were interested in subscribing.134  
 
The two countries did not get involved in the Austrian scheme because they had 
suddenly become converts to a Wilsonian version of international cooperation, 
however, but because they wished to see Austria survive, as they regarded this to be in 
their interests. The French and British governments, foreign ministries and treasuries 
were motivated to assist because they saw Austria’s continued survival as important in 
maintaining the new borders determined upon in the peace settlement, something that 
they regarded as critical. Neither France nor Britain (nor Italy) had been particularly 
helpful in achieving other solutions to Austrian problems, and indeed they had blocked 
other potential programmes or policies. However, whilst these European powers were 
careful to ensure that any settlement of the Austrian issue did not infringe upon what 
they perceived to be their interests (as, say, Anschluss might have), they also did not 
actually wish the state to fail, because they saw this as equally counter to their interests 
and as potentially destabilising for Europe. 
 
It was widely felt at the time within Austria and by others elsewhere (as will be seen 
below), that an Austrian collapse would entail widespread disruption and chaos across 
Eastern Central Europe, and this was one reason that the French and British supported 
attempts to ensure the survival of Austria. It is unsurprising that Austrian officials and 
politicians, seeking international assistance to alleviate the plight of their country, 
should have emphasised the scale of the problems that their country faced.  Chancellor 
Seipel, for example, stated that the conditions in Austria ‘constituted a grave danger to 
the peace of the world’, and the Austrian Minister in Paris suggested that the 
‘dangerous situation which threatens Austria’ presented a threat to ‘the peace and 
equilibrium of Europe’.135 This was a viewpoint that the Austrian government advanced 
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frequently. In a memorandum to an inter-allied meeting in 1922, they expounded their 
case in dramatic terms, positing Austrian ‘civilisation’ as a vital force in the world, 
Austria is today which she has been for centuries, the bulwark of Western 
Civilisation, an element of peace and order in Middle Europe, inhabited by a 
peaceable, industrious and skilled population. The Austrian Government is 
responsible for the maintenance in Austria and above all in Vienna, of an ancient 
seat of civilisation, irreplaceable for Europe and the whole world.136 
Writing in similar terms in a public appeal for western assistance to Austria in 1920, 
Austria businessman Julius Meinl stated that ‘Austria has for nearly a thousand years 
been the last bulwark of Western civilisation against the dangers of the East’.137  
 
This depiction of Austria as a final frontier against the wild and barbaric east was not, 
however, just an Austrian perspective. One motivation for the British in wishing to 
avoid Austrian collapse may have been a belief that the country was a bastion of 
civilisation. There are references in British documents to the civilised qualities of 
Austria, reflected in Lindley’s comment that it was ‘the most orderly and civilised 
society in central Europe’.138 Francis Oppenheimer also had a positive view of the 
qualities of Austrian society and the characteristics of the Austrian people, writing that 
they were an ‘altogether lovable race’ and a ‘sober, hard-working, enterprising 
people…. As a people their character is entirely foreign to what is known now as the 
true ‘German’ character. They are a people not unlike the French in some details, gay, 
cultured, and chivalrous’.139 In these sources we may perhaps see some support for 
Robert Boyce’s view that a factor influencing British foreign policy between the wars 
was stereotyped assumptions about the national or racial characteristics of various 
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states.140 And it was not just in Britain that such beliefs shaped diplomacy: as Liaquat 
Ahamed points out, at this time ‘racial and national stereotypes were taken for 
granted’.141 These are reflected in the dismaying observation of Frank Nixon, in a letter 
to John Maynard Keynes, (whom he was hoping to persuade to produce an article for 
the Manchester Guardian on the subject of the advantages of the League involvement 
in Austria) that Austria should be assisted by the international community as she was 
not a ‘Nigger country’.142 This kind of racism also perhaps underlay Nixon’s statement 
elsewhere that ‘the Turkification of Vienna is unthinkable’. Turkey, facing financial and 
budgetary problems, had found its budget subject to direct control by foreign 
bankers.143 This fate was apparently an unacceptable one for Austria. 
 
Regardless of whether notions of racial hierarchy and ‘civilisation’ directly motivated 
British (or others’) assistance, there certainly seems to have been no doubt in the 
minds of many politicians, officials and journalists that the failure of Austria as a state 
posed a grave risk to European stability: this was not just an Austrian opinion. Sir Arthur 
Salter said in 1923 that in August 1922 Austria had been ‘on the very verge of falling 
into the chaos of starvation, riot and revolution, - with the very great danger to the 
peace of Europe’.144 The situation in Austria was perceived as having significance for 
the recovery of the continent as a whole, and British and French politicians, diplomats 
and officials were also interested for this reason. French Prime Minister and foreign 
secretary Raymond Poincaré worried that the situation presented ‘a danger for the 
Austrian regime and also for the tranquillity of central Europe’,145 and in a message to 
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the American government, the British government stated that the result of the failure 
of Austria for the region ‘would be inconceivably disastrous both politically and 
economically’.146 
 
Britain and France regarded Austrian stability as important for European post-war 
recovery in general. For Sir Basil Blackett of the British Treasury and Financial 
Committee of the League, for example, ‘the Austrian problem could not be considered 
by itself, and as detached from the problem of European reconstruction’.147 Eric 
Drummond cited concern with the general position of Europe as an important factor 
motivating the British and the French at the time that the League was first awarded the 
project for Austrian reconstruction, and then when the Geneva Protocols were signed. 
He wrote that, ‘the preoccupations of the Guaranteeing Powers with the whole 
European situation (the chain in which Germany is very much the weakest link) caused 
them to come to the help of Austria… the League’s scheme for Austria offered the chief 
Powers an opportunity of general collaboration support of the European system as a 
whole’.148 
 
The British and French were primarily keen to ensure that Austria did not completely 
collapse because they wanted to guarantee that the post-war settlement they had 
designed for Europe succeeded, and thus the new borders and new states that had 
been determined upon in Eastern Central Europe must not fail.149 Events in Austria 
were seen as hugely important at the time and critical for the establishment of the 
post-war order: as Lindley commented to British foreign secretary Lord Curzon, ‘the 
disappearance of Austria as a body politic would signify the definite failure of the Peace 
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Settlement’.150 Blackett asked whether ‘we afford to stand aside… and risk Austria’s 
falling into complete anarchy and possibly dragging down some of the succession states 
with her?’151 So for Britain and France, supporting a scheme to attempt to resuscitate 
Austria was a way of upholding European order, the new borders endorsed by the 
peace treaties and the wider post-war settlement: a European order which they 
perceived to be in their interests to maintain.  
 
The sources show that in Britain, it was generally civil servants and officials and, as we 
shall see, the Bank of England and city interests, that urged League action on the 
Austrian question. Prime Minister David Lloyd George was somewhat more sceptical, 
although at the time of Seipel’s speech to the General Assembly of the League on 6 
September 1922, he threw his weight behind a League programme.152 French 
politicians were always more motivated to act. The French regarded the continued 
existence of independent Austria as particularly critical as they wished to prevent the 
formation of a stronger Germany and thus to ensure that Anschluss, union between 
Austria and Germany, did not occur. Paul Cambon had in 1919 identified the existence 
of an independent Austrian state as crucial to the French strategy of containment of 
German power and ambitions, whilst Poincaré, writing in connection with the scheme 
for Austrian reconstruction, wrote of the ‘legitimacy of the rights of France with respect 
to Germany’.153 A problem for France, however, was that the most commonly proposed 
solution in Austria to the issue of supposed unviability was forming some sort of union 
with Germany. Support for this idea came from across the political spectrum in Austria 
and not just from the Pan-Germans,154 whose aim Anschluss clearly was.155  
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In the early 1920s, one of the major political parties in Austria, the Social Democratic 
Workers’ Party (SDAP), who mainly represented the urban working class, held the view 
that Anschluss was the best solution for Austria. This opinion was shared in some 
sections of the other main party, the conservative Christian Social Party, a Catholic 
party representing predominantly, although by no means exclusively, the rural areas. 
The Christian Social Party’s national leadership were more sceptical as they had 
concerns about the possibility of Protestant or socialist domination of Austria, if the 
country were to join Germany.156 As early as 1919, the Austrian Parliament, then 
Socialist-dominated, had voted in favour of Anschluss (this at a time when Germany 
had a Social Democrat-led government and President, Friedrich Ebert). The Austria 
Parliament, within which Pan-Germans were only a small minority, objected to the 
treaty of St Germain on the basis that it deprived Austria of its ‘heartfelt desire, which 
also represents a vital economic, cultural, and political necessity: the union of German 
Austria with the mother country’.157 There was support for merging with Germany at 
the highest levels of the SDAP: the response to the 1922 hyperinflation crisis of 
Austrian Socialist leader Otto Bauer was to propose a currency union between 
Germany and Austria, as a prelude to later Anschluss.  Meanwhile, the Austro-German 
Popular League had a mass membership, and in the Christian Socialist dominated 
federal regions of Austria, various plebiscites proposing Anschluss were held at this 
time: one in Salzburg in 1921 saw a result of 99.3% in favour.158 
 
The issue for Austria was not only the apparent unviability that its post-war problems 
seemed to indicate, but also that the country lacked a sense of national identity. In 
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Stefan Zweig’s novella Chess, the protagonist, under arrest and enduring persecution by 
Nazis in Vienna, yearns for old Austria. He has a clear sense of an Austrian-ness that is 
distinct from German identity. But this identity, which may have reflected Zweig’s own 
feelings, was formed later, after Nazi takeover and the discrediting of German 
nationalism as a reactionary and repressive force.159 Certainly, as Peter Thaler argues, 
Austrian’s national identity in the post-First World War period was primarily a German 
one: if the empire was gone, then most Austrians wished to unify with Germany and 
felt themselves to be Germans.160 The hyperinflation crisis increased these sentiments 
as it exacerbated the sense of unviable Austria (in spite of the similar – perhaps greater 
– difficulties Germany was having at this time).161 So the call for Anschluss in Austria 
was strong in the early 1920s, and this was very worrying for France. Anschluss was 
considered by the French to be completely inimical to their interests, and the 
dissolution of Austria might lead to this, a contingency viewed by France with the 
‘utmost misgivings’.162 When the plebiscite on possible Anschluss was called in Salzburg 
in 1921, the French had signalled their complete hostility and willingness to take drastic 
action to prevent this eventuality by threatening to cut off aid supplies should the vote 
go ahead.163 For the French it was vital that events in Austria did not serve to 
strengthen either Germany or Italy.164  
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Peter Jackson argues that French foreign policy had more ‘internationalist’ currents in 
the post-First World War era than is commonly recognised. He also finds, however, that 
what he refers to as the ‘traditional’ approach – that is, a balance of power approach – 
prevailed in certain areas, and in particular, in policy towards Eastern Central Europe 
and with respect to Anschluss.165 The Poincaré government, in power from January 
1922, was more determined in this approach than the Briand government that 
preceded it. Securing the independence of Austria via the League of Nations 
programme thus became a crucial part of this strategy for France, and in the view of 
the French Chargé d’Affaires in Vienna the Geneva protocols were a triumph: ‘La 
politique Français has indeed succeeded even in its nuances’ he announced 
triumphantly to Poincaré in October 1922. A ‘solid base [had been] established to 
ensure the independent existence of Austria’.166 Through the Geneva agreements the 
French had achieved what they thought was an extra guarantee against Austro-German 
union in the form the Anschlussverbot (Anschluss ban) clause, and they supported the 
Geneva protocols in general as measures that would help to ensure the durability of 
the independence of Austria, and that would thus protect the post-war borders of 
successor states and reduce the likelihood of connections deepening between Germany 
and Austria. The French feared that their security would be vulnerable and their 
economic interests damaged by an enhancement to the territory or status of Germany, 
and did not wish to see anything hinder the development of their Little Entente system 
of alliances. In fact, French government and diplomats even thought that Austria might 
join the Little Entente, which the French Plenipotentiary to Vienna, Pierre Lefèvre-
Pontalis, thought ‘in more than one way, meets French interests in the Danube 
region’.167  
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And it was not only a French view that German expansion was unconscionable. Sir 
William Goode, speaking in 1921, felt it ‘unthinkable that the Allies could permit 
Germany to extend her Empire to the borders of the Adriatic, with frontiers in the rear 
of Czechoslovakia and on the flanks of Hungary, Yugoslavia and Italy. If that happened, 
an astonished world might well ask who won the war’.168 Austria must not be permitted 
to form alliances that would strengthen the position of Germany, and the Austrian 
reconstruction project became a means by which the Allied powers could attempt to 
achieve this.   
 
In addition to the security concerns that motivated British and French support for the 
Austrian scheme, the League programme was also the commencement of an aspect of 
what Jackson identifies as the more ‘internationalist’ current in French security 
thinking: that is, their desire to ultimately enmesh Germany in a financial system of 
loans that would help restore the European economy and tie European states with 
America. Jackson does not focus on the issue of the Austrian guarantees and the 
Geneva programme, but they were clear precursors to a wider programme to stimulate 
capital flows in Europe, as will be explored in the Chapter Six.169 
 
In addition to British and French support, Czechoslovakian support was also important 
in the provision of the guarantees that underwrote the loans to Austria that were a 
central part of the League of Nation’s scheme.170 The Czechoslovak government had a 
motivation to restore Austria in order to benefit their own trade, trade with Austria 
being an important component of the Czech economy, but were also motivated by 
similar concerns to those expressed by British and French officials and statesmen about 
the strategic alignment of Austria. An insight into this can be gained in the statement in 
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1925 to the Prague Press of Czechoslovak by foreign secretary and statesman, member 
of the League Council, former Czech Prime Minister and leader of the independence 
movement and later President, Edvard Beneš,171 that ‘in the Austria question two 
solutions must be categorically excluded, i.e. union with Germany and the Danube 
Confederation,172 which nobody desires. Austria must, therefore, receive economic aid 
to keep her independence.’173 For Beneš and the Czech government too, the territorial 
integrity of independent Austria was of critical importance.  
 
Britain and France were also keen to prevent the Bolsheviks, or other radical left-wing 
parties, gaining in strength in Central Europe. As early as 1919, when the potential for a 
revolutionary left-wing takeover in Austria was probably at its highest, Francis 
Oppenheimer felt that there was a connection between Allied support and the 
prevention of the rise of revolutionary left-wing ideas in Austria. He reported to David 
Lloyd George that in Austria ‘as long as there is hope that the Allies will save the 
country from utter ruin, Bolshevism has little chance of success.’174 The desire to 
ensure that Bolshevik ideas did not gain traction in Austria, and fears about the threat 
that these posed there persisted into the 1920s. Despite the real danger of Bolshevik 
takeover in Austria having passed and the tiny size of the Communist Party in Austria, 
the Reparation Commission worried in 1921 about the activities of Bolshevik agents in 
Vienna.175 British and French documents also reveal anxiety about Bolshevik support 
within Austria, and that the left-wing leanings of the army were a particular worry. 
Prime Minister Poincaré expressed his concern on this score in 1922, the year that the 
League scheme was determined upon, writing that the army’s ‘morale constitutes a 
danger for the Austrian regime and also for the tranquillity of central Europe. In 
particular, the Soldiers’ Soviets make the Wehrmacht, normally charged with 
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maintaining order, a mere instrument in the hands of the Social Democrats and the 
Communists’.176 Here we see the conflation between social democracy and 
communism so commonly made by inter-war conservative politicians, as in reality by 
this stage, the SDAP had long ago defeated the Bolshevik elements in the army.  
 
Despite this, however, the British were concerned too. In March 1922, British foreign 
secretary Curzon wrote to the then British Ambassador in Vienna, A. Akers Douglas, 
that the British and French governments were worried about Bolshevism within the 
Austrian army. According to British civil servant Herbert Butterworth, the Supreme 
Council decision to refer the Austrian situation to the Financial Committee of the 
League of Nations was partly motivated by the fact that ‘there were some 
apprehensions as to what might happen if a communist coup resulted from the 
fulfilment of the present Government’s threat to abdicate’.177 In the view of Sir William 
Goode, it was to prevent the eventuality of a revolutionary coup that France hoped for 
Austrian rehabilitation in order that Austria present ‘some stabilised point in Central 
and Southern Europe’.178 Supporting Austrian rehabilitation was, then, a way to support 
a further part of Britain and France’s plan for the post-war settlement and the 
maintenance of their power: the prevention of the spread of Bolshevism. 
 
So key allied states in post-war Europe wished to see Austria survive, albeit in a form 
that suited their interests, and the League eventually became the only way to pursue 
this goal, as other possibilities were either at this time impossible, or politically 
unpalatable. Britain, for example, would not countenance comprehensive economic 
support and assistance to Austria, partly because of the cost and the breach of the 
principles of sound finance that the Goode plan entailed. An additional obstacle to an 
alternative solution was that successor states were often obstructive in attempts to 
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improve trading relations with Austria whilst, as we have seen, Anschluss was politically 
unsupportable particularly for the French. Furthermore, the on-going crisis in Austria 
and the absence of any possible securities made obtaining further funds commercially 
all but impossible. As Benjamin Strong, the head of the Federal Reserve in the USA 
wrote to Sir Montagu Norman, his British counterpart at the Bank of England, 
‘conditions in Austria are generally described… as so desperate that … [a loan] would 
hardly attract our banks even at a high [interest] rate’.179 Ultimately, then, the decision 
to use the League of Nations, and then to back the League in making the scheme a 
success, partly came down to the lack of other options, combined with the desire on 
the part of particularly France and Britain to keep trying to see if the country could be 
saved. In the event, the Geneva protocols obligated Britain, France, Italy and 
Czechoslovakia to uphold the ‘the political viability, the territorial integrity and the 
Sovereignty of Austria’.180 Here, we find support for Mazower’s argument that a reason 
for great power involvement in international institutions after the First World War was 
that the League was seen as a means of supporting the peace settlement and new 
borders for Europe that they had designed.181 In this sense the League’s scheme could 
be seen as representing the new order for Europe that they had created following the 
First World War. But in the sense that Britain and France, the status quo powers before 
the war, were seeking to use the new order and the League to enhance their powers, 
the scheme for Austria also partly represented an attempt to create continuity with the 
pre-war era. Britain and France backed League action not because they had suddenly 
become governments of idealists, but because they saw it as potentially beneficial in 
strengthening their European position, and enhancing their status, and in France’s case, 
protecting their security. A novel element, however, was that these ‘great power’ 
ambitions were advanced partially through drawing Austria in to a complex sets of 
international financial arrangements which were, in an unprecedented move, 
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underwritten by the governments of certain states. This system, it was hoped, would 
strengthen the position of European finances and economies in general. 
 
Why the League? The role and motivations of bankers and financiers 
It was not just the involvement of some of the great powers of Europe that was 
essential for the successful launch of the League of Nations’ scheme for Austrian 
financial reconstruction. The participation and cooperation of banks was also crucial, as 
the scheme entailed the raising, through private channels, of short- and long-term 
credits for Austria. The Austrian government had found it increasingly difficult to obtain 
any such funds: a direct appeal by Dr Rosenberg of the Austrian Finance Ministry to 
Morgans failed to produce a positive response.182 A consortium of British and American 
private banks were interested in the possibility of lending money to the country, but 
were wary of the instability of conditions there and so sent British banker and diplomat 
G.M. Young on a mission to Vienna to investigate the economic and financial position of 
Austria.183 Young’s report was not encouraging and the group regretted that they could 
not assist, writing to the Ambassador Franckenstein ‘we and our associates 
unanimously came to the conclusion that the present financial conditions in Austria are 
so unstable that it is impossible for us to find a basis upon which a loan could be 
offered to the public’.184 For Young, the key problem was the question of Austrian 
viability and stability. His conclusion was that ‘Austria is a good investment area but a 
doubtful political entity’, and thus, too risky to invest in or lend to.185 Ultimately, 
however, a number of leading private banks did get involved in the League scheme to 
float short-term and long-term loans to Austria. It was the support of international 
bankers that was critical to the successful launch of the two foreign loans.186 To 
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reframe Mazower’s question about the interests of great powers in international 
institutions, it could also be asked why financial elites would participate in the work of 
these organisations, particularly when the risks were such that, as has been seen, 
bankers were reluctant to be involved in advancing further funds.  
 
That banks did get involved can be accounted for in a number of ways. One factor was 
the promotion (despite some misgivings about League control and the guarantees 
offered by various countries) of the plan by the Governor of the Bank of England, Sir 
Montagu Norman, and the support he received in this from Benjamin Strong, Governor 
of the Federal Reserve in America.  
 
Norman had very close links with the Financial Committee of the League of Nations and 
with leading members of various banks, such as Morgan Grenfell. In the case of the 
work of the Bank of England on the scheme, examination of the Bank’s archives reveals 
the centrality of the Governor to the direction of the Bank’s policy on this and many 
other matters. Norman was not only well-connected, with enormous powers (greater 
than those of his US equivalent), he was also personally very vigorous in pursuit of his 
aims.187 Norman personally, and the Bank of England under his direction more 
generally, worked diligently to ensure the scheme was a success, and also arranged for 
the Bank of England to float the long-term loan to Austria in London along with Morgan 
Grenfell. An example of the Bank of England’s work on the Austrian project can be 
found in a meeting convened in January 1923 by the Deputy Governor to investigate 
the League of Nations’ plan for obtaining foreign financial aid for Austria. In attendance 
were senior representatives of Barings, Rothschilds, Schroders and Morgan Grenfell 
banks, along with Otto Niemeyer of the British Treasury, Sir Henry Strakosch of 
Financial Committee of the League of Nations, and a Director of the Anglo-Austrian 
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Bank.188 Sir Montagu Norman himself was in frequent communication with members of 
the Treasury, the League’s Financial Committee and its Secretariat, banking 
representatives and Austrian representatives, such as Ambassador Franckenstein, and 
Benjamin Strong at the Federal Reserve, as well as, the head of the Banque de France 
and other bankers about the scheme for Austria.189 Norman also helped with the 
project by organising the Treasury to offer discounted Austrian treasury bills in March 
1923.190  
 
Norman’s interest in the scheme was motivated by various factors. He regarded Austria 
as important to the prosperity of the entire region of Eastern Central Europe and wrote 
to ter Meulen on this subject, expressing a hope that Austria would ‘remain the 
financial centre of Eastern Europe and the head for all economic purposes of the 
neighbouring countries’.191 Norman is, however, sometimes accused by historians, and 
by many at the time (particularly the French) of not being motivated by concern for the 
well-being of countries that the League assisted, but of using the Financial Committee 
and its reconstruction policies in central Europe as a means of furthering an agenda of 
what was labelled the ‘Norman Conquest’ –, that is, the creation, through financial and 
economic control, of British client states in central Europe.192 Norman was able to 
exercise influence through his contacts with banks and through his contacts on the 
Financial Committee, such as Otto Niemeyer and Emil Glückstadt of the Danish 
Landsmansbank. Indeed, for Stephen Schuker, during the Austrian and Hungarian 
projects of rehabilitation, the Bank of England ‘found it expedient to operate under 
League cover’.193 Norman’s strategy, in this reading, could be regarded as part of a plan 
to attempt to shore up Britain’s position as the dominant financial power in the world 
following the First World War. The decline in Britain’s position during the war, when 
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the economy contracted by 5%, compared to the rise of the US, which finished the war 
with an economy that was more than 50% larger than that of Britain, France and 
Germany combined, concerned Norman greatly. He sought to use international 
financial policy in the 1920s to retain Sterling’s position as the global currency of 
exchange.194 According to Ahamed, Norman ‘embodied a Britain stuck in the past and 
not yet reconciled to its newly diminished standing in the world’, for the reality was 
that it was New York, not London, where the real money now was.195 Norman was, 
however, still able to promote British financial interests because the Americans were 
not yet in the early 1920s fully exploiting the power that their financial strength gave 
them.196 The failure of the US to project their potential power enabled the Governor of 
the Bank of England to continue to exercise great influence as he sought to restore 
Britain’s in some ways diminished position, and he regarded Austrian restoration as a 
project that could help further this goal.  
 
In seeking Austrian rehabilitation, Norman’s aims related not just to an attempt to 
further British geo-strategic and financial interests, but also to his ideas for peace and 
prosperity. Norman saw in the Financial Committee of the League and the scheme for 
Austria an opportunity to further these aims. As György Péteri outlines, Norman was 
motivated to act partly by a fear of the possibility of revolution in Central Europe.197 In 
addition to this, Norman had a vision in the 1920s for a world restored to the values of 
sound finance, fixed values of exchange, low inflation and free trade, with London at its 
heart. His mechanism for achieving this central bankers’ utopia was the creation of 
independent and strong central banks, who, controlling money supply and setting 
interest rates around the world, would act in coordination with one another, and 
separately from (corrupting) ‘political’ influence.198 Norman hoped to advance these 
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aims by creating a network of cooperation between central banks and specifically 
between central bankers themselves, and he used the League’s financial committee in 
order to further his agenda, according to Miklόs Lojkό.199  
 
Even if part of Norman’s motivation for involvement in Austria was to do with 
attempting to secure Britain’s position in the face of rising US economic and financial 
strength, he nevertheless worked closely with Benjamin Strong, who was a powerful US 
ally for Norman. Indeed, Strong too believed in the positive potential of central bank 
cooperation, and the two corresponded frequently on the subject of Austria, and 
discussed how to progress a programme to assist the country.200 The support of the US 
was critical to the League’s Austrian programme, as the country needed to not only 
suspend its liens on Austrian assets, but also float the loans in the New York financial 
markets, and Strong worked closely with the New York banking community to ensure 
success for the placing of these in the US. Without the support of this community, the 
Austrian scheme would not have been viable.  
 
Many New York-based bankers and banks, including J. P. Morgan, supported efforts to 
use American financial might to help rehabilitate Europe, and Strong was no exception. 
There was an ‘internationalist’ view amongst some circles in the US, even if there was 
also a strongly isolationist strain of thought in other quarters.201 According to Melvyn 
Leffler, ‘American officials hoped that through central bank cooperation, Strong would 
be able to use the nation’s enormous gold reserves to rehabilitate foreign currencies 
and revive world commerce.’202 As in the case of Norman, Strong held the 
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reestablishment of the gold standard in Europe, and the restoration of orthodox 
economic policies, to be critical to the future health of European economies, and the 
Austrian scheme advanced these goals. Like Norman, Strong regarded his 
internationalism as being in his own country’s best interests, but he also was 
motivated, as, according to Priscilla Roberts, were many in his milieu, by an Anglophile 
sensibility, which left him keen to support Norman’s attempts at European 
rehabilitation.203 With many of the bankers of New York, such as crucially J.P. Morgan 
and Benjamin Strong, Norman found common cause to advance the Austrian scheme 
and moves to restore Europe to gold.  
 
In the Austrian case, Norman sought to work with not only Benjamin Strong and 
bankers in Austria and the US, but also the governor of the Bank of France, M. M. 
Robineau. Robineau and Norman frequently corresponded over the Austrian loans, and 
Norman wrote to Robineau regarding the Austrian case, thanking him for his assistance 
with respect to the Austrian loans and expressing his vision:   
the cooperation of the Central Banks of participating countries has contributed 
largely to the issue in London and has created an atmosphere throughout Europe 
which is distinctly favourable to the prospects of the contemplated long-term 
loan. I am very hopeful that the success of this co-operation with regard to the 
Austrian loan may prove a happy augury for the establishment of close and 
exclusive relations not only between our respective Banks, but also between 
Central Banks as a whole, which I am convinced are essential in the interests of 
the world’s prosperity and trade.204 
Norman’s view was that, by means of cooperation, central banks could prevent 
currency shocks, and act within their own countries to resist clamours for excessive 
credit or money supply. Norman sought a world tied to Sterling, which would return, 
sooner rather than later, to gold. Gold for Norman was the guarantor of stability and 
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harmony, and the Austrian scheme, which entailed the establishment of a Bank of Issue 
that would control the money supply, was a step towards a return to gold, and an 
erosion of undesirable political influence over financial matters.205 Norman had his own 
idealistic and internationalist vision in the post-war world, but it was an 
internationalism that was designed to protect British interests, and banking interests 
more generally.  
 
A further motivation for Norman was that failure to restore Austria could have proved 
detrimental to London-based financial economic interests. As Harry P. Davison of J.P. 
Morgan observed, ‘the London banks almost all have long-standing and valuable 
connections in Vienna and in Austria generally which it is wise for them to conserve and 
protect.’206 Julius Meinl observed that London bankers had an interest in the 
restoration of Austria ‘as they still have great sums owing’.207 And it was not just banks 
but also British businesses that had a stake in the fortunes of Austria, and the Bank of 
England itself had an interest in the Anglo-Austrian Bank, which was based in Vienna. 
The Bank of England had accepted liability for this bank’s commitments, and according 
to Kathleen Burk, the Anglo-Austrian ‘helped to restore Britain’s financial position on 
the continent, at the same time stimulating British interest in Austrian 
reconstruction’.208 On this score, banker G.M. Young wrote to Spencer Smith of the 
Bank of England in June 1922 that any loan guarantee and rehabilitation scheme for 
Austria would have the advantage of giving ‘us the opportunity we have always wanted 
of putting Austria under some great obligation to the Anglo Bank and incidentally 
would give us a large, if not predominant, share in the control of the future state 
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bank’.209 A wider community of business interests in the City of London was concerned 
to see Austrian financial rehabilitation, as a document in the Bank of England archive 
that was produced around the same time as Young’s letter reveals. In this, the ‘London 
Clearing Banks; the Accepting Houses and the Stock Exchange’ expressed their dismay 
at the continued failure to reach a settlement with respect to Austrian debt which ‘is 
seriously impeding the resumption of both mercantile and banking business with 
Austria’.210 The interests of these groups and the pressure which they applied may have 
also motivated Sir Montagu Norman. Overall, Norman was interested in promoting 
British power and interests, and in promoting his vision of a financial world order (aims 
that were not in any way mutually exclusive for Norman) and regarded the Austrian 
scheme as a means of achieving these goals.  
 
There is, however, also the question of why, other than by means of Norman’s 
lobbying, certain banks came to support the scheme and undertook to float it. 
According to Anthony de Rothschild, writing in 1922, there was on the part of bankers 
‘goodwill… if in any way it should be found to be possible’ to restore Austria – they 
were keen to see the old banking centre of Vienna resurrected.211 Partly, bankers must 
also have decided that they could make some money. As Flandreau writes, foreign 
money flows in even to desperate countries because loans and investment could be 
profitable.212 Once appropriate controls and guarantee were in place to reduce the 
risks of involvement to the banks and to ensure that the domestic policies that they 
considered appropriate were in place, the banks were prepared to get involved. There 
was also another motivation, as the banks also seem to have believed that Austria was 
of wider significance than just to itself, and to have become involved in order to assist 
with the restoration of the global financial system. They were keen to see the 
rehabilitation of German finances, and the case of Austria was perceived as having the 
potential to act as a prelude for a scheme of German reconstruction. This can be seen 
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in a telegram sent from J. P. Morgan to Morgan Grenfell: ‘We ourselves continue to be 
deeply interested in the Austrian situation regarding it as a crucial one. We feel too that 
if some Austrian plan were to be successfully carried out it might possibly show the way 
to a similar operation in Germany’.213 G.M. Young had concerns about the damaging 
repercussions failure in Austria might have for the European political scene.214 The 
bankers were, then, partly motivated to get involved in the launch of the League of 
Nations’ scheme because they wished to stabilise the international financial system and 
hoped to see a scheme for Austria herald a scheme for German reconstruction, 
something that was considered important for general European rehabilitation. Here, 
the plan for Austrian financial reconstruction was at least in part a means of 
reconstructing pre-war financial structures, even if organising this through an 
international institution was an innovative move. 
 
The role of the League 
Whilst the successful adoption of the scheme for Austrian financial reconstruction was 
to a large degree the result of the actions and attitudes of Britain, France and certain 
banks and bankers, the actions and nature of the League did also play a part. The use of 
an international institution had certain advantages in expediting an effective scheme 
and overcoming obstacles.  The benefit of a League-orchestrated scheme was that it 
gave a least an appearance of neutrality that made the successful adoption of the 
scheme by Austria and others more likely. The collective involvement and responsibility 
that the League represented was a way of overcoming the problems associated with 
having one country or group linked too closely and publicly to the programme. The 
difficulty of having schemes associated with one particular power are illustrated not 
just by the failed French Loucheur plan of 1921, but also by the reception in Austria to 
the work of G.M. Young, who in attempting to ensure that the British would get a 
return on an 1922 loan was seen, in his role as head of the Anglo-Austrian bank in 
Vienna, to be interfering in Austrian politics in a manner that was widely resented 
within the country, after Young insisted that Dr. Johann Schober remain in office as 
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Chancellor. A technocratic figure, Dr. Schober was regarded favourably by the Allies but 
less so within Austria. In the view of The Economist at the time, it was ‘thoroughly bad 
in principle that the representative of a single country [that is, Young] should be placed 
in this position’. League official J. van Walré de Bordes expressed concern to Frank 
Nixon on 17 May 1922 writing that ‘Mr. Young, who some time ago was extolled 
everywhere as the saviour of Austria is now severely criticised’ and that ‘the press asks 
what he is really for and calls him the “Viceroy” and the “Dictator”’.215  
 
In a separate incident that illustrates a similar problem, British Ambassador A. Akers 
Douglas identified the difficulties that British involvement in Austrian politics entailed, 
and also commented to the British foreign secretary in May 1922, in relation to an 
occasion of perceived Italian interference, that it was ‘of great importance that Austria 
should be left free and undisturbed by any outside political pressure of such a 
nature’.216 Using the League to organise the collection of loan repayments and having a 
League-appointed and accountable commissioner in charge in Vienna was a way of 
doing this. Mediating via the League allowed Austria to accept the temporary loss of its 
economic sovereignty, and enabled the allied powers to get involved as guarantors, 
which in turn caused bankers to feel enthusiastic about the scheme. One factor was 
that countries were keen that no other state should act independently. As Jean Monnet 
described in relation to the Austrian scheme, one of the benefits of ‘collective 
assistance’ was that it dealt with the problem that countries considering autonomous 
action were at least ‘anxious that no other country should attempt it’.217 Frank Nixon 
felt the League also provided a buffer against the excessive influence and control of not 
just of powerful countries, but also of bankers, writing that: 
private bankers cannot ‘enslave’ Austria... Granted this you are thrown back on 
the League of Nations as the only available body… you cannot hand over the 
States of Eastern Europe to the tender mercies of Western capitalists. You must, 
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therefore, have some device, some intermediary between the capitalists who 
grant the credits and the Government which is being coerced into financial 
rectitude.218  
However, the use of the League as an intermediary did not necessarily provide a 
meaningful reduction of the influence of private bankers in Austria. Some of the 
members of the League’s Financial Committee who designed and oversaw the Scheme, 
such as Glückstadt and Strakosch, were private bankers, and all members of the 
Committee had connections with the bankers who would help to facilitate the scheme. 
The League’s Financial Committee was not separate from powerful states, their 
treasuries and central banks, and global financial interests, but rather composed of 
members of these groups, and represented their interests. Indeed, that was in some 
ways the point, as the Committee assisted with coordination between these parties. In 
the case of Austria, the advantage that using the League provided that it to appeared to 
put these interests at one remove, whilst also assisting with coordination between the 
various groups.  
 
A further factor in the League’s adoption of the scheme for Austria was that certain 
League officials positively wanted the scheme. Members of the EFO wished to pursue 
the project in order to establish the importance of financial and economic work to the 
League, and the benefits of using the League in these areas. The idealistic spirit that 
seems to have motivated Salter and Jean Monnet (at least by their own accounts) may 
have been part of the reason why some members of the League, at least within the 
Secretariat, wanted to get involved. Unlike in the Committees of the League, the 
members of the Secretariat, whilst retaining strong links with their home countries, 
governments and civil services, were not actually part of institutions other than the 
League. As Clavin and Wessels suggest, if there was a ‘League spirit’ at the time, it was 
within the Secretariat that it was to be found.219 Certain members of the League’s 
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Secretariat, such as Salter and Monnet, did play an influential role in advocating for the 
successful launch of the scheme, and so did Sir Basil Blackett of the Finance Committee. 
Salter, Monnet and Blackett were all convinced that a League scheme could work, and 
Salter enthusiastically publicised it.220 The League’s archives also reveal that (contrary 
to Salter’s account) his predecessor Frank Nixon was also engaged in advocating for this 
option. In a message to Monnet 1922 Nixon urged that ‘the case for League action’ be 
made, and reported that he had persuaded a number of influential individuals of the 
value of League involvement.221 
 
Whilst certain people involved in the EFO advocated for League to organise the scheme 
for Austria, and some of them may have been motivated by an idealistic desire to work 
for the international common good, these forces were only a limited part of the story. 
In Austria, use of an international institution provided the appearance of neutrality but, 
as League officials were very conscious of, equally a means for ensuring that national 
and financial interests could actually operate, in a veiled manner, behind the scenes. 
The support of certain powers and elites, as has been seen, was critical for the League’s 
scheme to be launched. Indeed, it is doubtful whether Italian support for the 
programme, which was vital, would have been secured without the opportunity that 
the League’s mediation provided for them to have an input into events in Austria.222 As 
Frank Nixon recognised, the benefit of the League scheme was that control over Austria 
that represented interested parties could be established: ‘this secures the legitimate 
political claims of France and Italy. France would certainly accept this arrangement and 
Italy very probably’.223 Thus, the League’s mediation simultaneously provided a 
mechanism to make outside interference in the country more palatable, whilst allowing 
this interference to occur.  
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Austrian rehabilitation, then, was adopted and successfully launched by the League 
partly because other options were impractical or were blocked, and the League 
provided a means by which the scheme could be made acceptable to the powers and 
interests critical for its success. The powers and interests did want Austria to survive, 
for reason of diplomacy, strategy or economic and financial interest, and because a 
workable plan for the country was seen as providing support for the peace settlement 
and the reconstruction of international finance, and because certain members of the 
EFO wanted the project. However, for the scheme for Austrian financial reconstruction 
to be organised and successfully launched by the League of Nations also required 
Austrian agreement and cooperation. It could not be assured that this would be 
obtained, and there were, as will be seen in later chapters, many in Austria who 
entertained doubts, or were actively hostile to the capitalistic nature of the League’s 
programme, and objected to the extent to which it eroded Austrian sovereignty. 
Despite all this, ultimately, sufficient cooperation was obtained in Austria for the plan 
to get off the ground.  
 
The role of Austria 
For the Austrian government, support for the scheme came partly because they were 
very constrained in their options, and had exhausted other possibilities. As we have 
seen, attempts to raise loans entirely privately or to reach trade agreements were 
either impractical or politically unacceptable to others. The limitations imposed by the 
Treaty of St. Germain made attempting customs unions or Anschluss all but impossible 
at this stage. The League’s scheme offered an opportunity for the possibility of 
financing at a reasonable cost, and provided the advantage that politically difficult 
reforms, such as the reduction in the number of civil servants, could be at least in part 
be seen to be the responsibility of outside forces, such as foreign governments or 
financiers, or their proxies in the League. Here, the League’s role as mediator reduced 
the sense that any individual outside interest had excessive influence.224 In a 
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conversation with the British Ambassador in 1921, shortly after the visit of the first 
Financial Committee delegation, the then Christian Social Chancellor of Austria, Michael 
Mayr, revealed a further motivation of the government to seek League assistance. 
Whilst some Christian Social supporters were strongly pro-Anschluss, as the 
overwhelming votes in favour of union in Christian-Social supporting Salzburg and 
Styria reveal, most of the leadership of the party was not. They feared for the position 
of Catholics within protestant majority Germany – the Kulturkampf225 had not been 
entirely forgotten – and were concerned about the strength of socialism and 
‘Bolshevism’ in that country. Mayr thus expressed the view to Ambassador Lindley that 
‘the prospect of financial assistance by means of the League of Nations was the only 
effective weapon he had to combat the “Anschluss” agitation and he was convinced 
that if it was forthcoming the movement would die out’.226 ‘Anschluss’ agitation was 
shortly to drive Mayr out of power: his government resigned after a vote in the region 
of Styria in favour of Anschluss.227 Furthermore, there was support in some quarters in 
Austria for the programme the League wanted to enact. Banking circles within the 
country felt, according to Dieter Stiefel, that the social legislation that had been 
enacted in the Republic was very onerous: their hope was the League scheme would 
reduce the role of the state in Austria.228 For Seipel, it was perhaps easier to enact 
these measures when the pressure for them came from external forces, as Financial 
Committee representative M. Maggiorino Ferraris pointed out.229 A further motive, 
according to John Deak, was that the Geneva protocols were part of on-going attempts 
during this period by Seipel to ensure the viability of new Austria. Seipel, unlike many of 
his compatriots, was a supporter of an independent Austria, and pursuing League 
assistance was ultimately the best way for him to obtain finance for his country, 
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stabilise the currency, and reform the state apparatus.230 It was Seipel personally who 
acted in August and September 1922 to draw attention to Austria’s plight,231 and his 
dramatic speech to the General Assembly of the League on 6 September led to the 
establishment of the Council’s Austria Committee.232 
 
Furthermore, such was the depth of the crisis in Austria and the apparent lack of other 
alternatives, that it was possible to prevail upon the political opposition to support the 
League’s measures, at least to the extent of allowing the necessary legislation to pass 
through Parliament. By this stage, the supporters of Seipel and the Christian Socials 
outnumbered Socialists in the Austrian parliament, but the League felt that it was 
important that the Socialists be seen to back the plan, however, because of the scale of 
the project and severity of the some of the reforms required.233 As The Times’ 
correspondent wrote in October 1922, ‘if the League’s scheme is to go through, it must 
have the assent of the Socialists’.234 In addition to the need for some sort of political 
consensus to be achieved, the support of SDAP was specifically required to pass the 
parts of the League programme which gave decree power to the government on certain 
matters – the Ermächtigungsgesetz, or Enabling Law. As this was a constitutional 
measure, it needed the assent of two thirds of the National Assembly. The League may 
have also been persuaded of the necessity of gaining assent from SDAP by the 
intercession of certain individuals from Austria, such as Emmy Freundlich, who was an 
SDAP member of Parliament, activist in the Austrian cooperative movement (where she 
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insisted upon female representation at every level), President of the International 
Cooperative Women’s Committee, and the only women on the League 1929 Economic 
Advisory Committee. Freundlich lobbied Sir Arthur Salter via the British government 
urging that League negotiations involved the SDAP. According to Freundlich, 85% of the 
Austrian army and all Austrian railwaymen were Socialists.235 Whilst support for the 
Socialists had declined from its post-war peak, the SDAP was still a very powerful 
political force that dominated in urban areas and in particular in Vienna, where the city 
council was SDAP-led and embarking upon its famous period of political and social 
experimentation: it was the era of Red Vienna.236  
 
The kind of difficulties faced by the League and Seipel in gaining Socialist support can 
be seen in an appeal ‘to workers in all countries’ by the executive Committees of the 
International Union of Socialists that was placed in the left-wing newspaper Neue 
Wiener Sonn- und Montags- Zeitung, 23 October 1922, shortly after the League’s 
programme was announced: 
the executive Committee of the International Union of Socialists draw the 
attention of the proletariat in all countries to the manoeuvres of international 
capitalists, who, under the pretext of coming to Austria’s assistance, are really 
endeavouring to establish a Protectorate over the country such as that which the 
great capitalist Powers have established over Morocco and Mesopotamia.237 
Despite the in some respects radical nature of SDAP political stance, however, they 
ultimately did not oppose the measures required by the League’s scheme in 
parliament, and assent for these was finally obtained on 28 November 1922. According 
to G.M. Young, the Socialists did not block the scheme because they were ‘alarmed at 
the prospect of disorder’.238 The Socialists were also worried that their failure to 
support the Enabling Law would lead Seipel to repeal aspects of socialist legislation that 
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were a legacy of their time in power straight after the war.239 A further factor that 
helped to reduce Socialist opposition was that the League delegation and other 
interested parties worked to persuade the SDAP that these measures were the only 
option for Austria. A British attaché met with SDAP leader Karl Renner in November 
1922, for example, and helped to convince him of the necessity of the programme.240 
The League delegation helped to orchestrate a compromised between Seipel and the 
SDAP, and, after a secret meeting with Seipel, the SDAP agreed to abstain from voting 
on the parts of the scheme that they were opposed to, in return for a larger proportion 
of tax revenues being allocation to the Vienna city authorities. The bill that would 
enable the necessary measures to launch the scheme in Austria finally gained assent.241 
The SDAP were, after all, the party most closely associated with, and most supportive 
of, the Austrian Republic, and they did not want to be its ‘gravediggers’.242 
 
Conclusions 
Ultimately, the League of Nations was handed the scheme to design and implement a 
programme for Austrian financial reconstruction because other options had been 
exhausted or were politically or practically impossible. Forming trading or currency 
unions or agreements with other nations was not acceptable to the victorious powers, 
who were keen to ensure that the situation in Austria did not harm their interests. 
Obtaining finance directly through private channels proved difficult because of the 
depth of the problems that the country faced. The scheme got off the ground because 
of the active support of certain states and non-League economic elites, and because it 
was considered within Austria perhaps the only remaining option to prevent complete 
collapse. The role of the League of Nations cannot be entirely (or even substantially) 
separated from the operation and interests of other diplomatic, national, political and 
financial groups, and indeed the League officials and experts who worked on the 
scheme had national connections, as well as strong connections with, or indeed active 
involvement in, the financial community. In this sense the story of the League’s 
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involvement in Austria 1922-1926 is very much a transnational one. Officials, politicians 
and bankers formed networks of influence and communication across national borders 
to facilitate the successful launch of the scheme.  
 
However, this was not a transnationalism that transcended other interests: it was a 
transnationalism that was rooted in national concerns and priorities, and in the 
interests of financial elites. The role of, in particular, France and Britain in supporting 
the scheme, along with that of various banks, was critical to its success, and the 
handing of the scheme to the League was not a triumph for idealistic conceptions of 
transnational internationalism. Even if some League officials were somewhat 
idealistically motivated, the League’s involvement was not primarily about the pursuit 
of these goals, but was rather a pragmatic means to sidestep issues around national 
rivalries and sovereignty, whilst also allowing the interests of Britain, France and Italy to 
be accommodated and represented, and financiers the opportunity to contribute to the 
start of the reconstruction of the international financial system. These powers and 
elites were critical in ensuring that the League was handed the scheme and that it was 
successfully launched, and outside of the Secretariat of the League, key figures in the 
scheme were embedded in these interests, and cannot be separated from them. 
Despite their sometimes obstructive approaches, allied powers, central bankers and 
financiers did wish to see the country continue to exist, and this related to their 
perceptions of Austria’s significance for the wider-post-war order and reconstruction. 
For France and Britain, ensuring that the post-war settlement could be sustained was 
important, and for banking interests, it was the first stage of an attempt to reconstruct 
the international financial system around the principles of orthodox economics.  
 
Using the League did also convey certain distinct transnational advantages, however, in 
allowing the creation of an impression of neutrality. This provided a means of 
overcoming Austrian objections to the level of interference, disruption and loss of 
sovereign control that was necessary in order for the scheme to win the backing of 
crucial foreign political and financial groups. In reality, the scheme, as will be seen in 
the next chapter, was far from neutral. Ultimately, the League was able to act to 
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facilitate the wishes of the great powers, most notably Britain and France, and the 
wishes of those financial groups who were interested in acting in Austria, such as the 
Bank of England, the US Federal Reserve, and certain private banks like the House of 
Morgan. These various overlapping groups and interests were concerned with Austria 
either because of their geo-strategic or financial interests, and not really, it is 
unsurprising to learn, because of a sense of idealistic internationalism, or at least, if this 
was a relevant factor, the form that internationalist idealism tended to take was that of 
a belief in financial globalisation. The League’s scheme, then, to a large extent, 
represented the interests of these political and economic powers and elites, and thus 
was less of an innovation in international affairs than is sometimes depicted. Using the 
mechanism of an international institution may have represented something new, but 
the motivations behind the scheme were primarily to do restoring the pre-war financial 
order and values, such as balanced budgets and the gold standard, and enhancing the 
power of France and Britain.   
 
The title of this chapter is ‘why the League’, but an answer to this question also 
provides an answer to the question of ‘why Austria?’ Why did certain governments, 
banking interests and the League decide to attempt the financial reconstruction of 
Austria? Obviously, international attention focussed upon the country because of the 
depth of its problems, but other factors can also be discerned. Attention had been 
drawn to this country because of a perception that Austria was worth saving. This may 
have been partly because of racial or hierarchical notions regarding supposed Austrian 
civilisation, and was also to do with perceptions that countries and financial elites had 
about their interests in Austria, political, diplomatic, strategic and financial. The 
potential collapse of Austria was widely seen as being a significant risk to the stability of 
the entire region of Eastern Central Europe, and the survival of the country was 
regarded as important for post-war recovery of Europe as a whole, and for the 
maintenance of the post-war settlement as a whole.  
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Chapter Three 
The nature of the scheme 
‘the most stringent measures’ 
The prescription for the Austrian budget insisted upon by the Provisional Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations 
‘our bank chairmen… have nothing better to cry than “back to 1914”’ 
J. M. Keynes 
 
This chapter investigates the nature of the scheme designed for Austrian financial 
reconstruction, and examines who was responsible for its design, and what ideas and 
interests the programme represented. It explores the process by which the scheme was 
drawn up, and examines what the features of the scheme signify in terms of post-First 
World War ideas and realities in finance, economics, sovereignty and international 
relations. There is a considerable literature around the operation and condition of the 
interwar economy and the interwar gold standard and the links between the two, but 
little detailed consideration of the case of Austria – which was the first country 
subjected to such a rigorous programme of budgetary and the first to return to the gold 
standard.243 
 
In exploring the nature of the League’s work in Austria in the early 1920s, this chapter 
illuminates the issue of whether the EFO’s work represented a break with, or a 
reinforcement of, the liberal economic and financial orthodoxy that Robert Boyce 
argues was the predominant mind-set in the 1920s, that is, support for the gold 
standard and balanced budgets.244 The orthodox, classical or liberal economic and 
financial view, sometimes referred to at the time as ‘sound finance’, comprised a belief 
in a limited role for the state and the elimination of budget deficits, and the necessity 
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of countries possessing currencies fixed in value in relation to gold245 and backed up by 
sufficient gold reserves or reserves of currencies that were fixed directly to gold. In this 
world view, the state should adopt so far as possible a minimal laissez-faire position. 
These values were most often associated with contemporary (and perhaps not entirely 
vanished) British treasury doctrines, the key elements of which Adrian Ham summarises 
as ‘gold fever’. These entailed a commitment to the gold standard, balanced budgets 
and minimum government action. It reflected the belief that the ‘only acceptable 
objective of economic policy is the elimination of inflation’: an assumption that ‘once 
prices were brought down everything else automatically would come right’.246 The 
gold-standard system had been suspended during the war, and, as seen in the previous 
chapter, restoring it was something that was seen as crucial by certain key actors 
involved in the Austrian programme, such as Montagu Norman. In this way, Austrian 
financial reconstruction was an attempt to return to pre-war orthodox values, and, in 
the context of the 1920s, it could be said to represent conventional thinking in relation 
to economics and finance. I mean by ‘innovation’ in these matters thinking or policies 
which were a breach from these orthodox assumptions. So, for example, moves away 
from the gold standard regime, or less focus on budget deficits as the source of 
problems might be innovative, as might raising taxes but not reducing spending to end 
a deficit. Government spending in areas such as job creation is also a breach of laissez-
faire principles, and could be regarded as an innovative move in the 1920s. In Austria in 
the 1920s, as will be seen in Chapter Five, alternative economic and financial models 
were advanced by the SDAP. However, a break with orthodoxy did not necessarily have 
to reflect socialist values. 
 
Some historians have argued that in the early 1920s, a move away from past orthodox 
economic and financial values can be detected, and that this was reflected in the work 
                                                          
245 A currency could be fixed directly to gold or tied to another currency that was fixed to gold and thus 
indirectly fixed in value to gold. 
246 Adrian Ham, Treasury Rules – Recurrent Themes in British Economic Policy (London, 1981), 44. Much of the 
Conservative Party and those who supported Lord Rothermere’s ‘anti-waste’ campaign in the early 1920s held 
similar views. See Ross McKibbin, ‘Class and Conventional Wisdom – The Conservative Party and the ‘Public’ in 
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of the EFO. Decorzant suggests that, at least with respect to the organisation of 
international finance and economics, the First World War marked a break. He writes 
that ‘the completely disorganised state of the world economy at the end of the war 
encouraged governments to question the traditional management of the [sic] 
international economic affairs’.247 In the sense that orchestrating economic or financial 
policies through an international organisation and via international officials in the EFO 
represented an intervention against the purely laissez-faire operation of the world 
economy, this is true. However, I argue here that the values that were promoted by the 
EFO in relation to the Austrian programme were very strongly reflective of the 
orthodox economic and financial world view, even if, in the unprecedented and chaotic 
situation of the post-First World War era, the use of international conferences and 
international organisations to coordinate such moves was something new.  
 
Economists Anthony Endres and Grant Fleming suggest that the prevalent orthodox 
view was not always shared by the League’s economists.248  They regard the economic 
thought of the EFO as sometimes innovative and as representing something of a breach 
from the prevailing orthodox, liberal economic prescriptions. Endres and Fleming argue, 
for example, that ‘early EFO personnel were not completely wedded to laissez-faire as 
they have been portrayed’.249 Clavin suggests that the EFO sometimes challenged 
conventional economic prescriptions, but her argument is different from that of Endres 
and Fleming, as she contends that innovative thinking mainly occurred after the 
Depression hit.250 Dubin’s view is similar.251 In Berger’s view, there were breaches of 
                                                          
247 Yann Decorzant, ‘Internationalism in the Economic and Financial Organisation of the League’, in Dan Laqua 
(ed.), Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the Wars (London, 2011), 
115-133. 
248 Anthony Endres and Grant Fleming, International Organizations and the Analysis of Economic Policy 1919-
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who have researched the League, see, for example, F.S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times 
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249 Endres and Fleming, ibid., 57.  
250 Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy – The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946 (Oxford, 
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37/3 (1983), 469-493. 
82 
 
the principles of ‘sound finance’ during the League’s work in Austria, but these 
occurred primarily in the operation of the League’s second programme after 1932, and 
were not part of the design of either programme.252 
 
This chapter reveals that with respect to the values and ideologies that underlay the 
League’s programme in Austria, a very early example of the EFO’s work, innovative 
thinking was not yet much in evidence, even if the means by which these orthodox 
values were promoted was new – an international institution. The Financial Committee 
of the EFO regarded budgetary discipline and control of the issue of money as critical to 
the programme in Austria. Innovative thinking in the EFO generally came after these 
prescriptions had been challenged by the problems of the early 1930s, and where it 
originated earlier, from a rather different source than the ‘experts’ who designed the 
Austrian reconstruction scheme. The Financial Committee were financiers and bankers 
and not permanent League employees. Their position and prestige within the League 
left them able to promote their prescriptions for prosperity. It was amongst the 
members of the EFO’s secretariat, such as J. van Waldré de Bordes, as will be seen in 
this chapter and also in Chapter Four, that sometimes a more critical approach can be 
discerned in the 1920s.253 In this sense, Endres and Fleming may be correct. However, 
both the EFO’s secretariat and the members of the Financial Committee who worked 
with them on the Austrian programme’s design and implementation were in agreement 
upon its basic precepts, and, as will be seen in Chapter Six, very similar principles were 
adopted in the other League reconstruction programmes that followed in the 1920s. 
This chapter shows how, in the example of the EFO’s plan for Austria, the notion of 
expertise allowed the representatives of finance in the League’s Finance Committee to 
design the programme according to their own perceptions and beliefs about the correct 
operation of economics and finance. 
                                                          
252 Peter Berger, ‘The League of Nations and Interwar Austria: Critical Assessment of a Partnership in Economic 
Reconstruction’, in Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Alexander Lassner (eds.), The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Era in 
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The chapter first describes the process by which the scheme was designed, before 
outlining and then examining in detail the key components of the programme. There is 
then an exploration of the ideas and ideologies that the scheme’s design reflected, and 
consideration of who drew up the scheme, and whose interests they represented.  
 
The process of designing the scheme for Austrian reconstruction  
At the time that the League’s programme for Austrian reconstruction was designed, the 
institutions of the League included the Council, its committees (including the Austria 
Committee), and the Assembly, all of which were comprised of politicians from 
member states. There were, in addition, the expert committees such as the Provisional 
Economic and Financial Committees, backed up by a secretariat, who did not always 
just act as administrative assistance but sometimes actually shaped League policy.254 In 
the design of the programme for Austrian reconstruction, the most critical input came 
from the Financial Committee. Politicians deferred to the Financial Committee as the 
‘experts’ when it came to drawing up the scheme. Whilst the key members of the 
secretariat were in full agreement with the Financial Committee’s ideas, the main 
figures designing the programme were the members of the Committee.255 The Financial 
Committee’s members were appointed by member states but were able, theoretically 
at least, to act as independent experts whilst carrying out League business. The 
Committee was primarily composed of private bankers, although there was one central 
bank representative, and a number of treasury officials.256 British and French treasury 
officials, in conjunction with some of the private bankers, would prove to be amongst 
                                                          
254 On the role of the secretariat see Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessels, ‘Transnationalism and the 
League of Nations: understanding the work of its Economic and Financial Organisation’, in Contemporary 
European History 14/4 (2005), 465-492. The Economic and Financial Committee combined with their 
secretariats composed the Economic and Financial Organisation (EFO) of the League. 
255 Members of the secretariat such as Frank Nixon and Arthur Salter were fully supportive of the Committee’s 
plans. See, for example, Nixon to Jean Monnet, 7 January 1922, the League of Nations Archive, Geneva, LNA 
S116, Sir A. Salter. The file is Nixon’s outgoing correspondence even though it is labelled ‘Sir A. Salter’.  
256 The minutes of the Committee reveal that it was a sub-set of members who were involved in the 
deliberations about the Austrian scheme. This group generally consisted of Joseph Avenol, Sir Basil Blackett, 
Dr. Pospíšil and Sir Henry Strakosch, with others sometimes also in attendance. 
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the most influential members of the Financial Committee with respect to the design of 
the plan for Austrian reconstruction.257  
 
In the early 1920s, the institutions established by victorious powers to deal with issues 
arising from the War and the peace settlements operated alongside the new 
international mechanisms of the League. It was actually to the Supreme Allied Council 
that the Austrians initially appealed in March 1921, and not directly the League. The 
Supreme Council referred the matter straight to the League, however,258 and on 17 
March 1921, they requested that the Financial Committee investigate the possibility of 
applying their international credits scheme, the Ter Meulen scheme, to Austria.259 The 
Committee met between 28 and 31 March and agreed to take the project on, subject to 
agreement upon certain key principles, such as Austrian acceptance of budgetary 
discipline. This achieved, the Committee swiftly despatched a small delegation to 
Vienna in April 1921 to investigate conditions there and assess the likelihood of success 
of any putative programme. The Delegation consisted of British banker Sir Drummond 
Drummond Fraser, who had already been involved in promoting the Ter Meulen 
Scheme, Emil Glückstadt of the Danish Landsmansbank and the Financial Committee, 
and French treasury official, member of the Financial Committee and from 1933 to 
1940, Secretary General of the League, Joseph Avenol.260 The Delegation’s ideas about 
the nature of Austria’s problems, and the possible solutions that there might be formed 
the basis of the League programme that eventually emerged, and also established the 
                                                          
257 It is interesting to note the difference in the composition of the Finance Committee in comparison with that 
of the Economic Committee. The Economic Committee was completely dominated by civil servants. Yann 
Decorzant suggests that this is because of national sensitivities around trade policy at the time. In the case of 
the Financial Committee’s work in Austria, however, the civil servants on the Committee did play an important 
but not the determining role. Decorzant, ‘Internationalism in the Economic and Financial Organisation of the 
League of Nations’, in Dan Laqua (ed.), Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements 
Between the Wars (London, 2011), 115-133. 
258 A previous scheme consisting of increased Allied assistance for Austria proposed by the Austrian section of 
the Reparations Commission had already been rejected at this stage, as had the plan from French Treasury 
official M. Loucheur. See the previous chapter.  
259 The Supreme Allied Council was not a League body but it was the body, consisting of the leading statesmen 
of the major victorious powers, that designed the peace settlement. 
260 Avenol’s ‘main object’ Lord Halifax said, in relation to Avenol’s work as Secretary General, ‘appeared to be 
to protect the League of Nations from having to decide any difficult questions of principle’. See James Barros’s 
biography of Avenol, Betrayal from Within – Joseph Avenol, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, 1933-
1940 (New Haven and London, 1969). In the late 1930s, M. Avenol degraded the capacity of the League and 
cooperated with the Axis. 
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pattern of transnational coordination between treasury officials, like Avenol, and 
private bankers, such as Drummond Fraser and Glückstadt, that was to characterise the 
League’s work in Austria.   
 
The Financial Committee Delegation visited Austria and determined that a programme 
of internal reform was required if there was to be a chance of Austria receiving 
international credits. The report of the Delegation was used as the basis for a Financial 
Committee plan for Austrian financial and economic reconstruction.261 This in turn was 
the basis for a report submitted by the Austria Committee – a subcommittee of the 
League’s Council – to the Supreme Allied Council on 31 May 1921 and accepted by 
them and the Council in June 1921. The Austria Committee comprised representatives 
of the countries who were to guarantee the loans Austria, and, as such, the committee 
was there to represent their interests.262 As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
matters did not advance much further at this stage, largely because of the time it took 
to obtain the agreement of all countries to release their existing claims upon Austrian 
finances. When Chancellor Seipel made a renewed appeal directly to the Supreme 
Allied Council in August 1922, work finally begun in earnest to launch the scheme. The 
programme remained very similar to the one originally designed by the Financial 
Committee, at least with regards to the measures to be taken in Austria.  
 
Following Seipel’s August 1922 appeal, the Financial Committee were asked to look 
again at their scheme, and the Committee worked out a revised plan, which was 
submitted to the Austria Committee, who then sent it to the Council of the League in 
September 1922. As the Austria Committee made clear, they and the Council accepted 
the recommendations of the Financial Committee in full.263 The new design was similar 
                                                          
261 The Report of the Finance Committee, 31 May 1921, League of Nations, Financial Reconstruction of Austria 
– Report of the Financial Committee (with relevant papers) (London, 1921), 7-9. 
262 See League of Nations Secretariat, Principles and Methods of Financial Reconstruction Work Undertaken 
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in many respects to the original, in that it featured the idea of budget cuts, a balanced 
budget, raised taxes and the establishment of a bank of issue, but now it had the extra 
element that Britain, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia would underwrite the foreign 
loans raised for Austria. The plan was finally ratified by these ‘guaranteeing powers’ the 
Geneva Convention of 4 October 1922.  
 
The central role of the Financial Committee in designing the programme is clear, but 
the Austria Committee also asserted that in the design of the programme, Austrian 
economic and financial experts had been extensively consulted with.264 There is no real 
evidence of this in the 1922 discussions, however. The Financial Committee Delegation 
that visited in 1921 certainly took submissions and questioned various eminences who 
were predominately from the world of Austrian finance, and also spoke to Austrian 
politicians and representatives from industry.265 These are presumably the ‘experts’ to 
whom the Austria Committee refer, and delegation members Avenol and Drummond 
Fraser were reportedly ‘favourably impressed by the capacity of the Vienna financial 
experts whom they consulted’ at this time.266  There was a preponderance of figures 
from the world or banking and finance amongst those consulted by the 1921 delegation 
(four of them were from industry, and fourteen from banking, finance and the 
treasury).267 This reveals the assumptions that these representatives of the Financial 
Committee had about their remit and about who was most qualified to comment upon 
the condition of Austria and the action that should be taken. As will be seen in Chapter 
Five, the failure to give sufficient attention to potential effects of the programme 
outside of a fairly narrowly conceived financial and economic framework would have 
consequences for the impact and effects of the programme, but it was not surprising 
                                                          
264 Note on the Work and Constitution of the Sub-Committee of the Council of the League of Nations, undated, 
LNA S107, Sir A Salter, No. 4 Austria. 
265 See League of Nations, Financial Reconstruction of Austria – Report of the Committee of the Council (with 
relevant papers) (London, 1921).  
266 Lindley to Curzon, 29 April 1921, the National Archive, Kew (TNA), T160/57, 2073/4.  
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that the Financial Committee of the League, having been handed the project for 
Austrian reconstruction, should have viewed matters in this way.  
 
By 1922, Austria’s desperation for financing meant the country was not in a position to 
significantly influence the nature of the programme, but that is not to say that there 
was no support for its key elements in some quarters in Austria nor that the country 
was completely powerless when it came to the implementation of the programme.268 
The reforms already commenced by the government involved attempts to rationalise 
the obligations of the Austrian state, through, for example, ending certain subsidies,269 
and the June 1922 budget fitted with some of the precepts of the 1921 Financial 
Delegation report.270 Furthermore, in some areas of the programme, Austria did 
exercise a degree of control, most notably when the Austrian government insisted upon 
appointing their own (Austrian) head of the new Bank of Issue, contrary to the wishes 
of many foreigners involved in designing or promoting the scheme, such as members of 
Financial Committee and Sir Montagu Norman.271 The main features and the key 
principles that underlay the scheme were, however, designed by the Financial 
Committee and its associates. The programme for Austrian Financial Reconstruction 
was thus primarily a product of this transnational group of bankers, financiers and 
treasury officials, albeit one that was supported by key figures in Austria, such as Viktor 
Kienböck, Finance Minister from 1922, and Austrian banking and finance interests.272 
 
The scheme that the Finance Committee designed required Austrian support to 
succeed, however, and following ratification of the Geneva Convention, key elements 
                                                          
268 See Chapter Five for further details.  
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of the programme were agreed upon by the Austrian Parliament in November 1922. At 
this time, an Enabling Law was passed which gave the Austrian government the powers 
that were thought to be necessary to implement the programme. The final part of the 
plan was worked out in the first half of 1923, when the details of the short- and long-
term international loans to be provided to Austria were settled by the Austrian 
government and the League, in conjunction with the private financiers and central 
bankers who were required to launch the loans, and the governments who undertook 
to guarantee it. 
 
The key features of the scheme  
The programme included measures to be taken in Austria to attempt to restore 
currency and confidence; actions to be undertaken by foreign banks and governments 
to finance Austria, including the raising of a short- and long-term loans by public 
subscription, and the provision of guarantees by Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia 
and Japan to underwrite the scheme. The whole project was overseen and 
implemented by the League of Nations, firstly273 by a Financial Committee delegation, 
who were then succeeded by a Commissioner-General, Mayor of Rotterdam Dr Alfred 
Zimmerman (who moved to live in Vienna), who, it was reported to the Bank of England 
was a ‘very clever and able man, somewhat hard and not a jovial figure’.274  
Zimmerman was supported by an international Committee of Control, and both he and 
the Committee reported to the League. It was hoped by the League that the country 
would be stable, able to meet its obligations, with its budget balanced, within two years 
– by 1925.  
 
The steps to be undertaken in Austria included the end of government control over the 
money supply and thus the establishment of an independent bank of issue (with a view 
to the eventual establishment of the Krone (crown) on gold standard basis) and drastic 
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cuts in government expenditure, including a reduction by 100,000 of the number of 
state employees, and cuts to railway, postal and telegraph services. The expenditure of 
revenue generated by the loans required the agreement of the Commissioner-General, 
and was not supposed to be for used for investment purposes, but just for the meeting 
of immediate requirements.275 In order to obtain the confidence of foreign markets and 
governments, Austria had to undertake measures to rapidly achieve a stable currency 
and balanced budget, and accept international control. All elements of the scheme 
were thus interconnected and designed to create the kind of confidence that would 
allow Austria to borrow again, and the guarantors to feel that their undertakings were 
not too large a risk.  
 
All aspects of the scheme reflected certain economic and financial orthodoxies, the 
central aspects of which had been outlined by a group of economists at the 1920 
Brussels International Financial Conference. They had urged governments to establish 
fixed currency values tied to gold and to slash public spending, and called for 
international lending and free trade to resume.276 The experience of countries such as 
Austria in the early 1920s off the gold standard – i.e. uncontrolled inflation – reinforced 
the belief that the dangers of inflation and financial instability could only be avoided via 
the use of the gold standard.277 In April and May 1922 at the Genoa Economic and 
Financial Conference – an international conference called by David Lloyd George to 
attempt resolution of issues around post-war debt – proposals drawn up by the British 
delegation were ultimately adopted with minor modifications. These built on the 
Brussels principles in calling for a return to gold, which required balanced budgets, 
independent central banks and reduced national debt.278 The proposals at Genoa did 
contain more flexibility than those espoused at Brussels, but the elements that 
                                                          
275 As the loans were regarded as a short term measure to allow Austria to survive during the period of 
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represented a slightly less orthodox approach were not ever acted upon. According to 
Robert Boyce, the hostility of Montagu Norman prevented any deviation from the 
values of Brussels.279  
 
The principles articulated at Brussels and Genoa originated in work that had been 
completed in the British treasury280, but even the French government and French 
banking and treasury officials, although not in agreement with all of the British 
proposals on how to restore the gold standard system, were committed to eventually 
returning to gold and happy to see the principles of budget discipline applied to the 
defeated powers.281 The values of fixed currencies and budget equilibrium were not 
just those of the British, but also those of the transnational group of financiers some of 
whom had attended the Genoa Conference, who now made up the Financial 
Committee of the League that designed the programme: Austrian reconstruction 
reflected transnational and international cooperation in support of values of financial 
elites. However, in most circumstances, Kenneth Mouré points out, the supporters of 
these values could not force their adoption: ‘recommendations by outside experts 
could be proffered, and could be made a condition for foreign credits if the country 
sought such aid, but could not be imposed except in unusual circumstances’.282 The 
situation in Austria provided a perfect opportunity for the ‘experts’ to attempt to 
implement their programme.    
 
We turn now to examine the individual features of the scheme. Although all part of a 
unified package, certain strands of the plan can be separated out into different, albeit 
overlapping, aspects. The requirement for budgetary equilibrium was a particularly 
central feature. 
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Budgets, deficits and ‘sound’ finance 
From the very start of their involvement in Austria, the Financial Committee made very 
apparent their view of the reforms that would be critical were the country to be able to 
obtain any international assistance. Before commencing upon their investigation into 
conditions in Austria, and right at the start of their negotiations with the Finance 
Ministry in Vienna, the 1921 Financial Committee Delegation described their position, 
and informed the Austrian government on 25 April that Austria must concentrate ‘all 
her forces in a firm and tenacious desire to attain equilibrium in her public finances’.283 
On 28 April 1921 this was reiterated as the Delegation explained the central importance 
of a balanced budget to any hope of gaining assistance or recovery, writing to the 
Austrian government of the need to ‘equate the expenditure and the income of the 
governments and, thereby, to prevent further deficits’. 284 They also urged the ending 
of index-linked government salaries. The Delegation was clear that the measures that 
they were proposing would ‘impose [upon the people of Austria] CONSIDERABLE 
PRIVATIONS’.285 
 
When the League’s Council once again approached the Financial Committee in 1922, 
the Committee went so far as to stipulate that they would only work on an Austrian 
reconstruction project subject to ‘the most stringent measures [being] adopted in 
Austria’, by which they meant large government cuts – austerity measures.286 
‘Austerity’ was not often used as the short-hand term for government retrenchment 
and reductions in expenditure in the 1920s, but these kinds of measures were implied 
in the language deployed by the Financial Committee delegation in talking of the need 
to be ‘firm and tenacious’ and of ‘stringent measures’. In Austria the term used for 
what was later referred to in Anglophone countries as austerity was often ‘Abbau’. This 
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April 1921, TNA T160/57, 2073/4.  
285 Document signed by Glückstadt, Drummond-Fraser and Avenol, Vienna, 28 April 1921, Bank of England 
archive (BOE), OV/382. Emphasis in the original.  
286 Reply of the Financial Committee to the six questions reported by the Austrian Committee of the Council, 8 
September 1922, Reconstruction de l’Autriche, LNA C/S/C.A./4, Comité de Conseil Reconstruction Financière 
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translates as ‘reduction’ or ‘degradation’ and in this context conveys sometimes similar 
connotations to the term austerity, as can be seen in its use by the Arbeiter-Zeitung in 
March 1924.287 The term was also used on occasion in League documents.288 In the case 
of the League’s plan for Austria, Abbau entailed substantial reductions in the numbers 
of government personnel, as well the end of food and other government subsidies and 
cuts to other aspects of government expenditure, such as healthcare. Such measures 
were a central aspect of the scheme, and from its inception, and before they had 
conducted a full investigation into the situation in the country, the Financial Committee 
established a fundamental principle which would guide the nature of the project: the 
requirement that a balanced budget and ‘sound finance’ be core and essential parts of 
the programme.  
 
In the report submitted by the Committee to the Supreme Allied Council and the 
Council of the League, and later in their programme of September 1922, the need for 
an end to the budget deficit was reiterated. In the Geneva Convention of 4 October, 
budgetary rectitude was made a binding commitment. Protocol III of the Convention 
stated that ‘the Austrian government accepts the obligation to draw up a programme 
of reforms and financial improvements designed to enable Austria to re-establish a 
permanent equilibrium in her budget within a period of two years’. The Convention 
emphasised that ‘measures of this description are necessarily drastic and must be 
energetically carried out’.289 Throughout their involvement in the design of the scheme 
for Austrian reconstruction, the Financial Committee ensured that orthodox budgetary 
measures were at the heart of their proposals for Austrian financial reconstruction. 
 
The comments of members of the Financial Committee reveal how central they 
regarded the reduction of the budget deficit and government spending to be. In order 
to reduce the deficit, the Committee did envisage some tax rises, but these were to be 
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next meeting, June 1924, LNA S110, 2/19/2, Austria. 
289 The League of Nations, The Geneva Convention, 4 October 1922 (Geneva, 1922).  
93 
 
much more modest than the spending cuts that they sought.290 Financial Committee 
member Otto Niemeyer291 wrote of the need for (his emphasis), ‘drastic economies in 
budget expenditure’, and expressed scepticism about the possibility of increased 
taxation being used as a tool to reduce the deficit.292 Niemeyer was a key advocate for 
Britain’s disastrous return to gold in 1925, as his testy exchanges on the topic with 
Chancellor Winston Churchill show.293 He was also a strong supporter of balanced 
government budgets.294 Financial Committee member Sir Henry Strakosch, a South 
African and British banker of Austrian origin, also talked of the requirement for ‘drastic 
and comprehensive’ cuts.295 In a response to six questions asked of the Financial 
Committee by the Austria Committee in September 1922 about the Austrian scheme, 
the Financial Committee emphasized the critical importance of budgetary rectitude 
once again, telling the government representatives on the Council that, in relation to 
the proposed new Bank of Issue ‘the Committee desires to emphasise the fact that the 
Bank can only be of use in re-establishing Austria’s credit… [if] drastic reforms required 
to establish budget equilibrium are also taken’.296 On the issue of privatisation and 
government subsidies, Sir Basil Blackett revealed his view in discussions in the 
Committee on state-subsidised enterprises: he opined that ‘no railway had the right to 
exist if it showed a deficit’, and described approvingly the suppression of certain deficit 
causing government services in Britain as a ‘draconian decision that had an immediate 
salutatory effect’.297 Right from the start of League involvement in the scheme, then, 
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the criticality of lower government expenditure, and the necessity of an end to the 
deficit were established as key principles by the Financial Committee. The emphasis 
upon these features was continued in the Committee’s investigations into the Austrian 
situation, in their discussions of the design of the plan, and in the final programme that 
emerged: these elements were axiomatic to them.  
 
For Committee members, the belief in budgetary balance was not just a practical or 
pragmatic one, but had a moral dimension, as is revealed by the tone with which they 
spoke of government spending, the deficit and the need for cuts – a rather Calvinist 
rhetoric expressed in the language of ‘sacrifice’ and ‘privations’.298 The delegation 
talked of Austria requiring the ‘moral strength’ to carry out the reforms, and this 
reflected the discourse that surrounded government deficits and budget equilibrium at 
the time, a discourse that saw government spending as generally profligate, weak and 
immoral, and regarded governmental financial rectitude as tough but virtuous.299 These 
attitudes were reflected in the chiding tone of a Financial Committee report that stated 
that ‘the large sums advanced [to Austria that] should have been used for the re-
establishment of her finances and for her economic reconstruction, have been used for 
current consumption’.300 Here, the Austrian government were reproved for their lack of 
sound financial values, although, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, the 
difficulties faced by Austria at this time were immense. The ‘current consumption’ that 
sounds so indulgent was primarily food subsidies and the salaries of public officials, 
such as civil servants, teachers and railway workers. The moralising rhetoric around 
profligacy and the necessity for hardship helped to rationalise the project and also had 
the benefit of increasing the pressure on the Austrian government to take the 
measures that the Committee regarded as essential. Concern was rarely expressed for 
the impact that such policies would have, although the Delegation was well aware that 
the measures proposed might cause hardship. During their April 1921 visit they realised 
                                                          
298 Memo to the Austrian Minister by the Delegates of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, 28 
April 1921, TNA T160/57, 2073/4. 
299 See Adrian Ham, Treasury Rules, 44. This discourse in some ways returned after the Greek bailout from 
2010.  
300 Financial Committee report 30 January 1923, Financial Reconstruction of Austria Draft Resolution, LNA 
C/S/C.A./23. 
95 
 
that a balanced budget would ‘exact considerable sacrifices from the Austrian 
people’.301 The Delegation’s worries on this point are rather more evident here than in 
the deliberations of the Committee itself when it met in Paris, London or Geneva. As in 
the case of Sir William Goode, physical proximity to the problems of Austria did appear 
to produce somewhat greater consideration for the impact policies would have.302 A 
rare expression of concern from the Committee was the observation by Italian invitee 
S. Maggiorino Ferraris that the ‘social question’ should not be overlooked in the 
Austrian scheme.303 Other Committee members did not take up this suggestion and 
budgetary discipline remained at the heart of the programme. 
 
Control, confidence and sovereignty 
The ideological assumptions held by the members of the Finance Committee and its 
Delegation to Austria did not just reflect the beliefs of this narrow group, but also the 
beliefs (or at least, the Financial Committee’s perceptions of the beliefs) of the wider 
financial community whose backing for the scheme was critical if financing were to be 
obtained. These were the same banks and bankers, such as J.P. Morgan and Co. and 
Rothschilds, who had felt unable to assist Austria earlier in 1922. Now the 
governmental guarantees, international control and use of the structure of the League 
encouraged them to work to support the scheme. The Finance Committee contained 
members of this wider transnational financial and banking community. Indeed, that 
was part of the point: these individuals could mediate between stricken Austria and the 
financiers whose support they desperately needed, and the budgetary equilibrium 
pursued primarily through government spending cuts was regarded as necessary to 
obtain the confidence of this transnational elite, as well as the foreign countries whose 
guarantees were essential for the scheme to be a success. 
 
                                                          
301 Memo to the Austrian Minister by the Delegates of the Finance Committee of the League of Nations, 28 
April 1921, TNA T160/57, 2074/4. 
302 See the previous chapter for the role of Sir William Goode.  
303 Minutes of the Financial Committee, Ninth Session, Geneva, 9 September 1922, LNA S107, Sir A Salter, No. 
4 Austria. See Chapter Four for information on the social impact of the programme. 
96 
 
The Financial Committee delegation to Austria in April 1921 saw this clearly, writing 
that orthodox reforms were necessary not just for Austrian revival but also because 
‘foreign assistance [would be] unobtainable’ until there was confidence ‘that Austria 
means to utilize all its resources to justify foreign help’.304 A note by the EFO’s 
Secretariat similarly explained that ‘control must be organised… which will afford new 
lenders a guarantee that their advances will be used wisely’.305 There was a lack of 
confidence within the Austrian government and within the League in the ability of 
Austria to enact the reforms considered necessary without the existence of control. In 
the Committee’s view there was ‘no hope for Austria unless she is prepared to endure 
and support an authority which must enforce reforms’.306 The austerity and control 
measures were thus partly taken to increase the likelihood that the foreign powers and 
the international financial community, whose support was vital, endorsed the scheme. 
It was important to ensure that the programme seemed credible to them. As Wessels 
argues, in this sense, it was necessary that the programme contained these 
elements.307 Chancellor Seipel himself recognised, in a letter to Franz Rehrl, a provincial 
leader and fellow Christian Social politician, the importance that the loans produced a 
manifestation of the ‘renewed confidence of foreign countries [in the] creditworthiness 
of our community and the vitality of the local economy’ – he recognised that 
international confidence would help boost Austrian confidence and vice-versa.308 
 
The idea of international control of Austria’s budget and expenditure of loans had first 
surfaced in M. Loucheur’s report to Paris Peace Conference in 26 Jan 1921. He 
envisaged the creation of an international commission to control the budget and 
‘rehabilitate public finances… and supervise public revenue’.309 Loucheur’s scheme did 
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not gain acceptance at this stage as, without the mediation of the League, it appeared 
to Austria to award to foreign financiers, bankers and businessmen an excessive level of 
control over Austrian affairs. There is evidence that the British were sceptical of the 
idea of international control of Austria, the government view being that control was 
‘quite unjustifiable for a country like Austria’, an opinion that reflected the notions of 
national hierarchy in relation to sovereignty that existed at this time.310 However, some 
influential British figures did support the idea of international control, such as Sir 
Montagu Norman, who wanted from early on some kind of ‘neutral’ controller (by 
which he meant a financier of neither French nor Italian origin) who would be able to 
assist in protecting financial matters in Austria from what he regarded as damaging 
‘political’ influence.311 At the League, Frank Nixon was in favour of a powerful 
controller, writing to Jean Monnet on 2 Feb 1922 that ‘there is a great deal to be said 
for seizing this opportunity and appointing a single Controller… [with] not only power 
to control the expenditure of the loan by England and others, but also for powers to 
reorganise the Austrian budget’.312 French foreign minister M. Poincaré was also keen 
on the idea of control, and in early 1922 asked his Ambassador to London, A. M. de 
Saint-Aulaire, to discuss the idea with Avenol and the British government.313  
 
The initial Financial Committee delegation to Austria in April 1921 had envisaged some 
form of international control, but also claimed that the Austrian government would 
have a ‘free hand’ to take whatever measures they considered would fit with the 
general precepts of the scheme. The Committee stated that they were not concerned 
about ‘the exact methods by which their result should be obtained’.314 Over time, the 
necessity for strong control if the scheme were to get off the ground became clearer, 
and by the time the Financial Committee report of 1922 was produced, it was stated 
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that ‘all measures must be taken in cooperation with the Commission of Control’, a 
rather stronger formulation. By the time of the final scheme of September 1922, the 
veto power of Commissioner-General was established.315 At this stage, renewed 
Austrian difficulties and the country’s increasing desperation meant that everyone, 
including the Austrians, had accepted the centrality of international control to the 
scheme. In October 1922, Arthur Salter was still averring that the ‘real economic 
programme’ was to be designed by the Austrians, but, whilst the Austrian government 
was free to determine precise details of what cuts would be made, or which state 
employees laid-off, the general parameters of the scheme were not determined by 
them.316  Ultimately, Austria had to cede control over budgets and loan money to the 
Commissioner-General, and of control of the use of Austria’s assets to the Financial 
Committee itself. 
 
On earlier occasions where international control had been employed to ensure certain 
economic or financial policies, or extract repayment for lenders, force was used to 
back-up the control. As Niall Ferguson describes, gunboats were deployed by European 
powers to support the efforts of bondholders in obtaining their returns.317 The Financial 
Committee were aware of these precedents as they considered the Austrian plan, as a 
discussion on the case of the international control of the finances of Egypt after 1878 
reveals. The minutes of a Financial Committee meeting in 1922 record that Sir Basil 
Blackett (who had previously rather grandly told those present that he had already 
joined the Treasury at the time of the loan to Greece of 1898), was asked by M. 
Maggiorino Ferraris 'whether [he] or the Secretariat could inform the Committee of the 
powers of the former controller in Egypt’. Blackett answered that ‘this was very simple. 
The powers of Lord Cromer were purely advisory, but he was supported by a strong 
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“gendarmerie”’.318 In the case of the powers of the Controller in Vienna, however, 
there was no military and police back-up, but just Austrian desperation and a linguistic 
fudge that sought to save Austria’s embarrassment by concealing the extent to which 
the country was ceding sovereignty over fiscal and financial matters.  
 
Rhetoric in the Geneva Convention and from other the Finance Committee sources and 
the League Council emphasised that the programme would respect Austrian 
sovereignty, but in reality this was not the case. The point was, crucially, that the 
Commissioner-General was in charge of the allocation of the loans, and that budgets 
had to be approved by him. All of this gave Commissioner-General Zimmerman 
considerable leverage.319 It was an essential element of the scheme that Austria agree 
to the currency and fiscal reforms laid out in the League’s plan. Without this moves to 
negotiate the loans could not progress.  
 
The extent of the loss of Austrian sovereignty was often obscured, however. A typical 
formulation can be found from the Finance Committee, who having themselves worked 
out the details of the programme that they wanted with very little Austrian input, all 
then agreed that ‘the scheme should be a scheme of the Austrian government, which 
should be approved by the League of Nations.’320 Similarly, in the Geneva Convention, a 
polite method was found for expressing the limitations under which the Austrians 
would operate:  it was stated that ‘when drawing up a programme of Financial Reform, 
the Federal Government should not disregard the views which are expressed [in the] 
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Report of the Financial Committee… on which the Council of the League of Nations laid 
special emphasis when it approved the scheme for the reconstruction of Austria.’321 In 
reality, the scheme would not progress without Austria adhering to the measures 
expressed in the ‘views… of the Financial Committee’, as is revealed in the discussions 
within the Financial Committee, and by the later actions of both the League Delegation 
overseeing the initial phases of the programme in Autumn 1922 as well as the 
Commissioner-General’s actions from the start of 1923.322 There was some discussion 
within the Committee on the extent of control, but the only voice who spoke out 
against the Commissioner-General holding a veto in all matters of government 
spending was Sir Henry Strakosch, who, with his connections to Viennese banking 
circles, may have felt more sympathetic towards the notion of preserving a degree of 
Austrian sovereignty. Strakosch was of the view that the limitations placed upon the 
new Bank of Issue had the effect of restricting government spending, and that, thus, a 
veto power for the Commissioner-General was not required.323 No one else on 
Committee agreed, however. As Dr. Pospíšil, a Czechoslovak delegate suggested, strong 
powers for the Control were necessary for the requisite confidence to be established in 
the scheme.324 
 
The insistence on foreign control had the advantage that it helped to overcome the 
political instability and difficulties within Austria that made it problematic for the 
government to enact reforms autonomously. In Committee deliberations, both M. 
Maggiorino Ferraris and M. Avenol pointed to the way in which foreign control would 
be required to get certain policies, such as some of the austerity measures, 
implemented. Maggiorino Ferraris commented that ‘a number of excellent measures 
could not be taken in Austria for political reasons unless foreign pressure was brought 
to bear’, whilst for Avenol, control ‘would indeed have to reinforce the authority of the 
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Austrian government’.325 Avenol envisaged that the government would gain a measure 
of independence from parliamentary scrutiny and would then work with the 
Commissioner-General on the reforms to be implemented and the spending to be 
authorised: the Enabling Law that was passed in November 1922 was the step that gave 
them this independence.  
 
The level of the control established in some respects removed much sense of Austrian 
agency in the design for the programme, something that is borne out in the fact that 
(despite the Austria Committee’s claims to the contrary), the ‘consultation’ of Austrians 
for the design of the 1922 plan was generally limited to supply of factual information, 
on for example, the State budget, or to submission to interrogation from the Financial 
Committee as to why greater economies had not yet been enacted.326 The Delegation 
in April 1921 had consulted with Austrians, however, and the strength of the control 
did not mean that the programme was forced upon an unwilling and completely 
helpless Austria against its will, nor that the Austrians had no influence. According to 
Dieter Stiefel, the Austrian ‘bankers’ view’ was not only that the policies of the 
reconstruction programme were correct (as bankers in Austria wished to see currency 
stability, a balanced budget, lower taxes, the role of the state reduced, and the repeal 
of post-war social legislation which was ‘now felt to be extremely burdensome’), but 
also that external control in the shape of Zimmerman was desirable. This was because 
Zimmerman ‘was subordinate to the League of Nations’ Financial Committee, whose 
members were bankers and in which the Bank of England played a leading role’. Thus, 
they ‘knew Austrian economic policy to be in the right hands’.327 Here, we see once 
again the way bankers and financiers often had shared values, regardless of their 
nationality: many bankers, partly because of the nature of their work, had transnational 
connections, and transnational values. These values were also shared, at least to some 
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extent, by many in the governing coalition in Austria, and the government made some 
reforms entirely voluntarily, such as to the bread subsidy in early 1922. They wished to 
conform with the League’s prescriptions, and, in any case, the Christian Social-
dominated government wished to enact a similar agenda to that of the League. Whilst 
Peter Berger may be overstating it to say that the reform programme was 
predominantly representative of a ‘conservative national government’s strategy’,328 the 
government did broadly share the some of the same aims as the League, as will be 
explained in Chapter Four.329   
 
The Austrian government did demonstrate that it was not just the passive recipient of 
the League’s strictures on certain matters, such as the occasion when they insisted 
upon the appointment of their own head of the Bank of Issue. He was, contrary to the 
wishes of, in particular, Niemeyer and Norman, an Austrian, something which they 
feared would lead to dreaded ‘political’ interference in the running of the Bank. Both 
were outraged by this action, as their correspondence at this time makes clear. 
Niemeyer, for example, wrote to Sir Arthur Salter that the Austria’s Bank of Issue 
appointment was ‘not merely exasperating but folly… idiocy’.330 Norman’s objections 
were widely known by politicians in Austria, but none were willing to compromise on 
this point. Seipel apparently felt that the difficulties that this would present with 
parliament and with public made adhering to Norman’s wish here impossible.331 
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Overall, most parts of the programme were designed elsewhere, however, by a narrow 
group in the Financial Committee, and Austria had little choice but to accept its diktats.  
 
Money and gold 
A further central aspect of the League’s programme, and one that was regarded by 
Financial Committee members and others as being closely tied to the issue of 
budgetary equilibrium, was the idea that it was critical to establish the Austrian 
currency at a fixed value. The importance of a stable currency was highlighted by the 
1921 Financial Committee delegation to Austria early on, when they stated that this 
was ‘the most important step towards the reconstruction of Austria’.332 They outlined 
the benefits of a fixed-value for the currency, claiming that, ‘it alone will be able to 
prevent the continued rise in prices, and to lead to an actual stabilisation of the cost in 
living’: it would ‘do away with the diseased speculation prevalent today and 
threatening to infect all classes of the population,… support and stimulate all forms of 
productive activity, and restore internal and foreign credit’.333 In the minds of those 
involved in designing the scheme for Austria, budget deficits and the value of the 
currency were intrinsically linked to one another: the stabilisation of the currency was 
only possible, ‘if safeguarded against a relapse into budgetary deficits’.334  
 
The Bank of England and the British treasury were very clear on the problems that an 
absence of a fixed currency value created. A Treasury document from late 1921, for 
example, explained that foreign capitalists would be deterred from investment in 
Austria for as long as they would struggle to convert Krone into sterling (there being no 
buyers for Krone), but, ‘as soon as convertibility was a reality, the circulation would 
expand again, and the capital of the bank would be liberated for investment’.335 The 
specific form of fixed currency value envisaged was the creation of a gold standard. As 
is discussed later in this chapter, the restoration of this system, which had seemed to 
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deliver stability and prosperity before the war, was an urgent priority for influential 
financial figures such as Sir Montagu Norman. Austria-Hungary had been on a de-facto 
gold standard before the First World War operated by the Austro-Hungarian Bank.336 Its 
requirement to hold a ratio of 40% gold-to-currency had been suspended during the 
war, and the bank had assisted with war financing by issuing bonds and loans. To return 
to limited cash issues of notes backed up at a certain ratio by gold or currencies 
convertible into gold was for many politicians and financiers in the post-war world a 
financial and economic necessity – a measure of a country’s maturity and stature.337  
 
In order to ensure that the government did not control the money supply nor have the 
means to pressurise the Austrian central bank to increase the money supply, it was 
regarded as necessary to establish a Bank of Issue with full independence from the 
government of Austria. As with ending the deficit and lowering government spending, 
the establishment of a currency backed up by gold was also seen as partly a matter of 
confidence. It is interesting that unlike in budgetary matters, the close supervision of 
the establishment of the currency was not regarded as necessary, so long as the 
statutes of the Bank of Issue clearly specified the role and remit of the Bank. This 
perhaps reveals a faith in the intrinsic responsibility of bankers, in comparison with 
politicians, a perhaps unsurprising bias given the background of so many members of 
the Committee who tended to regard themselves as technical, impartial and above 
politics. The launch of an independent bank of issue was an absolutely key part of the 
reforms, so far as the Financial Committee were concerned. It was, thus, the first 
priority of the Delegation overseeing the initial implementation of the programme in 
the autumn of 1922 to ensure the prompt establishment of the Bank of Issue. This 
occurred by November 1922, at which point, in a move designed to reassure the 
international community that a currency fixed to gold was on the horizon, the Bank was 
compelled to urgently issue a statement that it ‘intended at the earliest possible date 
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to substitute for the existing discredited notes a completely new currency with a 
definite value.’338 When the bank commenced operations on 2 January 1923, they 
announced that their aim was a Krone at a value of 71.060 to the dollar, a relatively low 
level, at which value it was hoped the currency would not be too much of a hindrance 
to exporters, although, as we will see in the next chapter, this value still had a 
deflationary effect.339  Austria thus become the first currency to be established post-
war on a gold-standard basis in 1923, as the Krone was replaced by the Schilling.340 This 
currency was not restored to the pre-war de-facto parity in relation to gold, that is, its 
value in relation to gold was lower than pre-war, and in this sense was not an entirely 
rigid implementation of the ‘return to 1914’ values.341 The apparent success of Austrian 
stabilisation (even though it predated the actual fixing of the value of the currency and 
the establishment on gold)342, reinforced the belief in the efficacy of ‘gold values’, as 
will be discussed in the final chapter.  
 
The loans and the guarantees 
One of the purposes of budgetary discipline, international control, and the 
reestablishment of the Austria currency was that these measures would engender the 
international confidence to give Austria access to the funds that she desperately 
required. The requirement for foreign financing was at the heart of Austria’s appeal to 
the international community, as seen in the previous chapter. The Finance Committee 
initially wished to see an internal Austrian loan go some way to meeting Austria’s 
needs, but this was not possible in the absence of international support in obtaining 
foreign finance, as the Delegation to Austria quickly realised.343 The fact that these 
loans would only be possible if guarantees were provided to underwrite them was not 
realised at the time of the original, stalled Financial Committee plan of 1921. It was 
                                                          
338 Financial Committee Report, 31 May 1921, TNA T160/57, 2073/5. 
339 See Peter Berger, ‘The League of Nations and Interwar Austria: Critical Assessment of a Partnership in 
Economic Reconstruction’, in Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Alexander Lassner (eds.), The Dollfuss-
Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A Reassessment, Contemporary Austrian Studies, 11 (New Brunswick and London, 
2003), 80. 
340 See ibid., 79. Also, Nathan Lewis, Gold – the Once and Future Money (Hoboken, New Jersey, 2007), 40.  
341 See Chapter Four.  
342 For more information on this, see the next chapter.  
343 See Mr. Lindley to Lord Curzon, 29 April 1921, NA T160/57, 2073/4.  
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hoped at this stage that the suspension of the liens would be sufficient, as, with 
Austrian assets free of these obligations for twenty years, as Austrian Finance Minister 
Alfred Gürtler344 pointed out, the assets of Austria were more than sufficient to provide 
security for the loans.345  
 
As Austrian difficulties continued for another eighteen months, however, and as liens 
were slow to be released, it gradually became clear that some sort of foreign guarantee 
would be necessary if there were to be any hope of Austria obtaining the funds that it 
required in the short term. This was despite the fact that the Reparations Commission 
had withdrawn from Austria, signalling that it would not attempt to collect reparations 
from the country, at least for the time being.346 The decision of the transnational 
consortium of banking interests that investigated the possibility of lending to Austria in 
spring 1922 that they could not lend, indicated the scale of the difficulties that the 
country faced. The issue was once again one of confidence in the future viability and 
existence of Austria as a state: it was very difficult for foreign lenders to consider 
becoming involved in a state which might not exist at a later date. British banker G.M. 
Young, who had investigated conditions in Austrian on behalf of the consortium in the 
spring of 1922, outlined the problem to a British treasury official and raised the 
possibility of a guarantee in June 1922:  
I have come to the conclusion that a guarantee is required for any foreign credit, 
simply because we cannot say whether in two years there will be an Austria or 
not, and the successor State whoever it may be will have to take over the 
obligation. The material security is I believe quite adequate, but clearly if you take 
the Austrian customs you must make provision for the case of their becoming 
German or Danubian customs in five years. This is not the kind of business that 
Morgans would look kindly on. There is too much politics in it.347 
                                                          
344 Alfred Gürtler, economist, statistician and Austrian Finance Minister between 1921 and 1922 in Chancellor 
(and INTERPOL pioneer) Johann Schober’s first Christian Social administration.  
345 Dr Gürtler’s speech in the National Council 13 October 1921, reported in Neue Freie Presse, 14 October 
1921, translation from TNA T160/58, 2073/7. 
346 The Commission had already released their control over Austrian assets, but their actual physical 
withdrawal from the country was a move designed to engender confidence that reparations would not be 
collected for the foreseeable future.  
347 G.M. Young to Spencer Smith, 17 June 1922, BOE OV28/53, Austria (Rehabilitation).  
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Thus, the apparently dim prospects for Austria’s survival as an independent country left 
the possibility of foreign lending to Austria very remote, but, as Chapter Two revealed, 
the very same fact acted as a motivation for the French and British governments to 
become involved to attempt to assist Austria, and by the time that the Financial 
Committee met to examine the Austrian situation again in September 1922, the idea of 
the guarantees was firmly established. Sir Basil Blackett was clear at this stage on the 
necessity of a guarantee, as he indicated in a note sent to Eric Drummond, Jean 
Monnet and Sir Arthur Salter just before the Committee convened.348 In the event, the 
Committee agreed upon a mechanism for the guarantees, designed by Sir Henry 
Strakosch, that proposed separate guarantees be issued simultaneously.349 The 
governments involved agreed, and the stage was finally set for Austria to be able to 
access the funds that would help to keep the country, and the government, afloat.  
 
Whilst the League’s project in Austria in many ways represented an attempt to restore 
pre-war economic and financial values, and, as such, it was not an innovative move, the 
attempt to implement these was pursued via co-ordination orchestrated by 
international institutions, which was novel. And in some respects, the guarantees 
represented a new form of international financial and diplomatic cooperation via an 
international institution in pursuit of what might be regarded as the greater good – in 
this case, financial stability in Austria which enhanced the chances of the country’s 
independent survival. As we saw in the previous chapter, however, the motivations for 
the powers to offer these guarantees were to do with their perception of their 
interests, and their desire to uphold the peace settlement and prevent chaos in Europe. 
Furthermore, the guarantee mechanism was not as novel as it at first appeared, in that 
guarantees had been given by foreign governments before to secure international 
finance for a country, as in the case of the international loan to Greece of 1898.350 The 
Austrian case is thus only partially the dawning of a new era of international financial 
                                                          
348 Sir Basil Blackett to Drummond, Monnet, Salter, ‘Austria’, undated but around late August 1922, LNA S107, 
Sir A Salter, No. 4 Austria. 
349 Minutes of the Financial Committee, Ninth Session, Geneva, 9 September 1922, LNA S107, Sir A Salter, No. 
4 Austria. 
350 See Michael Waibel, ‘Echoes of History – the International Finance Commission in Greece’, Christoph G. 
Paulus, A Debt Restructuring Mechanism for Sovereigns – Do We Need a Legal Procedure? (Oxford, 2014), 3-20.  
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cooperation (albeit one that broke down during the depression years). It was also the 
continuance of long established mechanisms, via a new and official international 
organisation, the League. 
 
Assumptions, interpretations and ideologies 
In considering why the scheme for Austria took the form that it did, and whose 
interests and ideologies it reflected, the Finance Committee, who were for the most 
part unified on these matters, advanced a certain set of prescriptions for the Austrian 
budget that reflected their assumptions and ideologies, which in turn reflected the 
opinions and interests of a wider transnational elite. Their views represented a desire 
to return to the conditions that had produced prosperity for certain groups before the 
First World War. Whilst these assumptions were widely held in certain circles at the 
time, they were not universally held, and the solutions that they offered were not the 
only possible options. A focus upon budgetary rectitude and fixed currency values tied 
to gold as key features of the programme reflected a set of assumptions and beliefs 
that the Financial Committee had about the causes of Austrian woes. Underpinning this 
interpretation was an orthodox economic world view. This world view tended towards 
a particular assessment of the causes of hyperinflation in post-First World War Europe, 
which in turn influenced the proposed solutions. The view of the Financial Committee 
was that the cause of the problem was firmly rooted in government overspending and 
deficits, and in the absence of a fixed value for the Krone. Their interpretation about 
the causes of inflation and hyperinflation were not necessarily correct, as some at the 
time and since have realised.  
 
The debate about the causes of hyperinflation in post-First World War Europe, and 
most particularly Germany, is not conclusively finished, partly because historians’ and 
economists’ interpretations often reflect their political ideologies and cannot be 
entirely reconciled, although, in the case of German hyperinflation, Charles 
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Kindleberger and Niall Ferguson have to some extent attempted some reconciliation.351 
Nikolaus Wolf identifies the two polarised interpretations of the causes of inflation as 
the ‘fiscal view’ and the ‘balance of payments view’.352  The first blames inflation on 
excessive government spending, which eventually reduces the confidence of lenders 
and investors to the government, leading the government to increase the money 
supply and thus inflation so as to meet its expenditure obligations. In this view, 
government deficits are the key cause of inflation. This belief was widely held at the 
time of the Austrian difficulties, and was reflected in statements produced by the 
League on the situation. For League official J. van Waldré de Bordes, who was part of 
the Secretariat supporting the Financial Committee, the Austrian problem was a 
‘vicious circle: drawing up a balanced budget, inflation to cover the deficit, 
depreciation, another budget unbalanced. It is like a cat chasing its tail’.353 According to 
a Bank of England source, the idea that the inflation in Austria was caused by excessive 
government expenditure was a ‘cardinal point’ for the Financial Committee.354 A major 
contemporary proponent of this account in a more nuanced form was leading 
economist Gustav Cassels, and later this ‘fiscal’ interpretation was reflected in the 
monetarist account of the causes of inflation produced by Milton Friedman.355 As Niall 
Ferguson points out, however, a strictly monetarist interpretation does not really 
account for ‘why in one country the inflationary process proceeds so much further or 
faster than in another. Nor can it explain why the consequences of inflation vary so 
much from case to case’. He makes the point that British public expenditure during the 
First World War exceeded that of Germany, and that French expenditure exceeded that 
                                                          
351 Charles P. Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe (London, 1984), 289-300; Niall Ferguson, The 
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355 Gustav Cassel, The World’s Monetary Problems (London, 1921), and Milton Friedman, Inflation – causes and 
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of Russia, and yet it was Germany and Russia that had the particularly difficult 
inflationary problems.356 
 
According to gold standard adherents and some later monetarists, balance of trade 
problems are resolved by tight monetary policy.357 For these economists, the key issue 
is the value of money. In their view, a stable exchange currency value, controlled 
money supply and low inflation will produce a positive balance of trade.358 The original 
theory relating to this is David Hume’s notion of a price-specie flow mechanism (specie 
refers to gold), which theorised an automatic mechanism whereby international 
transactions were conducted in gold between countries whose currencies were fully 
convertible to gold. Those in trade surplus would see an in-flow of gold, leading to an 
increase in money supply, leading to an increase in inflation, leading to an increase in 
prices, leading to a reduction of exports, leading to a reduction in their quantities of 
gold holdings and thus a trade-neutral position. The reverse mechanism applied for 
those in trade deficit. However, for some economic theorists, the causation of inflation 
flows the other way, in that a dependence on imports leaves a country short of foreign 
currency, which then makes it harder for that country to pay for the very goods and 
services it requires from abroad, which in turn leads to currency difficulties, 
depreciation and inflation.359 
 
In the context of the post-First World War world, a complex interaction of both factors 
contributed to the problems faced by countries suffering from hyperinflation, but other 
factors were also crucial.360 Economists acknowledge the role of psychological factors in 
                                                          
356 Ferguson, Ascent, 102.  
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producing hyperinflation.361 As early as 1937, Constantino Bresciani-Turroni wrote in 
relation to the case of German hyperinflation that ‘many times I have pointed out… 
psychological causes of the fall of the mark’.362 In Austria, a central issue was also the 
lack of confidence in the viability of the country. This made foreign speculators unlikely 
to buy up the Krone, and caused those in Austria with cash to seek to turn their Krone 
into foreign currency, as foreign currency held its value better, and was, critically, more 
likely to survive. As an Austrian commentator realised at the time, and later authors 
have pointed out, the problem was not just the money supply or the deficit, it was once 
again the lack of confidence in the future survival of the state,  
the economic illness, from which Austria is suffering, is at bottom due to the fact 
that at the moment of the collapse… everyone lost all belief in the permanent 
existence of the country. And in consequence there is in Austria a perfectly 
genuine and effective hunger for foreign currency for saving purposes, in which 
hunger there is nothing forced. It is based on the psychology of the population. 
The country is sucking up foreign currency against its exports in commodities and 
capital investments, because there is here a perpetually increasing demand for 
foreign currency.363 
As the British Embassy noted in 1921, in Austria at this time there was ‘an abnormal 
demand for foreign money’.364 The worthlessness of the Austrian currency was fuelled 
by expectations of the country’s oblivion, which promoted enormous demand in 
Austria for foreign currency, and widespread attempts to liquidate all holdings of Krone. 
The government then struggled to use its depreciating currency to pay for its 
requirements, such as food and fuel imports, and the repayment of foreign debt, and 
resorted to the printing press to meet the ever-inflating food subsidies and salaries of 
officials. The index-linking of many salaries to inflation further added to the inflationary 
spiral. The inflationary problems seem to have been worsened by rapid increases in the 
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money supply and upward movements in wages. These were really but symptoms of 
the underlying problems, as the government desperately struggled to keep up with the 
diminishing Krone and tried to prevent severe reductions in living standards, as these 
might have increased social and political tensions and unrest. Whilst there was a 
correlation in Austria between the money supply and the rate of inflation, the amount 
of Krone in circulation actually continued to rise substantially even after the point of 
stabilisation and as inflation dramatically reduced.365 Thus, it is difficult in the case of 
the Austrian example to conclude that the underlying problem can have been the 
expansion in the size of the money supply, although it may have exacerbated the 
difficulties.  
 
In 1924, League official de Bordes, who had previously regarded the Austrian problem 
as one of budget deficits, undertook a study into the causes of Austrian hyperinflation 
and concluded that the root of the problem had not been deficits but had been, rather, 
speculation on the exchanges and capital flight, and that these movements were 
propelled to a significant extent by psychological factors.366 In the view of Karl 
Bachinger and Herbert Matis, ‘capital flight and currency speculation were decisive 
elements in post-war inflation in Austria’, although they argue that the origins of the 
original inflationary problem lay in difficulties in financing the war economy.367 In 
Finance Minister Alfred Gürtler’s view, it was not so much the deficit that was the 
problem as the uncertainty and insecurity produced by St-Germain and reparations, 
and certainly, whilst no attempt was actually made to collect reparations, their 
theoretical existence, and the presence until 1922 of the Reparation Commission in 
Austria added to the insecurity and uncertainty that surrounded the question of the 
future of Austria.368 The perception of instability and unviability left confidence in the 
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Krone at rock bottom, the value of the currency low and falling, inflation rising, and the 
government little option but to produce more cash to meet requirements, which added 
further to the collapsing value of the currency.  
 
Another problem hampered the Austrian government, which is that the income tax 
system was dysfunctional. A mixture of Austrians’ reluctance to pay tax on principle, 
combined with a sense that it was not worth contributing to the exchequer of a 
perhaps failing state, increased the difficulties with collection. The Austrians in 1921 
were still collecting income tax for 1918 (an unintended bonus of the reconstruction 
was that it reversed this problem in 1923, as we will see in the next chapter), although 
other taxes were easier to collect.369 In Austria during the inflationary era an alternative 
way of viewing the country’s inflationary difficulties, even if the budget deficit is 
accepted as a major factor in driving the problem (which it need not be), is to view the 
level of taxation as insufficient. In the context of post-war Europe, with large labour 
movements, newly enfranchised working classes, veterans to reintegrate and in some 
cases care for, economies to reconstruct, and in the case of Austria, a nation and a 
state to create and legitimise, a sufficient level of taxation to pay for services and 
reconstruction would have prevented large budget deficits. The problem of the 
legitimacy of the state did not make collecting taxation easy, as we have seen. 
Nevertheless, there was also a resistance to raising the level of taxation in some 
quarters, as evinced by the ferocious reaction when the City of Vienna municipal 
authority did just this from 1922.370 In the view of Barry Eichengreen, Peter Temin and 
Eduard März, the situation in Austria could be regarded as a ‘distributional conflict’: 
that is, the problem in post-war Austria was insufficient willingness to share and 
redistribute resources to pay for what was needed to stabilise the country.371 
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For their part, the Financial Committee of the League had a broadly monetarist or fiscal 
view of the causes of Austrian hyperinflation, and their suggested solutions reflected a 
certain set of assumptions about the proper operation of finance and economics. These 
assumptions influenced interpretations about the causes of Austria’s problems, which 
then affected the nature of the remedies they proposed. Whilst the beliefs held by 
members of the Financial Committee were widely shared within their circles, other 
interpretations of the problems and other possible solutions were advanced. 
 
Early on, for example, the key problem in Austria was regarded as being one of trade. A 
report of the Austria Committee to the Allied Conference in Paris in January 1921 
focussed to a large extent on trade problems as critical in Austria.372 Recognising the 
centrality of this issue, certain countries, such as Italy and to some extent 
Czechoslovakia, along with individuals such as Sir William Goode, attempted (and 
failed) to gain support for a conference in Pressburg (Bratislava) to attempt to resolve 
issues in former Austro-Hungarian lands around trade and trade barriers. These 
attempts did not receive much support elsewhere. By September 1922, the trade 
situation, whilst far from ideal, had improved somewhat.373 Beneš and various Austrian 
leaders had made some efforts to improve trading relations between Czechoslovakia 
and Austria, and a very low-value currency gave benefits to Austrian exporters. Indeed, 
the increased and fixed value of the currency post-1923 was not necessarily in the 
interests of exporters, a little remarked upon side-effect of the scheme. Some of the 
supporters of the League programme in Austria, such as Czechoslovakia, were likely to 
benefit from a stronger Krone relative to their currency.  
 
Another problem faced by Austria was the lack of economic investment that there had 
been post-war in the country’s industries and enterprises. Sir William Goode’s 
previously mentioned plan envisaged that the finance raised for Austria could be used 
                                                          
372 The Report of the Committee of Austria, Approved in principle by the Allied Conference in Paris 29 January 
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for investment in economic development.374 This was definitely not a part of the 
League’s programme, however, and indeed, when in 1924 the Austrian government 
sought to use loans in this way, their attempts were blocked by the Commissioner-
General and the League.375 Direct government investment in the economy in this form 
was, after all, contrary to the precepts of ‘sound finance’. Another scheme proposed by 
an associate of Sir William Goode’s in Vienna suggested that the value of the Austrian 
currency be maintained by restoring confidence in it via the means of the concerted 
purchase by a foreign group of the ‘far too low price crown’.376 This scheme made 
sense if the root of the problem was the lack of demand for the crown and excessive 
demand for foreign currency for saving purposes within Austria, but as long as the issue 
of the lack of confidence about Austria’s future survival remained, it would seem 
unlikely that such a group would have felt the confidence to speculate. Perhaps a 
guarantee, similar to the one issued for the loans, could have been arranged, however. 
Whatever the feasibility of such a scheme, it was anyway not investigated by the 
Financial Committee.  
 
A further proposal for Austrian financial reconstruction issued at the time was that of 
the Social Democratic Party, who suggested fewer cuts, measures to deploy the large 
private holdings of foreign currency that there were in Austria for investment purposes 
in the economy, restrictions on future purchases of such currency (in order to stabilise 
the currency value) and some extra taxes on business and the wealthy.377 That this 
programme was not regarded as completely impractical nor revolutionary can be seen 
by the support which it received, not just from Sir William Goode, but also from the 
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British diplomat Edward Keeling, and from the Christian Social Party.378 SDAP’s 
proposals were not considered or even mentioned by the Financial Committee, who 
presumably would have not been likely to entertain the possibility that socialist 
economic ideas could have relevance. 
 
The focus of the Financial Committee was not on the idea that one of the main sources 
of Austria’s problems was huge demand for foreign currency, nor upon the issues that 
the viability question caused, despite the knowledge of some in Austria and elsewhere 
of these factors. And whilst the Committee was aware of the significance of the issue of 
trade and investment, these factors were not at the heart of their assessment of what 
was wrong in Austria. Their view, from the start of their involvement in the project, was 
a conventional one: these kinds of problems were caused by government deficits and 
the absence of a gold standard. In this, they reflected the standard assumptions of 
financiers and bankers, and British treasury assumptions. It is interesting to note how 
little discussion there was in Committee meetings about the possible causes of the 
inflation. The Committee did not conduct a serious examination of the problem at this 
stage. As far as they were concerned, the problems were evident and obvious, and in 
that sense easily fixed, although they did realise that the measures that they were 
proposing would not be likely to deal with the entirety of Austria’s difficulties.379 But 
the membership of the Committee did reflect the views of the transnational financial 
class that they represented, and in this, they were probably correct to think that 
conventional economic and financial measures would be required to create the 
requisite confidence.  
 
The role of the Financial Committee and the role of nation-states 
The views of the Financial Committee were central in shaping the Austrian scheme and 
when examining the programme, the lack of input from politicians and the reliance 
upon the judgements of the bankers and treasury officials identified as the financial 
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‘experts’ is striking. The Austria Committee and the Council of the League did not 
discuss the provisions of the scheme in much detail, nor seek to alter the prescriptions 
of the Financial Committee. Council member and British foreign secretary Austen 
Chamberlain, until recently British Chancellor of the Exchequer and thus presumably 
versed in financial and economic matters, highlighted the reliance that the Council 
placed upon the experts’ reports.380 The Committee did not act in complete isolation in 
their work, and those corresponding with members of the Committee about the 
scheme included Sir Montagu Norman, head of the Bank of England and central part of 
the wider transnational banking community from which the members of the Financial 
Committee were drawn.381 In contrast, politicians and even treasury ministers did not 
communicate directly with the Committee except through formal channels, such as the 
Austria Committee.382 
 
The politicians very much deferred to the Committee as the ‘experts’ and thus did not 
challenge their interpretations of events nor question the solutions they proposed. As 
Arthur Balfour, chair of the Austria Committee expressed it, ‘the Committee must 
reserve for its own consideration the political questions and refer to experts the 
financial and economic questions’.383 Later, when the Financial Committee produced its 
report and programme, the Austria Committee and Council adopted it without 
alteration.384 As contemporary commentator Maurice Fanshawe put it, the prevailing 
view was that the experts ‘were fully qualified to reflect current and highly informed 
opinion’.385 What Balfour referred to as ‘political’ elements were more to do with 
gaining the various parties’ acquiescence to the scheme, and it is noteworthy that there 
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was little focus in the Austria Committee on what they regarded as ‘technical’ questions 
for the ‘experts’.386  
 
This feature of the early stage of international financial diplomacy is in striking contrast 
to the direct involvement that politicians had at the Paris Peace Conference around 
issue of borders, empire and security.387 This reflected the politicians’ perception that 
territorial and defence matters were of greater significance for their countries and for 
future peace and the post-war settlement, but as John Maynard Keynes famously 
pointed out, by overlooking the centrality of economic and financial matters to the 
future of Europe, politicians were failing to engage in one of the most critical issues for 
the future of the continent.388 The distinction that was often made between ‘political’ 
matters and supposedly technical economic and financial matters reveals widespread 
assumptions amongst politicians, civil servants, financiers and bankers about the 
supposedly objective and technical status of advice, and there are repeated references 
in the archives to the ‘impartial’ nature of the Committee.389 Matters of financial and 
economic policy are, however, intrinsically political, and represent choices that reflect 
ideologies that often benefit certain groups, and the effect of leaving policy-making of 
this kind to supposedly objective and scientific technicians can be to obscure the very 
political nature of what they are engaged in. As shown earlier in this chapter, the 
scheme for Austria represented certain ideologies and assumptions that were not the 
only possible interpretations of, nor the only possible solutions to, the situation in 
Austria. Certain governments and politicians were interested in seeing Austria survive, 
and thus became involved in advocating for the scheme and ensuring its viability 
                                                          
386 An example of this can be seen in a British account of the issue of Italian acquiescence to the suspension of 
liens in which it was reported that the French anxious to get Italy to agree: ‘this is really a political and not a 
financial question and is not primarily suitable for study by an expert Committee’, MacFadyean to Fass, TNA 
T160/57, 2073/5.  
387 See Margaret McMillan, Peacemakers – the Paris Peace Conference on 1919 and its Attempt to End War 
(London, 2001).  
388 John Maynard Keynes, Economic Consequences of the Peace (London, 1919), 134: ‘to what a different 
future Europe might have looked forward if either Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Wilson had apprehended that the 
most serious of the problems which claimed their attention were not political or territorial, but financial and 
economic, and that the perils of the future lay not in frontiers or sovereignties, but in food, coal and transport.’ 
389 For example, note by Frank Nixon outlining the 1921 process, Annex A. Extract from British Secretary’s 
verbatim notes of a meeting of financial experts, 17 March 1921, TNA T160/57, 2073/5.  
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(through, for example, urging for the lifting of liens), but when it came to the political 
details, they did not feel that it was their proper role to be involved. In the ‘technical’ 
areas, experts were able to wield a huge amount of power, by dint of their supposed 
special and privileged knowledge. The example of the case of Austrian financial 
reconstruction reveals the role of the ‘experts’ in designing the scheme for Austrian 
financial reconstruction and demonstrates the power that such figures had in financial 
policy making, even at this early stage of institutionalised internationalist financial 
work. It bears out the contentions of those, such as Flandreau and Pauly, who point to 
the central importance of the work of transnational experts in shaping financial 
policy.390 The experts in Austria were part of the development of the process of what 
Mitchell calls ‘the production and export of technocratic knowledge’, which he 
identifies as having its origins in the development of parts of particularly the British 
Empire, for example, in Egypt in the late nineteenth century.391 The links between 
various facets of the situation in Austria and that in Egypt were clear to the members of 
the Committee, and in the Austrian case, we see the continuation and greater 
extension of technocratic power in the post-First World War era.  
 
Whilst the members of the Financial Committee can be regarded as forming part of a 
transnational group or class, they were appointed by and originated from specific 
member states of the League, and, as such, may have sought advanced the national 
interest of their home nations through the League’s scheme.392 It is necessary to very 
cautious about the extent to which these individuals might have reflected the interests 
of their country or the viewpoints of their government, as the members of the Finance 
Committee participated as independent experts. Nevertheless, they often had 
important roles within the countries from which they came, and some, such as Blackett, 
                                                          
390 See Louis W. Pauly, ‘The League of Nations and the Foreshadowing of the International Monetary Fund’ in 
Essays in International Finance No. 201 (Princeton, 1996); Marc Flandreau (ed.), Money Doctors: History, 
Theory, Policy – The Experience of International Financial Advising, 1850-2000 (London, 2003). 
391 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts – Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 
2002).  
392 Later on in the inter-war period, the supposedly non-political stance of members of the secretariat of the 
League was undermined by the growing entrenchment of fascism in Italy. See Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer, 
The International Secretariat – A Great Experiment in International Administration (Washington, 1945).  
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worked for the state, and thus some tentative ideas about the role of national agendas 
in the Financial Committee can be advanced.  
 
It is interesting to note that the individuals who were most consistently present at 
Committee meetings about Austria were Avenol, Blackett, Pospíšil and Strakosch – 
perhaps demonstrating the greater interest in the project that their home countries 
had, compared to, say, Japan, whose delegate was rarely present.393 Economic and 
fiscal orthodoxy was in the 1920s a British concern, with the French following a less 
austere line, as can be seen in Robert Boyce’s comparative study of the British and 
French economic policies of the era.394 The Financial Committee of the League at this 
time has often been viewed as being essentially an extension of British policy, 
controlled by Sir Montagu Norman. Montagu’s activities in central Europe, conducted 
via the work of the Financial Committee, have been characterised as an attempt to 
advance British power via the means of extending British economic interests and ties in 
central and Eastern Europe, as we have seen.395 Similarly, the French Petite Entente 
strategy also contained an economic element that progressed in tandem with their 
political goals.396 French and British policy is often regarded as being in tension and 
conflict over this area at this time, but in the case of the Financial Committee, there is 
little evidence of French representatives deviating from the British line, even if British 
representatives like Blackett and Niemeyer were perhaps more forceful in their 
advocacy of a strongly orthodox stance on budgets. Key French Committee member 
Joseph Avenol appears to have agreed on the orthodox policy, and here, as elsewhere 
in relation to the Austrian scheme, there was harmony between the British perspective 
and the French perspective, despite the British desire expressed elsewhere to prevent 
‘French protectionist economics’ having an influence.397 The French and the British also 
                                                          
393 Japanese delegate Kenjo Mori was generally based in London so his absence is not likely to be due to the 
distance from Japan.  
394 Robert Boyce, The Great Interwar Crisis and the Collapse of Globalization (Basingstoke, 2009). 
395 See Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed – European International History 1919-1933 (Oxford, 2005), 281.  
396 See Peter Jackson, Beyond the Balance of Power – France and the Politics and National Security in the Era of 
the First World War (Cambridge, 2013). 
397 See, for example, the report from M. Lefèvre-Pontalis, Ministre de la Républic Français en Autriche á 
Raymond Poincaré, 10 Juillet 1922, AD, CPC-Z-Europe, Europe 1918-29, 117 Autriche, and Frank Nixon to Sir 
Basil Blackett, July 1921, LNA S107, Sir A Salter, No. 4 Austria. The British were, however, suspicious of the 
Loucheur scheme as it seemed a too blatant attempt to advance French economic interests. 
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cooperated on the issue of the suspension of liens and discussed the possibility of 
League action on Austrian in February 1922.398 
 
Scrutiny of the deliberations of the Financial Committee reveal the dominance of 
particularly British and somewhat British delegates (Sir Henry Strakosch being a South 
African, of Viennese origin, residing in London, with substantial business interests 
there), along with Joseph Avenol and Glückstadt, who had been members of the 
original delegation to Vienna.399 The dominance of these figures is particularly 
noticeable when it comes to the perhaps more ideological elements of the scheme, 
such as the budgetary and currency issues. Others members, such Dr. Pospíšil of 
Czechoslovakia, and S. Maggiorino Ferraris of Italy were heavily involved in the 
discussions of the form and powers of international control. There is also no real 
evidence of disagreements between nationals on the Committee, with the exception of 
Strakosch’s desire for the Controller in Vienna to have fewer powers. In general, the 
Italian representative did not become very involved in the discussions on the more 
ideological elements of the scheme, and this may reflect an Italian stance on the 
scheme that differed from that of the British and French. For the Italian government, 
their big decision had been whether to lift their liens against Austria, as these were 
substantial, and they were keen to be involved in the programme. The government’s 
lack of concern for the actual details of the scheme, as indicated by the fact that there 
is a scarcity of Italian treasury documents relating to the project,400 suggests perhaps 
that the Italians did not regard the financial elements as key to their interests, but more 
their involvement in general as important in reflecting their status as a victorious power 
and an influential power in Europe. The lack of Italian treasury interest in the scheme is 
in sharp contrast to the level of engagement from the British treasury, reflected in the 
substantial quantity of treasury documents on this subject held in the British national 
                                                          
398 See document, ‘Instructions to be given by British and French Treasuries to British and French Foreign 
Offices’, 3 June 1921, copy in LNA S107, Sir Arthur Salter, No. 4 Austria, 2/11 and in the same location, a copy 
of a foreign office document (from FO 2073/4) from M.G. Ramsay of the Treasury to the Under Secretary of 
State at the Foreign Office (undated). 
399 Along with yet another British banker, Sir Drummond Drummond Fraser. 
400 Archivio centrale dello Stato, Rome.  
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archives.401 The British archives show a substantial amount of communication between 
the Treasury, the Bank of England and the Foreign Office on the subject of Austrian 
financial reconstruction between 1921 and 1923, and this demonstrates the way that 
British officials and the Bank of England saw a connection between their strategic 
interests and the financial and economic position of Austria, and indeed saw their 
strategic interests as being advanced through the development of the economic and 
financial position of Austria.402 
 
Overall, despite the perhaps somewhat different emphases of different nationals on 
the Finance Committee, there were not substantial disagreements as to its form. This 
lack of disagreement between the different nationals indicates that in the case of the 
Financial Committee, we are dealing with a transnational group, who in general shared 
a common understanding in the main on the principles of finance and economics. Of 
course, these nationals, as is evident in the case of Otto Niemeyer, did not see a 
contradiction between their own beliefs and that of their national interest, quite the 
contrary.  
 
Conclusions – what did the scheme represent? 
As the first major financial and economic scheme designed by a new international 
organisation – that is, the League and its incipient economic and financial arm the EFO, 
the scheme for Austria often appears innovative in its nature and form. Indeed, in many 
ways the programme for Austria was the beginning of a continuous line in international 
financial diplomacy reflected in the post-Second World War work of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank and their stabilisation packages, and ‘bailouts’, 
such as that in Greece from 2010.403  As a precedent for international involvement in a 
state’s economy and finances, the scheme certainly was in many ways novel, and it 
contained many of the elements found in later stabilisation programmes, such as the 
                                                          
401 TNA. The British treasury records held in the archives also include foreign office documents relating to 
Austria reconstruction, which have been placed in the treasury archives. Nevertheless, there are a substantial 
number of documents that were originally treasury documents.  
402 See TNA T160/57, op. cit.  
403 See Pauly, ‘The League of Nations’.  
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involvement of international institutions and their ‘experts’, attempts to present 
schemes as neutral and non-political, and the loss of elements of national sovereignty 
from the recipient state. Study of the case of Austrian financial reconstruction reveals 
the absolutely central importance of supposedly impartial experts to the programme, 
the power that they wielded by dint of their expert status, and the politicians’ lack of 
desire to get involved in detailed deliberations about the scheme. In this, the 
programme reflected the acceleration in the use of ‘experts’ to solve international 
issues that historians have identified as a feature of the post-First World War world, 
emerging from experiences of expert cooperation during the war, and because of the 
scale of the problems that faced Europe following the war.404 
 
However, excessive focus on the innovative elements of the programme can serve to 
obscure the ways in which Austria financial reconstruction was very much rooted in the 
past. As discussed in the previous chapter, the scheme was not in fact the first 
international intervention in a state’s economy.405 The Austrian project was, after all, 
named a reconstruction and this language was significant: it was a programme for 
restoring the economic and financial values of the pre-war. It reflected the values of 
financial elites who had prospered in this earlier era, who now came together to 
attempt to resurrect some of what had been lost, albeit in a novel manner, via a 
formally constituted international organisation, and with some apparently innovative 
features, such as the guarantees provided by Britain, France, Italy and 
Czechoslovakia.406 The experts, despite their innovative role on the Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations were representatives of the pre-war economic and 
financial world, originating from banks and treasuries (particularly the British) that 
wished to, as Keynes put it ‘get back to 1914’. 407 Despite some innovative elements, 
the programme for Austria was primarily indicative of a desire to recreate pre-war 
financial and economic norms and values, and its main features reflected the orthodox 
                                                          
404 See Flandreau, Money Doctors. 
405 I refer to the previously cited examples of Greece, Egypt. 
406 In fact, even the guarantees were not innovative but had been a feature of previous international loans. 
407 J.M. Keynes cited in Adrian Ham, Treasury Rules, 51. 
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economic ideas that were widely, although not universally, held amongst economic and 
financial decision makers and elites.  
 
The scheme represented a commitment to a certain ideology, despite efforts at the 
time to present it as ‘technical’ or ‘neutral’, and this ideology was reflected in features 
such as budgetary equilibrium, the establishment of a fixed value currency and a Bank 
of Issue. These aspects were present as crucial elements of the programme from the 
start or very early on in the Financial Committee’s involvement. Other features (such as 
the form of the control, the requirement of an Enabling Act, and the international 
guarantees) came later and could perhaps be viewed as more the practical mechanisms 
by which the financing could be obtained that enabled the programme to be enacted 
and Austrian finance to be re-established and stabilised. The less ideological elements 
in some respects appear the more innovative, as this was the first occasion on which an 
international reconstruction programme of this nature was carried out, and the 
mediating role of an international institution was a new feature. However, even here 
we see continuity with the pre-War world: foreign government guarantees had 
underwritten loans in the past, such as in the case of Greece in 1898, and with respect 
to control, it was long established that provision of international loans might be 
accompanied by a loss of sovereignty.  
 
In the past, this control had been backed up gunboats, and the innovative element now 
was that it was supported by the authority of the League and here the League provided 
an element of apparent neutrality that helped to give the Austrian reconstruction 
scheme the credibility that it required. Whilst the implementation of measures to 
assure the interconnected orthodox doctrines of stable money, sound finance and low 
inflation were central to the scheme, they were not of themselves sufficient to restore 
Austria: it was critical that a measure of confidence in the scheme was established, and 
for this the support of the international community was necessary. A crucial 
requirement for Austria was that she obtained short-term foreign financing, and the 
confidence of both potential domestic and foreign investors to lend to the Austrian 
government had completely evaporated. In order get the help she required, Austria 
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needed foreign governments to underwrite the loans, but the guarantors, along with 
the financial institutions who would float the Austrian loans, wanted to ensure that 
Austria carried out the orthodox economic and financial reforms considered necessary 
to future stability. Thus, in order to get the guarantees and loans, Austria had to 
substantially cede economic and financial sovereignty to the control of a representative 
of the international community who had the power to enforce the economic and 
financial doctrines of the plan, and the Austrian government needed to get the powers 
it required, in the form of an Enabling Act, to enact the specifics of the reforms. The 
fact that the scheme was a League one facilitated action in Austria because the League 
lent an impression of neutrality to the League programme, and provided a buffer 
between the Austria, financial interests and other states. 
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Chapter Four 
Sanierung und Abbau:408 the financial, economic 
and administrative impacts of the scheme on 
Austria 1922-1926 
 
‘Although we Austrians are small and insignificant in the global economy, we see 
many eyes upon us’ 
Victor Kienböck, Austria’s Finance Minister 1922-1924409 
‘The Austria reconstruction scheme was a milestone in the post-war process of 
economic recovery and political consolidation in Europe’ 
W. M. Hill, 1946 
 
This chapter is the first section of a two-part exploration of the impact of the scheme 
for Austrian financial reconstruction. The previous two chapters have examined how 
the programme came into being and was launched, and what its attributes were. The 
next two chapters seek to explore the consequences of all of this for Austria. They focus 
upon the time from when the scheme began in September 1922, until it was adjudged 
to have been completed and Commissioner-General Zimmerman’s control removed in 
June 1926. The ramifications of the scheme were multifarious and complex. It had 
effects on the political situation in Austria, as will be explored in the following chapter. 
It also impacted upon the financial position of the country in relation to its currency 
and budget, and its economic situation with respect to growth rates, trade and 
unemployment. Furthermore, the programme saw changes to the administrative 
structure of the Austrian state, and its level of service provision. These different aspects 
of the effects of the programme cannot be entirely separated out, as a development in 
one area often had an effect elsewhere. So, for example, high levels of unemployment 
provoked political responses. The various effects of the programme are explored over 
                                                          
408 ‘Reconstruction and reduction’: the terms often given to the measures that comprised the Austrian 
financial reconstruction scheme. For more on the term ‘Abbau’ see Chapter Three, page 92. 
409 From Victor Kienböck, Das österreichische Sanierungswerk (Stuttgart, 1925), 3. ‘Wenn wir Österreicher auch 
ein kleines, in der Weltwirtschaft unbeutendes Volk sind, sehen wir doch viele Augen auf uns’.  
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these two chapters in order to illuminate the extent to which the League’s programme 
was a success.  
 
The scheme for Austrian reconstruction was portrayed as a resounding success by 
contemporary commentators on the League. W. M. Hill wrote in his account of the 
work of the EFO in 1946 (which gave a positive account of the prospects for 
international financial and economic cooperation in the context of the immediate post-
Second World War era) that, ‘the success of the scheme is well known’ and stated 
‘conditions of relative prosperity were restored by 1926’.410 For Maurice Fanshawe, 
writing before the programme was terminated, the scheme had seen ‘real international 
cooperation providing for complete comprehensive reconstruction and assistance’.411 
Partisans for the scheme in the 1920s were also unsurprisingly positive, at least in 
public. On the occasion of his return to Vienna in June 1924,412 Sir Arthur Salter, for 
example, revelled in the ‘the amazing contrast between present-day Austria and the 
Austria of twenty months ago’ and in the improvement ‘visibly in a year and a half’ in 
Vienna in ‘the comfort, the health and the welfare of its people’, all of which he 
attributed to the work of League. It was, said Salter, for ‘both Austria and the League of 
Nations a tremendous result’.413  The Financial Committee’s assessment of their own 
programme, contained in joint report produced by the Committee and the League’s 
Commissioner-General in Vienna, assessed the situation similarly: ‘the invention of the 
League…  [has] made it possible to convert Austria… into a reorganised state’.414 
 
The question of success has occupied significant sections of the historiography. Some 
League historians and economic historians have followed the assessment of these 
original League figures and supported the idea that the League’s scheme for Austria 
                                                          
410 W.M. Hill, The Economic and Financial Organisation of the League of Nations. A Study of Twenty-Five Years’ 
Experience (Washington, 1946), 28. 
411 Maurice Fanshawe, Reconstruction: Five Years of Work by the League of Nations (London, 1925), 136, 124. 
412 Salter had been in Vienna at Christmas 1922, and had returned in the intervening period for only one day. 
Interview with the Neue Freie Presse (NFP), 22 June 1924, ‘Die Ergebnisse der Sanierung in Österreich’, 2. 
413 Interview with NFP, 22 June 1924, ‘Die Ergebnisse der Sanierung in Österreich’, 2. 
414 Joint Report by the Financial Committee and Commissioner-General, 15 September 1924, the League of 
Nations Archive, Geneva (LNA), S110.  
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produced positive results. Piétri was an early example, writing in 1970 that Austrian 
financial reconstruction ‘constitutes a good example of the activities of a technical 
organisation which performed its pioneering task with competence and lucidity’.415 
More recently, Beyersdorf’s view that the programme was ‘a great success’416 is also 
reflected in the work of Flores and Decorzant.417 The issue of whether the scheme 
succeeded beyond its narrow remit – whether it actually created a basis for long term 
Austrian stability and reconstruction – has often been overlooked. Nathan Marcus does 
make this a major focus of his investigation and concedes that, given the extent of 
Austrian financial and economic difficulties in the early 1930s, long term stability was 
not assured. However, Marcus attributes this to the lack of thorough and continued 
application of the programme’s prescriptions. In his view, the end of the League 
programme and the termination of Commissioner-General Zimmerman’s control came 
much too soon, and the application of its orthodox principles was insufficiently 
rigorous. Thus, for Marcus, the scheme per se was not a cause of Austria’s problems in 
the early 1930s, it was the absence of the scheme that was.418 The issue of the 
connection between the events of 1922-1926 and the difficulties Austria faced from 
1931 after the collapse of the Creditanstalt bank (a crisis which was instrumental in 
exacerbating the Great Depression – and not just in Austria), is explored in more depth 
in Chapter Six, but this chapter will highlight the contributions and the diminutions that 
the League’s work made to the economic and financial position of Austria up to 1926, 
when League control was largely withdrawn, and I question Marcus’ view: continuance 
of the League’s control was not feasible politically, and some of the developments 
                                                          
415 Nicole Piétri, La Société des Nations et la reconstruction financière de l’Autriche 1921-1926, (Geneva, 1970), 
200. Piétri does not regard the programme as an unqualified success for Austria, however.  
416 Frank Beyersdorf, ‘‘Credit or Chaos?’ The Austrian Stabilisation Programme of 1923 and the League of 
Nations’, in Dan Laqua (ed.), Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the 
Wars (London, 2011), 148. 
417 Although their focus is very specific, as they investigate the impact that various League loans had on the 
rate of interest that beneficiary countries could obtain through these schemes. Yann Decorzant and Juan H. 
Flores, ‘Public borrowing in harsh times: the League of Nations Loans revisited’, Working Papers in Economic 
History, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (Madrid, September 2012). See also Yann Decorzant, 
‘Internationalism in the Economic and Financial Organisation of the League’, in Laqua, Internationalism 
Reconfigured. 
418 Nathan Marcus, Credibility, Confidence and Capital: Austrian reconstruction and the collapse of global 
finance, 1921-1931 (Unpublished thesis, New York University, 2012). 
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occasioned by the scheme were far from helpful for future stability. A more rigorous 
application of the scheme might have deepened these difficulties. 
 
Other historians have taken a more negative view of the effects of the programme. 
Zara Steiner argues that it was enacted for the benefit of Austria’s new creditors, and 
did not have positive impacts for Austrian politics, society or economy. Hers is not an 
in-depth or archival account, however.419 Stephen Schuker, who examines the League 
loans from the perspective of an interest in the work of financial experts, also does not 
view the scheme as a success. He focuses upon the instability that remained in areas 
such as trade and unemployment, and the fact that Austria remained vulnerable to 
external shocks.420 
 
The assessments of historians of Austria have tended to be mostly negative with 
respect to the scheme, but they have also focussed more upon the League’s work in the 
1930s, because the end of democracy, the period of the ‘Austro-fascist’421 regime and 
the rise of the Nazis are subjects of continued interest.422 Siegfried Mattl examines the 
League Loans of the 1930s, and provocatively describes League control at this time as 
‘Finanzdiktatur’. He also criticises the deflationary tendencies of both the 1920s and 
the 1930s programmes.423 For Bachinger, Matis, Berger and Ausch, the 1920s 
programme was excessively orthodox, although Berger does not regard the scheme as 
merely an imposition from Geneva.424 For März, the programme ‘did not deal with the 
                                                          
419 Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy – The Reinvention of the League of Nations 1920-1946 (Oxford, 
2013); Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed – European International History 1919-1933 (Oxford, 2007).   
420 Stephen A. Schuker, ‘Money doctors between the wars – the competition between central banks, private 
finance advisors, and multi-lateral agencies, 1919-39’, 58, in Marc Flandreau (ed.), Money Doctors: History, 
Theory, Policy - The Experience of International Financial Advising, 1850-2000 (London, 2003). 
421 ‘Austrofascism’ is the term applied to the period of authoritarian, repressive, corporatist and undemocratic 
rule in Austria of the Vaterländische Front from 1934-1938. The Chancellors of Austria during this time were 
Engelbert Dollfuss and (after Dollfuss was assassinated by Nazis in 1934), Kurt Schuschnigg. The Christian Social 
Party was absorbed into the Vaterländische Front.  
422 See, for example, Peter Berger, Im Schatten der Diktatur – die Finanzdiplomatie des Vertreters des 
Völkerbunds im Österreich (Vienna, 2000).  
423 Siegfried Mattl, ‘Die Finanzdiktatur, Wirtschaftspolitik in Österreich 1933-1938’, in Emmerich Talos and 
Wolfgang Neugebauer (eds.), Austrofaschismus – Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934-1938 
(Vienna, 1984), 133-159. 
424 Karl Bachinger and Herbert Matis, Der österreichische Schilling – Geschichte einer Währung (Graz, Styria, 
1974); Karl Ausch, Als die Banken fielen: Zur Soziologie der politischen corruption (Vienna, 1968); Peter Berger, 
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deeper causes of the Austrian economic malaise’.425 Jelavich mentions the ‘high social 
cost’ of the programme, as does F.L. Carsten, but they do not explore this in much 
detail.426 Jens Wilhelm Wessels is more positive, but his account just focusses on the 
impact on one set of companies. He also downplays the extent to which programmes 
such as this impact at all on the macro-economic picture.427  
 
Austrian historians may have assessed the League’s scheme for Austria in more 
negative terms than the historians of the League partly because examination of the 
record in Austria raises more questions about the efficacy about the League’s 
programme. I build upon the work of these authors to try to create a rounded picture, 
deploying a wide range of sources and incorporating evidence from the ego-account of 
a Viennese seamstress, material from some of the often over-looked Austrian 
provinces, as well as other Austrian sources, such as newspapers, and League sources, 
such as the reports of Commissioner-General Zimmerman. 
 
Histories of internationalism sometimes overlook the perspective of the recipients of 
the internationalists’ work,428 and the viewpoint of, and impact on, people and on 
societies. Economists and economic historians also often have a narrow field of vision 
with respect to the effects of policies, and the ideologies and interests that underlie 
them, as Francesco Boldizzoni has pointed out.429 In the case of Austrian financial 
                                                          
‘The League of Nations and Interwar Austria: Critical Assessment of a Partnership in Economic Reconstruction’, 
in Gunter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Alexander Lassner (eds.), The Dollfuss / Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A 
Reassessment, Contemporary Austrian Studies 11. 
425 Eduard März, Austrian Banking and Financial Policy – Creditanstalt at a Turning Point, 1913-1923, trans. 
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426 Barbara Jelavich, Modern Austria – Empire and Republic 1800-1980 (Cambridge, 1987), 175; F. L. Carsten, 
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428 See, for example, Glenda Sluga’s recent work, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism, (Philadelphia, 
2013). 
429 In The Poverty of Clio – Resurrecting Economic History, by Francesco Boldizzoni (Princeton, 2011). 
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reconstruction, whether it is seen as a success or not to some extent depends upon 
whose perspective is examined. Many of those who have written about the work of the 
League in Austria only examine elite, Vienna-based (male) perspectives, and do not 
consider the social effects of the programme, in common with Financial Committee 
members, who, as we saw in the previous chapter, did not much consider the ‘social’, 
or for that matter, political, effect of their work.430 This chapter gives a broader 
perspective on the work of the League, which alters the assessment of whether the 
programme was successful or not. 
 
I argue in this chapter that whilst the League’s programme did indeed deliver currency 
stability and access to loans for Austria, it also had many detrimental aspects, as it 
further fuelled a speculative atmosphere that worked to undermine the stability of 
Austrian banks, and occasioned a large rise in the level of unemployment. Furthermore, 
the scheme left some of the key problems of the Austrian economy, such as the large 
trade deficit and under-investment in industry, unresolved. More positive assessments 
of the League’s work in Austria often overlook the social impacts of the programme, 
such as its effects on service provision and those made unemployed, an oversight that 
this chapter remedies. This lacuna leaves a major facet of the programme, that is, the 
impact on the population of Austria, under-investigated in previous works. The social 
impact is central when considering the success or otherwise of the scheme – for what 
use are financial and economic policies if they do not serve and benefit wider society? 
To ignore or minimize the significance of the social effects of financial and economic 
policies is to ignore what should surely be their fundamental raison d’etre. Sources 
from Austrian provincial archives and the experiences of individuals are for the first 
time deployed to understand this aspect of the impact of the scheme. 
 
 
                                                          
430 Marcus typifies this approach: he acknowledges that the level of unemployment resulting from the 
programme was high but does not analyse this in any depth or consider the social and political effects of this, 
Nathan Marcus, Credibility, Confidence and Capital: Austrian Reconstruction and the Collapse of Global 
Finance, 1921-1931 (unpublished thesis, New York University, 2012). 
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Confidence, speculation and the Krone 
The main initial aims of the scheme for Austrian reconstruction were to stabilise the 
Austrian currency, and to obtain foreign loans for Austria in order to bridge the gap 
between its governmental income and expenditure, until such time as equilibrium was 
achieved. The extent to which these aims were fulfilled is one way to assess the extent 
to which the League’s programme was a success, and certain progress was made 
almost instantaneously. The decision to definitely pursue the League scheme was taken 
at the end of August 1922 and the announcement of this immediately created positive 
results in Austria. There was a tangible restoration of public confidence from late 
August 1922, a development that Commissioner-General Zimmerman labelled as 
‘remarkable’.431 The main sources of the new feeling of optimism were a belief that 
foreign loans into the country would be forthcoming, and a belief that this foreign 
money was central to prospects for Austrian recovery. The new mood of foreign and 
domestic investor and speculator confidence continued into 1923, an outcome that 
Zimmerman attributed to ‘the intervention of the League of Nations, the interest 
shown by foreign countries and the energy of the Government’.432 
 
The ‘flight to the crown’, as Maurice Fanshawe labelled the return of capital to Austria, 
started as soon as it became clear that the implementation of a League plan was 
definitely being attempted, and it predated the launch of any of the measures outlined 
in the League’s programme.433 At the end of August 1922, before the details of the 
scheme had been revealed,434 before the unbacked issue of banknotes had ceased, 
before any moves had been taken to attain budget equilibrium, and before the 
currency value was officially fixed, there was a surge in confidence which saw foreign 
currency holdings converted back into Krone. Hyperinflation ceased in September 1922, 
and internal prices remained relatively steady.435 The stabilisation of the crown on the 
                                                          
431 The First Report by the Commissioner-General of the League of Nations for Austria, 15 December – 15 
January 15 1923 (Geneva, 1923). 
432 The Seventh Report of the Commissioner-General, 15 June – 15 July 1923 (Geneva, 1923), 1. 
433 Maurice Fanshawe, Reconstruction, 136. 
434 Although its likely contours would have been clear from the Financial Committee’s 1921 plan. 
435 See Steve H. Hanke and Nicholas Krus, ‘World hyperinflations’, in Randall E. Parker and Robert Whaples 
(eds.), Routledge Handbook of Major Events in European History (Abingdon, Oxon, 2013), table 30.1, 372-373. 
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foreign exchanges and the end of hyperinflation thus occurred almost immediately 
upon the announcement of the League’s involvement and without any policy changes 
or reforms, as Arthur Salter acknowledged.436 It seemed that the very existence League 
support was sufficient to create some of the conditions which might allow Austria to 
return to prosperity. As Marcus and März point out, however, part of the reason for the 
stability on the exchanges was that the government’s Foreign Exchange Agency, 
through which all foreign currency earned from export sales had to pass, was able 
maintain the value of the Krone through intervention on the currency market, 
something that the sheer level of currency instability had previously not made possible. 
Levels of public confidence after August 1922, whilst improved, were still volatile, and 
to sustain the value of the Krone the Foreign Exchange Agency had to act. From 
November 1922, they attempted to maintain the Krone’s value in relation to the Swiss 
franc, and then, after the franc’s value started to fluctuate in May 1923, fixed the Krone 
to the dollar.437  
 
Examination of the dollar-to-Krone exchange rate reveals how the value of the Krone on 
foreign exchanges stabilised once League involvement in Austria was certain. The 
exchange rate held steady and even improved somewhat between late August and mid-
December 1922: 75,000 Krone were required to obtain one dollar on 25 August and 
70,750 on 15 December.438 This stability continued into 1923, and by 14 March 
approximately the same rate of 71,175 Krone to the dollar had been maintained.439 And 
it was not just on the foreign exchanges that matters improved. The League reported 
that during the same period, the purchasing power of the Krone also increased 
domestically, as prices reduced. A further sign of the people of Austria’s much greater 
                                                          
436 Sir Arthur Salter, The Financial Reconstruction of Austria – General Survey and Principal Documents 
(Geneva, 1926). 
437 See Marcus, Credibility and Eduard März, Austrian Banking (London, 1984), 536.  
438 Document, ‘Summary of position on December 15 1922’, 19 December 1922, in LON S100, Mr. Nixon Box 
No. 4 Austria, 79/5/1 – League of Nations Financial Delegation in Austria. 
439 Third Report of the Commissioner-General, 15 February – 15 March 1923, in League of Nations, Austria – 
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confidence in their own currency, and by implication, the future of their own country, 
can be seen in the 82% increase in the savings rate in November 1922.440 
 
The Financial Committee regarded the production of unbacked bank notes441 and the 
expansion of the money supply as the cause of the Krone’s difficulties, and so their 
delegation in Vienna moved in the autumn of 1922 to ensure that this ceased. This 
aspect of the reform programme of the League was, as we have seen, not actually 
necessary to arrest the slide in the value of the Krone (and in any case there were large 
inflows of money into Austria post-August 1922, and the amount of money in 
circulation rose),442 but the knowledge that this reform would occur was likely an 
important factor in restoring confidence in the Krone. The end of ‘inflationary’443 issue 
was also a prerequisite if Austria was ever to obtain the guarantees from foreign 
governments that were so critical to the prospects of Austria gaining the foreign loans 
that it needed. Thus, the necessity of the rapid establishment of the bank of issue was 
clear to the Austrian government, and they moved very quickly in the autumn of 1922 
to ensure that the legislation governing this was enacted.444  
 
The move to cease production of ‘inflationary’ bank notes occurred on 18 November 
1922. At this point, Finance Minister Victor Kienböck declared, ‘the time of inflation 
was finally over’ and ‘the reconstruction had stepped out of plans and into life’.445 A 
new bank of issue, theoretically independent from the supposedly damaging political 
influence of government, was launched in early 1923, backed up by hard currency 
                                                          
440 Document, ‘Summary of position on December 15 1922’, 19 December 1922, in LNA S100, Mr. Nixon Box 
No. 4 Austria, 79/5/1 – League of Nations Financial Delegation in Austria. 
441 I.e. bank notes which were not covered by minimum reserves of a currency fixed to gold or gold in the 
central bank. 
442 See März, Austrian Banking, 536-537. 
443 As the League of Nations’ Financial Delegation referred to ‘the issue of paper money’ by the Austrian 
National Bank in a document: Summary of Position on 15 December 1922, S100 Mr Nixon, Box No. 4 Austria.  
444 See Report by the Provisional Delegation of the League of Nations at Vienna, 1 February 1923, in League of 
Nations, The Financial Reconstruction of Austria – General Survey and Principal Documents (Geneva, 1926), 
195-196. 
445 Victor Kienböck, Das österreichische Sanierungswerk (Stuttgart, 1925), 31.  
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(primarily the dollar) supplies equivalent to 83 million gold Krone.446 On 18 May, the 
Krone was fixed to the dollar (which was in turn fixed to gold) at a rate of 71,060, 
making Austria the first European country to return to gold after the First World War. 
The Krone remained at a parity of 14,400 to gold for the remainder of its existence.447 
On 7 July 1924, a new gold-backed currency, the Schilling, which involved the issue of 
coins that contained precious metals, was introduced, completing the final stage of 
Austrian currency restructuring. 10,000 Krone were exchangeable for one Schilling. The 
Reichspost greeted the introduction of the new currency with great enthusiasm, writing 
that ‘just as the silver of the Austrian Schilling is more tangible and solid than paper, so 
the new currency seems a tangible down-payment on a better future’.448  
 
The stabilisation of the external value of the Krone also saw the end of hyperinflation, a 
major achievement of the programme. The stabilisation of the Krone, and the 
anticipation that foreign loans would be obtained, caused the rapid increase in 
domestic prices to cease from September 1922: a dramatic change from August 1922, 
when inflation had peaked at 129%. Retailers no longer drove prices up in response to 
fears of further currency depreciation. However, the effects of hyperinflation on living 
standards had been ameliorated by the wide-spread practice of index-linking of wages 
to prices, a practice which in the stabilisation era declined. In his third report, 
Zimmerman recorded that rents and coal prices had risen, and so that the index of 
prices recorded a 6% increase between February and March 1923.449 In April and May 
                                                          
446 See ibid, 31. Further issue of notes were only permitted ‘on the basis of the maintenance of a statutory 
proportion of gold and foreign exchange’. 20% was the ‘statutory minimum cover prescribed for the first five 
years… in gold and foreign exchanges stable with gold.’ This was ‘soon far exceeded’: Sir Arthur Salter, The 
Financial Reconstruction of Austria. Salter, 91. By 1926, the notes in circulation were 60% covered by the gold 
or gold-backed holdings of the National Bank according to a League report: Draft Report on the Financial 
Reconstruction of Austria, 15 September 1926, LNA R519. 
447 I.e. 14,000 paper Krone were equal to one gold Krone. The figure on gold parity is from Kienböck, 
Sanierungswerk, 31. There is some discussion about whether the exchange rate with the dollar was too high or 
too low. See März, Austrian Banking, 536-537. From 6 August 1925 the Krone was left free to float against the 
dollar, 536. 
448 The Reichspost, cited by Karl Bachinger and Herbert Matis in Der Österreichischem Schilling – Geschichte 
einer Währung (Graz, 1974), 79. No exact date given. The Neue Freie Presse were rather more sceptical about 
the introduction of the silver coinage.  
449 The Third Report of the Commissioner-General, 15 February – 15 March 1923 (Geneva, 1923), 14. 
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the rate was 7% each month,450 and as Bachinger and Matis point out, the speculative 
boom that occurred in 1923 and early 1924 produced obvious price rises.451 But the 
cost of living increases did not end after the Austrian stock exchange the Börse crashed 
but continued into 1925. In an internal League of Nation’s report for the EFO, League 
economist and member of the EFO secretariat, J. van Waldré de Bordes, noted that ‘the 
index of the cost of living has uninterruptedly been rising since August 1923 up to 
February 1925. During that same period, the wage level has constantly been rising, 
through somewhat slower than the cost of living index’.452 So whilst the League’s 
programme brought the benefit of dramatically reducing the level of inflation and 
creating more stable prices, prices still out-ran wages for many people. It was the view 
of both Alexander Loveday of the EFO and Adrianus Pelt of the League’s Information 
Section that by 1924, the salaries of officials were too low.453 Average wages, whilst low 
in comparison with other countries, however, did not fall, and in this sense, wage 
earners did not lose out too much in this period.454 
 
The steps taken to re-establish and stabilise the currency represented considerable 
successes in the work of the League and the Austrian government, and were for Arthur 
Salter and other EFO operatives essential developments that allowed Sir Arthur to 
report approvingly to the International Chamber of Commerce in June 1925 that the 
Austrian currency, which had been ‘the most disorganised currency in Europe outside 
                                                          
450 See Letter from the Commissioner-General to the Federal Minister of Finance, 20 April 1923, contained in 
Annex VI of The Fifth Report of the Commissioner-General, 15 April – 15 May 1923 (Geneva, 1923), 16.  
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Russia’ was now stable, on a gold basis and with plenty of reserves.455 As we will see, 
however, currency stabilisation also had various effects upon the Austrian economic 
and financial situation that were detrimental to other aspects of stability. 
 
The apparent return of confidence to Austria and in its currency was not the entirely 
beneficial development that it might at first have appeared to be, and indeed it had 
some very negative features. The rapid restoration of value of the Krone in many ways 
reflected the continuation of precisely the kinds of disordered speculative activity that 
had undermined the currency in the first place. As Peter Cottrell has written, ‘life in 
Vienna came increasingly to be centred on the Börse during the inflation, and, 
moreover, for a further fifteen months after monetary stabilisation’.456 The knowledge 
that foreign loans would arrive engendered a bullish mood amongst both foreign and 
domestic speculators, and a dramatic speculative boom on the stock market 
commenced and continued throughout 1923. The stock exchange index rose from 882 
in March 1923 to 2680 in January 1924.457 Already by April 1923 the Commissioner-
General was reporting upon a feverish atmosphere in Vienna where there was a ‘desire 
for rapid gains in a milieu in which large fortunes were made in a short space of 
time’.458 He was, however, somewhat positive about the development, as he 
recognised that it generated capital, a higher standard for living for those who had 
capital with which to speculate, and tax receipts.459 By Christmas that year, Zimmerman 
was more negative about the reckless and speculative mood that the stock exchange 
boom engendered, reporting critically of ‘a feverish desire to spend’ in an atmosphere 
of ‘heedless extravagance’.460 This was the kind of atmosphere that according to SDAP 
leader Otto Bauer produced ‘the cultureless luxury of the newly enriched Bourgeoisie’ 
                                                          
455 Arthur Salter’s speech to the International Chamber of Commerce, 23 June 1925, Austria, Miscellaneous 
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which when ‘the country is in plight, embitters the masses’.461 This culture had been a 
feature of the inflationary days, and it now continued in wild stock market speculation.  
 
The first anniversary of Zimmerman’s tenure passed and still the bubble grew. By 
January 1924 the mean index figure on the Börse was up 2680 from its level of 502 in 
September 1922, the month of the commencement of the League’s work in Austria. 
The mood was now one of reckless over-confidence, and in early 1924 leading foreign 
speculators on the Viennese Börse co-ordinated with Viennese banks to launch a 
concerted attack on the French franc, which seemed for a time likely to be the next 
European currency to succumb to worthlessness. Vast quantities of Viennese-based 
capital were lost as the French government succeeded in March 1924 in maintaining 
the value of their currency via the means of the provision of a large loan from J. P. 
Morgan Bank.462 Some investors on the Austrian stock exchange lost considerable sums 
in France, and the incident more generally pierced the bullish confidence of the Börse. 
The collapse was dramatic – a fall in the value of the stock exchange index of 27% in a 
month from 15 March to 15 April, representing a decrease by this point of 36% from 
the highest value of the index.463 By October 1924, the stock exchange value had fallen 
further to 975, and it was to remain in the doldrums for the remainder of the duration 
of the Commissioner-General’s work in Austria.464 According to the Arbeiter-Zeitung in 
the year after the stabilisation, profits from speculation on the stock exchange ‘piled 
high’ and ‘daily hymns of celebration to the reconstruction’ were heard at the Börse. 
Now, the newspaper reported, this atmosphere had ‘completely collapsed’.465 And it 
was not just those who engaged in franc speculation who were affected. Small 
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investors who had not been involved were also, according to Bachinger and Matis, 
‘thrown’ by the stock market crash ‘into the Abyss’.466 
 
The franc incident revealed the problematic speculative activities of many Austrian 
banks. The banks’ position had been undermined by disruptions resulting from the war 
and the loss of the Austrian empire. Their excessively close connections to Austrian 
industry, lack of capital, and the insufficient regulation of their activities created further 
difficulties.467 The League’s scheme did nothing to address this major source of 
instability in the Austria financial and economic system, and indeed by provoking a 
fresh wave of speculative activity and creating depressive economic conditions, actually 
acted to increase the problems of Viennese banking, which were during the Great 
Depression to prove such a significant destabilising force.468 The number of banks in 
Austria halved between 1923 and 1927,469 and, attracted to Austria by the belief that 
there were profits to be made in the restoration of Vienna to the heart of central 
European trading and financing, speculative ‘sharks’ moved in the early 1920s to gain 
powerful roles in Austrian banks.470 Men, such as Italian (previously Austro-Hungarian – 
he was from Trieste) Camillo Castiglioni, who became president of the Depositenbank, 
and Siegmund Bosel, who had a controlling share in the Unionbank, were instrumental 
in the catastrophic attack on the franc. Castiglioni, in particular, was associated with 
these activities, and fled to Italy amid a furore about his role in the collapse of the 
Depositenbank, which lost large amounts in its attempts to profit from speculation 
against the franc.471 
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Austrian banks had extremely close relationships with Austrian industry, as Peter Eigner 
reveals, owning large shares of the enterprises that they supplied investment capital 
and credit to. Bankers often sat on the boards of many of these companies. Thus, the 
needs of industry were very dependent upon the activities these banks, who, lacking 
capital in the post-war period, had become more and more involved in speculative 
activity.472 The weak position of Austrian industry encouraged the banks to engage in 
speculation, but equally, losses acquired through this activity undermined the position 
of industry, through weakening the position of the banks upon which they depended. In 
addition to the connections between Austrian industry and the banking sector, some 
banks were also involved closely with the Christian Social Party. This relationship led to 
the adoption of dubious practices in order to obscure and cover-up the disreputable 
banking activities of some Christian Social politicians, and the post-stabilisation 
speculative boom saw these banks drawn further into ill-advised activities, and other 
institutions weakened in the process.  
 
The case of the Steirer Bank is an important and illustrative one. Steirer was established 
after the First World War by Christian Social politician and governor of Styria (and 
associate of the Heimwehr,473 and later the National Socialists), Dr. Anton Rintelen,474 
partly for anti-Semitic reasons.475 The bank had a short and ignominious history. Local 
Christian Social politicians used Steirer to obtain substantial credits, and were heavily 
involved, via the bank, in Stock Exchange speculation in the aftermath of stabilisation. 
The bank suffered heavy losses and bankruptcy loomed. To prevent a political scandal, 
the Central-Bank Deutscher Sparkassen (whose chief shareholder, Styrian based 
financier Dr. Viktor Wutte (a Pangerman), was close to Dr. Rintelen) were leaned on by 
the government to take over the Steirer. Steirer was not the only such concern that 
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Central-Bank Deutscher Sparkassen476 (CBDS), who were already weakened by the 
disruptions that the end of Empire had caused, absorbed, and in 1926, CBDS itself 
collapsed. The CBDS might have been able to survive, had it not been persuaded to take 
on liabilities, such as the Steirer, by the government. The government had acted, in 
part, to try to reduce the damaging financial fallout from events after the end of the 
speculative bubble, and also to protect various Christian Social politicians from 
exposure for their shady profiteering activities.477 When the edifice of CBDS collapsed, 
the government had to offer a guarantee to savers. In the case of the Postsparkasse478 
bank, which fell into difficulties shortly after the CBDS, the National Bank took it over, a 
move which, in turn, undermined the National Bank’s position. 
 
The failure of attempts to profit from selling the franc in 1924 significantly weakened 
the Austrian banking sector, whose illiquidity increased, and whose under-regulated 
managements responded by beginning the obfuscation and concealments about their 
balance sheets that would finally explode into view with the collapse of Creditanstalt 
bank in 1931. The events of 1924 started a process of bankruptcies and mergers within 
Austrian banking which by 1929 created a situation where Creditanstalt was the only 
Austrian bank supporting industry. The bank became a behemoth, but its size 
concealed the illiquidity of many of the concerns that it had absorbed. Difficulties of 
post-war adjustment, damaging speculative activities triggered by inflation and then 
exacerbated by the false sense of confidence that the League’s scheme produced, as 
well as an absence of regulatory oversight, produced weak and unstable banks: banks 
upon whom the industrial activities of Austria depended.479 As we will see in Chapter 
Six, the instability and indebtedness of Austrian banks, which was exacerbated by the 
consequences of the League’s financial reconstruction plan, was a major weakness in 
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the Austrian financial and economic system, and, as it turned out, a weakness in the 
European financial and economic system. 
 
Despite the troubling consequences of the League plan in relation to speculative 
activity and banking, the scheme did work very effectively to obtain for Austria the 
loans that it was felt by the government and the League were so badly needed.480 The 
short-term and long-term loans were successfully floated, and the new confidence in 
Austria was illustrated by the speed and enthusiasm with which foreign investors 
signed up to participate. Commissioner-General Zimmerman reported that the short-
term tranche issued in London was twice oversubscribed, whilst the long-term tranche 
was oversubscribed three times within two hours of its issue in the same city. In New 
York, a similar situation occurred within just fifteen minutes.481 A loan issue in Austria 
was also enthusiastically received and raised the equivalent of $13 million, three times 
the value of money in savings accounts.482 The issue of the long-term loan allowed the 
repayment of the short term credits in July 1923, at which time Zimmerman 
triumphantly and justifiably stated that the League loan system, ‘though it was 
condemned in various quarters as too intricate and as unlikely to inspire confidence in 
the investing public, is a perfectly practical and feasible one’.483  According to Julio 
Santaella, the loans had the positive impact of unlocking capital flows into Austria; they 
had ‘catalytic’ effect, a development that Commissioner-General Zimmerman reported 
favourably upon in early 1923 and late 1924.484  
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The kind of financing that followed on from the provision of the first international loans 
can be seen in the example of the 1925 $5 million ‘Dollar-Anleihe’ (Dollar-Loan) that 
was raised in New York for the province of Upper Austria and their private sector 
partners in order to finance the development of their hydroelectric and coal capacity. 
The restoration of a degree of confidence in Austria is revealed in a promotional 
brochure for potential investors which portrayed a glowing image of the conditions and 
potential of the province.485 A hydroelectric scheme was also developed in the Tyrol, 
and the financing for this was heavily dependent upon Austrian banks, who were in 
turn heavily reliant on money from the United States. Indeed, a report published by the 
shareholders in Innsbruck in 1925 reveals that in 1924 the Austrian backers (mainly 
banks) of the Tyrolean hydroelectric company sought foreign financial backing, and, 
specifically, financial ties with the United States.486 The League loans encouraged 
further foreign financing, and encouraged Austrian banking interests and economic 
concerns to seek out such financing, which had a positive effect upon the development 
of infrastructure and on job creation in Austria in these areas. As will be seen in the 
final chapter of this thesis, however, the extent of the dependency of Austrian 
economic and financial concerns upon foreign money was a significant problem when 
the depression started to impact in the early 1930s. 
 
In addition to encouraging capital flows, Flores and Decorzant also adjudge the loans a 
success as they provided Austria (and later League loan recipients) with not just access 
to credit, but also credit at a lower rate of interest than that which might be expected, 
given the dire economic condition of these countries at the time.487 As the first country 
to benefit from League loans, however, the rate of interest that Austria obtained was 
not as advantageous as that achieved by later beneficiaries. Lenders were 
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understandably somewhat cautious, and the average rate of interest for Austria on the 
long-term loans was around 7%, according to Flores and Decorzant. März cites an 
interest rate of between 9.46% and 10.20%, a rate that he says ‘in view of the Great 
Powers’ guarantees and the provisos’ was ‘strikingly high’.488 For creditors, the Austrian 
scheme offered a very profitable rate of return, and the guarantees of Britain, France, 
Italy and Czechoslovakia removed any risk. It is thus unsurprising that, as we will see in 
the assessment of the political response to the scheme contained in the next chapter, 
accusations were sometimes made that the scheme benefitted foreign financial 
interests, whilst leaving Austrians to struggle under the strictures of budget cuts.489 
 
The wider economic implications of the scheme 
The League’s scheme had complex effects upon the economy of Austria. As we have 
seen, the programme contributed to Austrian stability in the short-term by stabilising 
the currency, creating more stable prices and savings’ values, and restoring, at least for 
a time, confidence. However, this confidence had some negative, speculative effects 
that did not aid long-term stability, and served to mask some of the economic problems 
that had been created: in a number of different ways, the League’s programme and its 
consequences had a depressive effect upon economic conditions in Austria. 
 
The low value of the Austrian currency in the inflationary period had created an 
advantage for Austrian exporters, but the combination of stabilisation within Austria 
and declining currency values elsewhere removed this advantage in late 1922 and into 
1923. This feature of the Austrian economic scene was perhaps unavoidable, as the 
country could not do much about the value of other currencies and further 
depreciation of the Krone would have damaged international and domestic confidence, 
but nevertheless stabilisation did create problems for the export sectors of the 
                                                          
488 März, Austrian Banking, 504. 
489 A further beneficial aspect of the League of Nation’s scheme to those outside Austria was that the costs to 
the nations who supported it were very minimal. Thus, it was for them a much more cost-effective way of 
supporting Austrian and European stability than the previous grants of aid and provision of direct loans had 
been. According to Maurice Fanshawe, the total cost of the scheme to the League and to the guarantor states 
was only £7000, and of this, he estimated that Britain’s share was £600-700. See Fanshawe, Reconstruction. 
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economy, often already struggling with negative trading conditions and high tariffs.490 
The League’s programme also contributed to depressive economic conditions through 
its cuts to expenditure in certain areas, such as the postal service, and through its huge 
redundancy programme. In excess of 85,000 civil servants lost their positions, short of 
the League target of 100,000 but still a very considerable reduction.491 At least 28% of 
civil servants were made redundant.492 The League and Commissioner-General 
Zimmerman continued to pressurise the government to make further redundancies, 
even during periods of high unemployment. Furthermore, there were also reductions 
to the numbers of civil servants employed at provincial level in some areas, as the 
government reduced and then removed the grants it provided to pay for the salaries of 
some of them.493 As März says, the chances of ex-state employees finding new jobs in 
the depressed economic climate of Austria were ‘extremely slim’.494 
 
Various other pieces of evidence point to the depressed economic conditions of Austria 
in the years following financial stabilisation. There is an absence of data from the time 
on actual rates of economic growth. The notion that the way to assess the health of a 
country’s economy was by the measurement of the extent of growth (or shrinkage) in 
the level of gross national or domestic product had not yet been conceived in the 
1920s, and it was only adopted as an international tool at the Bretton Woods 
conference of 1944.495 Estimates have been made, however. According to Peter 
Cottrell, between 1913 and 1929, growth in Austria averaged only 0.35% in terms of 
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income per capita.496 Weber characterises Austrian growth in this era as stagnated – it 
was not non-existent, but it was unimpressive, and lower after the stabilisation of the 
Krone than before.497 Wicker points out, in addition, that in Poland and Hungary, the 
provision of the stabilisation loans seemed to have a positive effect on output, but that 
this was not the case in Austria.498 Overall, the return of confidence and capital 
produced a short-lived boom in some areas in Austria in 1923, which kept 
unemployment at a lower level than it might otherwise have been, in spite of the 
problems that exporters had. These problems manifested themselves in the dire 
balance of trade figures: imports exceeded exports by 14% in 1923, as the trade deficit 
leapt from 144 million gold Krone in the first quarter of 1923, to 297 million gold Krone 
by the final quarter.499 After this, between 1924 and 1926, Austria experienced 
recessionary conditions.  
 
Some of those closely involved in the scheme in Austria acknowledged some of the 
problems. By the early 1924, Zimmerman reported that ‘the recent period of business 
activity is at an end’,500 and in a speech in 1925, Sir Arthur Salter struck an 
uncharacteristically downbeat note. He said that although ‘striking progress’ had been 
made, ‘there is now an economic depression in Austria’. He pointed out that the same 
was true in other countries that had stabilised after depreciation, including Britain.501 
The Austrian Committee of the League, not prone to comment negatively upon the 
situation in Austria, similarly acknowledged that from 1924 there was in Austria ‘a 
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grave economic crisis’.502 In contrast, the economists Charles Rist and Walter Layton, 
commissioned by the League to investigate conditions in Austria in 1925 to pave the 
way for the withdrawal of League control, painted a rosy picture.503 Whilst they were 
probably correct to challenge some of the notions about the supposed economic 
unviability of Austria, their report, created essentially for the purposes of facilitating 
League withdrawal, did distort the reality of the Austrian economy.504 Rist and Layton 
did not retreat from the key tenets of the original League programme, emphasising that 
even though Austria was in economic crisis, ‘recovery must necessarily be slow, but it is 
certain, if the Austrian people and the Austrian Government strive energetically… to 
maintain budgetary equilibrium and to exploit to the full Austria’s natural 
advantage’.505 
 
Another area that pointed to economic difficulties within Austria is that of the level of 
bankruptcy, a phenomenon that was also analysed by J. van Waldré de Bordes using 
information provided to him by a private Austrian organisation, the Creditorenverien. 
De Bordes labelled the situation with regards to bankruptcies ‘appalling’. In 1922, there 
were only a total of 62 bankruptcies. By 1923, this figure had leapt to 533, before 
soaring in 1924 to 2546, a forty-one fold increase. Between May 1924 and April 1925 
(which the exception of September 1924) an average of 200 business filed for 
bankruptcies per month, with the rate at times running at 300 a month.506 The situation 
remained as bad in 1926.507 Small banks that had sprung up during the inflationary era 
were particularly affected. Industrial and commercial companies were hit by trading 
problems following stabilisation. Other merchants, attracted by the low rate of the 
franc during the time of speculation, were affected. They had purchased goods on 
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credit that, with the franc’s recovery after the J. P. Morgan loan, became difficult to 
repay. Producers of luxury goods, who had profited in the boom, also struggled.508 
 
These bankruptcies contributed to the level of unemployment in Austria, and a further 
consequence of the deflationary nature of the League’s scheme was that it produced 
high unemployment in Austria. The rate of unemployment had remained low in the 
years following the First World War, and in August 1922, on the eve of the League’s 
scheme for Austria, 31,000 people were registered as being in receipt of government 
unemployment support.509 According to Karl Bachinger and Herbert Matis, there was 
essentially full employment in Austria 1920-1922.510 Commissioner-General 
Zimmerman recorded information about the level of unemployment, at least in relation 
to those in receipt of government assistance, in his monthly reports to the Financial 
Committee of the League. At the time of his first report covering the period 15 
December to 15 January 1923, the number of people receiving unemployment benefit 
was 150,000, a nearly five-fold increase on the level found in August.511 The real level of 
unemployment was higher still: in 1924, when unemployment figures in official 
statistics started to include those ‘registered’ and not just those in receipt of relief, 
approximately 30,000 more people were listed as unemployed than were eligible for 
unemployment benefit.512 By this stage, unemployment had become a major political 
issue, and it was a matter that was frequently mentioned in some of the Austrian press. 
In March 1924, for example, the Arbeiter-Zeitung published a sarcastic cartoon 
depicting an unemployed man, which satirised Seipel’s economic theories as 
expounded at a speech that he had given at the Dominican Church in Vienna (see 
Figure 1. below). 
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Figure 1. Der Arbeitslose (unemployed person), Arbeiter-Zeitung, 11 March 1924, 8.  
The caption says, ‘So now, after the speech of the prelate Seipel in the Dominican Church, I 
know: an imbalance in ownership is necessary to give an incentive to work and progress.’ 
 
 
 
There was a surge in unemployment occasioned by the commencement of the League’s 
Plan and by the stabilisation of the currency. According to League economist de Bordes, 
the impact of unemployment was felt ‘immediately’ when the League programme 
began.513 By April 1923, however, as the effects of the speculative boom started to 
filter through the economy, the rate recorded by Zimmerman had declined to 149,000 
and this trend continued until by October 1923 when the rate, at 80,000, was the 
lowest for a year.514 By December 1923, the rate had started to rise again, and in early 
1924 jumped by 24%, from 97,000 at the end of December to 120,000 at the end of 
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January.515 The summer months saw reductions in unemployment, which Zimmerman 
attributed to seasonal factors, before starting to rise once again in autumn 1924 and at 
the start of 1925. The official statistics reveal that the numbers in receipt of 
unemployment relief rose by around seven and a half times between the time of the 
commencement of the League scheme in August 1922 and its peak in January 1926, an 
increase of some 200,000 people.516 The League’s scheme, thus, seems to have 
occasioned initially very high levels of unemployment in late 1922 and early 1923, 
followed by a persistently high level of joblessness from 1924 onwards, which rose 
further still in 1925 and 1926.  
 
Commissioner-General Zimmerman, ideologically committed to austerity, did not have 
many useful suggestions to deal with the scourge of unemployment, other than to 
suggest further reductions in government spending, but he was alarmed by the 
problem and in his twenty-fifth report of January 1925, he highlighted its extent.517 At 
this stage, Zimmerman recorded that there were 175,000 unemployed people in 
Austria, whilst the official statistics of the Austrian Republic gave the figure as 219,000 
people.518 Zimmerman’s analysis revealed that the level of joblessness as expressed in 
his reports, never mind the even higher figure given in the official data, was far in 
excess of that of comparable countries. In Czechoslovakia, for example, only 80,000 
were out of work even though the population there was twice that of Austria. Poland 
was four times the size of Austria in terms of its population, but only had the same 
number of unemployed. In Germany the recorded number of workless was 436,000 and 
yet the population was ten times larger than Austria’s: per capita unemployment in 
Germany was, thus, running at only between twenty to twenty five percent of the rate 
in Austria.519 According to the official statistics, unemployment did not fall below 
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150,000 in 1925 and 1926 in Austria, and it reached its highest level of 254,000 in 
January 1926 at a time when the population was approximately six and a half million 
people.520 As de Bordes pointed out, the level of unemployment in Austria remained at 
‘a much higher level than during the period of inflation’ throughout this time.521 
 
We have already seen that by comparison with other countries the unemployment 
level in Austria was high, but it is useful to try to gain a sense of what the actual 
percentage of jobless as a proportion of the workforce was. There are some difficulties 
about exactly assessing the extent of unemployment in Austria at this time as some of 
the contemporary figures collected tended to be expressed in terms of an absolute 
numerical value that related to the numbers of people registered as unemployed, a 
figure which often excluded those ineligible to claim for unemployment benefit, who 
often did not register. Agricultural and forestry workers, some workers in rural 
industries, along with domestic workers, were not eligible, which, given that the 
agricultural and forestry sector comprised between 40-50% of those employed, means 
a great many people may not have been counted in the official statistics.522 Female 
workers were, however, eligible for unemployment relief, something that was not true 
in all countries at this time. To receive support, workers had to have been employed for 
at least twenty weeks during the previous two years, and before 1924, support was 
only given for only twelve weeks. This was extended to forty-two weeks in 1924, in the 
face of the high and persistent unemployment levels.523 Figures were not collected in 
Austria on the overall size of the workforce, so the unemployment rate as a percentage 
of the workforce was not calculated. There had been no labour-force survey in Austria 
since 1902, but there were figures available for the numbers of people employed under 
collective contracts (which were, according to de Bordes, universal in Austria at this 
                                                          
520 Statistisches Handbook (1927), 142. 
521 J. van Waldré de Bordes, Note on Unemployment, 26 May 1925, LNA S113, Sir Arthur Salter, No. 10. 
522 There are different figures for the proportions employed in these areas. In a document in LNA S113, Sir 
Arthur Salter, No. 10, Austria, ‘Comparison between the natural resources of Austria and Switzerland’, the 
figure is given as 40%, whilst Wicker puts the figure at 50% in Elmus Wicker, ‘Terminating Hyperinflation in the 
Dismembered Habsburg Monarchy’, American Economic Review 76/3 (1986), 350-364. 
523 Wicker, ‘Terminating Hyperinflation’, 361. 
152 
 
time), so some percentages of the level of unemployment can be calculated for certain 
industries, but there existed no overall official calculation of the percentage.524 
 
A comparison with one of the countries most affected by unemployment at this time, 
Britain, helps to illustrate the scale of Austria’s problem. Britain’s unemployment rate 
at the end of 1924 ran at around 10-11% of the workforce, and at this time the 
Commissioner-General estimated that there was a similar level of unemployment per 
head of population in Austria as in Britain. Indeed he suggested that it was only in 
Britain, of all countries in the world, that the rate was in anyway comparable to the 
level in Austria.525 Given that the Commissioner-General understated the true levels of 
unemployment and that the actual percentage ran much higher, Marcus’s assertion 
that the level of unemployment in Austria was the highest per capita in the world 
seems accurate.526 Other evidence can be found in the information provided by the 
Austrian labour movement, representing primarily industrial workers. In May 1925, the 
Austrian Chamber of Workmen and Employees gave the figure for the number of 
people unemployed as 180,000 and suggested that this represented 10% of the 
workforce, which if true would suggest that when the official level of unemployment 
peaked in January 1926 at approximately 250,000, around 14% of the workforce were 
unemployed.527 Economist Elmus Wicker has attempted to estimate how much the 
programmes of the 1920s that were aimed at ending hyperinflation contributed to the 
overall rates of unemployment in the various countries. He gives a ‘deliberately 
conservative’ estimate that, in Austria, the excess unemployment generated specifically 
by the stabilisation programme ran at 7% of the workforce, an effect that he terms in 
the neutral language of an economist, as ‘nonnegligible’.528 
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The rate of unemployment was not uniform across the country, although its impact was 
felt widely across many different sectors and in different regions of Austria. Industrial 
areas were particularly affected, although, of course, there is less reliable information 
relating to the position of agricultural workers because of their ineligibility for 
unemployment relief. According to de Bordes ‘the industrial districts (Vienna, Wiener-
Neustadt, Graz and Linz) are responsible for three-quarters of the unemployment in 
winter and practically all of it in summer’.529 Certain sectors of the economy also 
showed higher levels of unemployment than others, so the rate in the chemical, 
rubber, paper and graphics industries was very low, whilst the rate in metals, clothing, 
and hotel work ran at 10-15% in January 1925. Graz, which depended upon the iron 
and metal industries, was particularly badly hit.530 
 
How can the high and persistent level of unemployment that Austria experienced 
during the time of the League’s work in Austria be explained? Arthur Salter was clear 
that the unemployment experienced was ‘post-stabilisation unemployment’.531 Elmus 
Wicker’s explanation of the causes include the impact of the sacking of the 85,000 state 
employees and effect of stabilisation had upon the size of banking operations in the 
country, the reduction of which resulted in 10,000 fewer employees at financial 
institutions. Zimmerman did acknowledge that stabilisation had reduced Austrian 
export advantages, which depressed the economy, but he also attributed 
unemployment levels to a lack of markets, the cost of credit (which was high partly 
because of the stabilisation programme),532 the financial burdens produced by taxation 
and the costs of social legislation.533 He did not understand the detrimental effect that 
other aspects of the League’s programme likely had on unemployment. There is in his 
reports a clearly expressed concern about the unemployment rate, juxtaposed with 
frequent exhortations to the government to go faster and further with their cuts to the 
number of civil servants employed, with no hint of contradiction. Zimmerman’s second 
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report to the Financial Committee, for example, talks approvingly of the high number of 
state employees made redundant, whilst also bemoaning the unemployment ‘crisis’, 
and pointing to the ‘general hardship and individual suffering’ that the crisis 
produced.534 In his mind, there was no contradiction: anything other than minimal 
government expenditure (including spending upon the wages of public servants) was 
harmful to the economic outlook. Whilst handwringing about the numbers of jobless in 
his twenty-fifth report (covering late 1924 and early 1925), Zimmerman also opined 
that, ‘one of the greatest services that can be rendered to the economic life of a nation 
is to make drastic reductions in public expenditure’.535 For Zimmerman, a major factor 
in causing unemployment was excessive government spending, even though this was 
also something that was originally blamed in pre-stabilisation era, when levels of 
worklessness were low, for hyperinflation. Whilst notions of counter-cyclical 
government spending had not at this time been fully developed,536 to urge the state to 
make more people jobless when joblessness was a problem does seem particularly 
perverse. 
 
One contemporary at the League, J. van Waldré de Bordes, did have a more rounded 
and sophisticated understanding of the causes of the unemployment. He recognised 
the deflationary effects of aspects of the League programme in his ‘Note on 
Unemployment’, and acknowledged that the looser monetary policy pursued by the 
National Bank of Austria from Autumn 1923 to Autumn 1924 helped to reduce 
unemployment.537 Such a policy was, of course, anathema to the Financial Committee 
and its supporters, such as Montagu Norman. The delegation of the Committee that 
visited Austria in September 1924 saw to it that such a policy was stopped, which 
occasioned an increase in the already high levels of joblessness, as has been seen.538 
Furthermore, depressive conditions were created by the high bank rate that was 
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required to maintain the value of the Schilling and the gold standard. In March 1925 the 
bank rate was 13%, for example.539 Such a rate made borrowing for investment by 
Austrian firms very difficult, which in turn had a depressive effect on the economy, 
increasing unemployment.  
 
Unemployment is not just a statistical matter or a subject for theorising about in 
economics: it is a cause of real hardship. This is a fact that often seemed to be of 
minimal concern to some at the League of Nations. Frequently, League representatives 
accepted unemployment as an unfortunate bi-product of necessary reforms.540 As 
some of the negative effects of the League’s programme on employment levels and 
social conditions became clear in early 1923, for example, the response of the Austrian 
Committee of the League was to suggest that the suffering was necessary and 
unavoidable. They wrote that ‘it was clearly foreseen in September [1922] that 
sacrifices and hardship during the transitionary period were the indispensable 
condition of Austria returning to a position of self-supporting independence and 
prosperity’.541 Consideration was not made of how to alleviate these difficulties. 
Avoidance of unemployment could be a central aim of economic, financial and fiscal 
policy, but in the case of Austrian financial reconstruction, budget equilibrium and 
currency stability were the priority, and unemployment was treated as a necessary, 
albeit regrettable, side-effect.  
 
Unemployment was a particular issue for Vienna, as Commissioner-General 
Zimmerman highlighted, but it was not only in Vienna that it was a problem. Evidence 
of the detrimental social effects of the unemployment produced during the initial 
period of the League’s programme, and evidence of concern about this, can be found in 
the meetings that took place in Graz of the Landtag (regional assembly) of Styria. Styria 
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was a semi-industrial region, with some industrial areas based in Graz, and some small 
industrial settlements elsewhere. It also relied upon its agricultural economy. On 21 
December 1922 the Landtag – which contained a substantial number of SDAP 
representatives but more Christian Social members – passed unanimously and without 
amendment a measure enabling the regional government to provide emergency funds 
to help assist the unemployed. One hundred million Kronen were supplied for the 
purpose, which was intended to assist the ‘genuinely poor’.542 The assembly also took 
steps to attempt to organise contacts with local industry to see how they could assist 
with the alleviation of unemployment.  
 
In the Tyrol, a region that was much more dependent on agriculture and tourism than 
Styria, and where regional politics were dominated by Christian Social affiliates the 
Tyrolean People’s Party543, similar discussions occurred in the regional parliament in 
December 1922. Proposing an urgent motion to take measures to tackle 
unemployment, SDAP representative for Innsbruck Martin Rapoldi stated that ‘for 
weeks the level of unemployment in Tyrol has risen alarmingly’. According to Rapoldi, 
the support given to the unemployed was inadequate to even purchase sufficient 
bread, and thus the workless were ‘abandoned to the largest woes’.544 Rapoldi and his 
co-signatories proposed public works schemes such as the completion of the 
construction of the high road to Hungerburg on the outskirts of Innsbruck, and 
emergency winter works to help alleviate unemployment. They identified a sum of 
money that the Industrial District Commission could use for this purpose.545 In contrast 
to Styria, the motion was not immediately adopted by the Landtag, but the measures 
were referred to its Finance and Construction Committee.546 In this example in the 
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Tyrol we see the proposal of a programme of public investment for the purpose of the 
alleviation of unemployment. These were economic policies that were in opposition to 
the principles of the League’s financial reconstruction scheme, which had envisaged a 
small state and no government invention of this type. Butschek identifies what he 
refers ‘Präkeynesianismus’ in Austria but his focus is on the 1930s. In the discussion and 
proposals of the Tyrolean Landtag in 1922, we seem to have an even earlier 
example.547  
 
Concern about unemployment persisted in the provinces of Austria, and by 1925, when 
unemployment had reached very high levels, the SDAP-organised marches urging for 
‘work and bread for the unemployed’ in Vienna and in Innsbruck.548 At this point, the 
whole of the Tyrolean Landtag, with its large majority of representatives of the 
Tyrolean People’s Party, voted unanimously in favour of an SDAP motion proposing 
similar publicly-financed job creation measures to those put forward in 1922. According 
to the SDAP representative for Innsbruck, Herr Holzhammer, speaking in the debate on 
this motion, although rises in the numbers of unemployed were seen across Austria, 
the problem was particularly acute in the Tyrol where levels were ‘downright 
frightening’. He also pointed out the suffering experienced by the many unemployed 
who were not counted in the figures or did not claim the benefits to which they were 
entitled. Holzhammer also focussed upon housing shortages and poor quality housing 
and urged consideration of measures to finance the construction of housing, as, 
through this, ‘commercial employment opportunities and incomes’ could be generated 
to reduce unemployment. By these measures Holzhammer suggested, the ‘greatest 
evils of our time… housing shortages and unemployment… would be mitigated and 
thereby lasting and useful results produced’.549 The motion, which the Landtag had no 
power to enforce, was amended by a proposal of a member of the Tyrolean People’s 
Party that the regional governor refuse all work permits to foreigners in times of high 
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unemployment as foreign labour ‘aggravated unemployed and housing shortages’.550 
Thus, in some of the regions of Austria, the sources document a great level of concern 
about the unemployment produced in the wake of the League’s programme for 
financial reconstruction, and give us an insight into the suffering caused by 
unemployment, and some of the proposals to tackle the problem via non-orthodox 
measures – proposals that ran counter to doctrines promoted in the League’s scheme. 
 
Concern about unemployment was often expressed by organisations such as the 
Austrian Chamber of Workmen and Employees551, and some representatives in the 
Tyrol, such as Martin Rapoldi, were clearly deeply worried about the suffering that 
unemployment could cause. Individual stories and women’s experiences of 
unemployment have often disappeared from view, however. The effects that 
unemployment could have on an individual and a woman are revealed in the diaries of 
Josefa Gastegger, a young seamstress from Vienna.552 Gastegger was from a working-
class background: her father was a bricklayer, and from the age of sixteen she worked 
to support herself in the textiles industry, taking a number of temporary positions in 
the industry in the early part of the 1920s.553 The textile industry was particularly 
vulnerable to recessionary conditions, and Gastegger experienced periods of 
unemployment. By 1925, she was working for Frau Hauser’s business in Vienna in a job 
she enjoyed, but, at this time of particular difficulty for the Austrian economy (1925 
being the year of peak post-stabilisation unemployment), she realised that once again, 
she would lose her job. Recognising that in Vienna she would ‘probably again, though it 
is so unpleasant to me’, need to apply for unemployment assistance, Gastegger heard 
of a position working in a kitchen in Württemberg, Germany, and decided to take her 
chances abroad. In 1926 she moved for another job to Antwerp.554 Gastegger’s position 
as a young, single, childless person made the possibility of migrating for work an option 
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for her, but her experience illuminates the precarious employment conditions for many 
people in post-stabilisation Austria. Women, more likely to be working in insecure and 
non-unionised professions such as hers, were particularly vulnerable; especially as, 
since the war, the status of women’s employment had been downgraded as part of a 
gendered attempt, according to Maureen Healy, to ‘reconstruct’ the old pre-war era. 
Healy describes the difficulties of reintegrating soldiers after the war, and the problem 
of absorbing sometimes physically and psychologically damaged men back in to the 
labour force, particularly with soldiering now considered the ‘one true masculine 
vocation’.555 There was amongst returning soldiers anger about female employment, 
and, partly in response to this, the authorities made concerted efforts to reduce the 
number of women in work, and restore traditional gender relations.556 It was in this 
context that the women who claimed unemployment benefit received a lower rate 
than men, which then potentially left them in an even more impoverished condition 
than men. Gastegger’s diaries are interesting on the issue of unemployment assistance, 
as she professed a dislike of claiming it.557 This may have reflected a desire on her part 
to always be self-supporting, but it also may point to the rather stringent and 
humiliating obligations that those in receipt of these benefits were subjected to. They 
experienced constant monitoring, and had to report twice a week to labour exchanges, 
where their willingness to work was assessed, and officials could require the 
unemployed to take positions, even if they were not suitable.558  
 
Gastegger’s experiences also reveal a common response to unemployment: emigration. 
Indeed, it was thought by Basil Blackett and others that emigration might be an answer 
to the Austrian unemployment problem, and, thus, the practice was to be 
encouraged.559 The Neue Freie Presse on the 27 May 1925, the same year that 
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Gastegger left Austria, reported that the Chamber of Workmen and Employees had 
petitioned the Chancellor and called for steps to be taken to get 50,000 workers to 
emigrate to North America. One of Chamber’s particular concerns was the drain that 
unemployment support represented: they believed that the standard of living of 
workers was ‘seriously affected by the fact that every five of them must support one 
unemployed’. For the Chamber at this point, emigration was an answer.560 There 
certainly was high emigration from Austria at this time, but nevertheless, high 
unemployment also persisted.561 In their petition, the Chamber linked the high level of 
unemployment with the question of Austria viability. The country seemed to them not 
able to viably sustain the population and they asked; ‘how many people can live in 
Austria so long as she is forced to exist as an independent State and an independent 
economic unit’.562 Whilst a few contemporaries were clear that Austria did have the 
resources to be viable as an independent entity, in the minds of many, currency 
stabilisation and the reform programme had not resolved the issue, as there were still 
problems around unemployment, trade and investment.563  
 
Thus, the problem of unemployment in the post-stabilisation period illustrates the ways 
in which the League’s scheme for Austrian reconstruction simultaneously contributed 
to processes that increased stability and the prospects for survival in the country, whilst 
also contributing to developments that undermined them. Currency instability and 
inflation had caused insecurity and a wide-spread perception that the country was not 
viable as an independent entity. Unemployment caused precisely the same problems, 
and even as the currency stabilised, the Anschluss movement and political tensions 
grew, as we will see in the next chapter.  
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The reform of budget and administration 
In addition to currency stabilisation and the provision of foreign loans, another element 
that was regarded by the Financial Committee of the League as critical to Austrian 
financial reconstruction was the achievement of budget equilibrium and lower 
government spending, and assessing the success of attempts to achieve these is a 
further way of analysing the impact of the League’s programme. The absence of 
budgetary equilibrium was seen by the Financial Committee to be the central cause of 
Austria’s financial woes, and they attributed the deficit to excessive government 
spending.564 Thus, it was axiomatic to the Financial Committee that cuts be made to the 
government’s budget in order to achieve budgetary balance, although they did 
envisage some increases in taxation too.565 The principle of budgetary equilibrium was 
central to the League of Nations’ scheme, and the Geneva Protocols stipulated the level 
at which the budget should be balanced (350 million gold Krone), a sum that Peter 
Berger says was a ‘very low level’, and which entailed large reductions in state 
spending.566 As has been seen, this required large reductions in the numbers of state 
employees. It also involved administrative reforms to government procedures, the 
rationalisation of postal, telegraph and rail services, cuts to government-funded 
services, and modest raises in the level of some taxes to help cover the deficit.567 The 
Umsatzsteuer (Turnover Tax) introduced in April 1923 was particularly helpful in raising 
revenue.568 
 
Right from the commencement of his involvement in Austria, Commissioner-General 
Zimmerman was very keen to promote any money saving administrative reforms and 
efficiencies that he could find, such as the reduction in the number of government 
ministries. As Peter Becker says, Zimmerman was able to pressurise the government 
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with respect to administrative rationalisation and reductions in expenditure via his 
published monthly reports.569 At times, Zimmerman took an extraordinarily hands on 
approach, inspecting the light railway system personally to attempt to identify guards 
whose jobs could be made redundant.570 In addition to the reductions in government 
ministries and the reduction in the number of civil servants, a comprehensive plan of 
administrative reform was designed to increase the efficiency of bureaucratic 
procedures. The Gesetz zur Vereinfachung der Verwaltung (Law to Simplify 
Administration) was finally passed in June 1925. According to the Government minister 
responsible, Vice Chancellor Felix Frank of the Groẞdeutsche Volkspartei, the 
administrative reforms represented ‘standardisation, simplification and savings’.571 The 
reforms were an innovative part of the League’s programme, representing the first 
attempt by an international organisation to assist with this kind of restructuring. 
Reorganisation to try to reduce spending (and cut jobs) also occurred when the 
Telegraph and Telephone administration was merged with that of the Postal Service. 
Postal rates were increased by 50%, and redundancies made from the state-run 
tobacco monopoly.572 Subsidies on certain kinds of rail fare were also reduced, some 
reorganisations carried out on railways, and the state railway company was 
commercialised according to a plan devised by British rail expert, Sir William 
Acworth.573 The railway reforms produced opposition, as will be seen in the next 
chapter.574 The League’s programme did occasion some significant restructuring of the 
bureaucratic apparatus and administration of infrastructure in Austria, but the 
measures did not go as far as Zimmerman and the League would have liked. 
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Zimmerman wrote to the Chancellor in February 1924, for example, that ‘nothing is at 
present of greater urgency from Austria than to carry out the reforms with rapidity and 
vigour and to brush aside all obstacles… very little has, so far, been accomplished in the 
matter of expenditure.’575 In April 1923 he was frustrated that the number of official 
publications and army establishments had not been further reduced, and that reform 
of the administration to federal theatres had not been implemented.576 
 
The reforms that were implemented did contribute, however, to the achievement of 
budgetary equilibrium at an earlier date than envisaged, and by 1925, the Financial 
Committee reported that the remaining deficit was only five million gold Krone, and 
that in 1926, the Austrian state would actually achieve a surplus of 28.4 million gold 
Krone.577  The attainment of this was at a higher budgetary level than that desired by 
the Financial Committee and Zimmerman. The budget actually accepted in 1926 of 515 
million gold Krone was considerably more than the 350 million gold Krone envisaged in 
1922, even allowing for the fact that there had been some inflation during this 
period.578 The relative speed with which Austria achieved balance was due to the much 
higher than anticipated tax take that the state received after 1922. Restored confidence 
in the prospects for Austrian survival encouraged the payment of taxes, and direct 
taxes actually produced in 1923 five times the revenue that had been estimated by the 
Delegation.579 Part of this was down to positive effects created by the stock market 
boom – monies made were taxable, and the creation of wealth encouraged the 
payment of tax.580 This unexpected benefit of the League’s programme had complex 
consequences. It helped increase confidence in the country and its budget, and 
somewhat reduced the pressure to cut services and government spending yet further. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, however, it also increased political tensions, in that 
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Zimmerman and other Financial Committee representatives felt that the tax receipts 
were exceptional and not sustainable, and that anyway, the level of taxation was too 
high. This view brought them into conflict with Austrian regional governments, and 
particularly, the administration of the City of Vienna.  
 
Despite the higher than anticipated tax-take, however, significant cuts to some services 
did occur, and these produced some deleterious social impacts and damaged the 
enhancements to state functions and provision that had occurred towards the end of, 
and after, the War. The exigencies of the war, and the SDAP’s determination to 
introduce social reform, had seen the functions of the Habsburg state and its 
Republican successor expand. During the war, a Ministry of Social Welfare and National 
Health was established, but despite this, as Healy argues, one of reasons for the 
collapse in support for the Habsburg state at the end of the First World War was the 
state’s failure to deliver basic welfare and provisions for its people.581 In the context of 
this collapse in the functions of the state, the effective provision of services to its 
‘demanding citizens’ was one method by which the new post-war state could build its 
authority.582 The designers of the League’s programme for Austria had hoped to create 
legitimacy via the establishment of a stable currency, balanced finances and a 
rationalised bureaucracy. By undermining effective service provision, promoting the 
‘degradation of certain social achievements’,583 and alienating certain groups whose 
support could have helped to develop a stable future for the Austrian Republic, such as 
civil servants and war veterans, the programme also had negative effects upon the 
generation of support for the new Austrian state from its populace. Thus, a process 
intended to rationalise the new state and ensure its viability, namely, reductions in 
government spending to a level that allowed a lower and balanced budget, also had the 
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effect of reducing the legitimacy of the new state, and its long term prospects for 
durability, as will be explored in the next chapter.  
 
Public health provision was a service that was negatively affected by the drive for 
permanent budget equilibrium insisted upon in the League’s scheme. The government 
instituted cuts to health care in a bill of 3 February 1923, the Reform of Public 
Administration of the Hospitals and Sick Law, which entailed cuts to public health 
provision of 25-30 milliard Krone. The impact of this is revealed in some of the debates 
held at the Styrian Landtag, where SDAP members, in particular, expressed their 
concern and dissatisfaction at threatened closure of the Graz-West hospital. Their 
objections were multiple: they disliked the reduction in health provision, and the fact 
that the location of this hospital in the industrialised west of the city meant that 
working-class citizens would suffer more from its closure. They were also concerned 
about the unemployment that would be produced if some of the hospital’s staff were 
made redundant.584 In this, the members of the Landtag showed an awareness of the 
ways in which reductions in public spending can reduce social cohesiveness. It is not 
just the reduction in services, but specifically which group of people will be affected (in 
this case, mostly working-class people), and the impact of the resulting job losses that 
will have an impact. Furthermore, even though wage levels in the First Republic were 
generally maintained, pressure on health budgets does seem to have affected the 
wages for some workers (‘Badepersonal’), who were affiliated to a health workers’ 
union, according to a report in the Arbeiter-Zeitung from 1924.585 The austerity 
measures also affected the provision of services for what were termed ‘war victims’, 
which included those disabled by the war, along with war widows and their 
dependents. It is estimated that between 4-8% of the Austrian population, some 
250,000-500,000 people, were war victims. These people saw reductions in veterans’ 
education and health services, and reductions in the level of their pension 
                                                          
584 Stenographische Berichte des Landestages Steiermark I, 1920-1923, Sitzung 40, 30 Dezember 1922, LAS. 
585 AZ, 11 March 1924, 10, an article entitled ‘Sozialpolitik’ about the struggle for fair wages of Badepersonal 
‘das dem Zentralverband des Krankenpflegepersonals angeschlossen’.  
166 
 
entitlements.586 The next chapter explores the opposition that this provoked, and the 
implications that these cuts had for the prospects for the future stability of, and the 
creation of legitimacy for, the Austrian state. 
 
It is interesting to note, that the federal subsidy to the Viennese State Opera was not 
cut, as a result, according to Arthur Salter, of his direct intervention. Salter helped to 
ensure this when he was part of the delegation that oversaw the League’s plan prior to 
the arrival of Zimmerman. In the case of the opera, Salter was clearly able to see the 
benefit that this element of expenditure would have, writing that ‘the morale of the 
whole people depended… upon this daily escape and inspiration’.587 He did not 
apparently place the same value on other aspects of government expenditure, such as 
services for veterans, and expenditure on decent health provision. The priority that 
Salter placed upon the maintenance of the opera may reflect the kinds of assumptions 
about the value of Austrian ‘civilisation’ that we saw described in Chapter Two. If it was 
partly the culture of Austria, and the cultured character of its people, that made the 
country worth saving, it is no surprise that Salter should wish to privileged the 
preservation of cultural, ahead of material, services.588 
 
Whilst government spending came down as public servants were laid off and certain 
spending programmes cut, it was not reduced to the envisaged level, much to 
Zimmerman’s irritation. One factor was that the economic problems that the League’s 
scheme generated, such as unemployment, saw certain public costs rise, as the 
government contributed 20% of the cost of unemployment assistance. Unemployment, 
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as has been seen, was at a low level before the commencement of the scheme, and its 
dramatic escalation was costly for the government. Government expenditure was 
increased when the length of time for which people were entitled to assistance was 
extended in 1924, as the problem of long-term unemployment was recognised. In 1925, 
Parliament voted to increase the level of unemployment relief for men.589 A further 
issue was that the immediate savings produced by redundancies were limited by the 
generous terms of pay-offs. Attempts to reduce the level of these were thwarted in the 
Extraordinary Council of the Parliament that was established to scrutinize the actions of 
the government early on in the League’s programme.590 Additionally, the scale of 
bankruptcies in the banking sector 1923-1927 led to expenditure, as the government 
attempted to reduce the impact of this.591 Overall, the League achieved its aim of 
budget equilibrium and the level of the budget was reduced, but not by as much as the 
League would have liked.  
 
Conclusions  
This chapter sheds light on the mixed effects in Austria of the financial reconstruction 
scheme. It had a number of positive impacts, but also significant detrimental aspects, 
and the programme in some respects hindered economic development. In public 
reports, as we have seen, the League and its representatives tended to portray the 
effects of the programme in a predominantly positive light. However, the presentation 
of the project as an uncomplicated success story was never the whole truth. Although 
the scheme did achieve many of its short term financial aims, such as the stabilisation 
of the currency and the successful acquisition of foreign loans for the Austrian 
government, its contribution to the longer-term macro-economic stability of Austria is 
much more debatable. Furthermore, the effects of the scheme had positive and 
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negative effects upon the inhabitants of Austria: the stabilisation of the value of the 
currency produced a greater degree of stability in prices and in the value of wages and 
savings, but its deflationary aspects reduced social welfare provision and produced very 
high and persistent unemployment. The programme for Austrian financial 
reconstruction generated currency stability partly through the psychological confidence 
that it initially produced. It also delivered loans to Austria. It also, however, created 
depressive conditions, a high trade deficit and high unemployment, as well as some 
negative social impacts. Furthermore, whilst stabilisation prevented the further erosion 
of the capital of savers, it also provoked more of the speculative excesses that 
generated social tensions, and further undermined the precarious position of Austrian 
banking, a problem that the League’s programme did nothing to address. In addition, 
some aspects of the reform plan caused social harm via the reduction in services, and 
the high levels of unemployment occasioned by the scheme, which caused hardship 
and insecurity across Austria. The detrimental social effects that occurred worked to 
undermine the stability and brighter future that it was hoped would be created for 
Austria by the programme.  
 
In certain respects, the programme actually undermined support for the new state. 
Confidence in Austria’s future was generated, to some extent, in the international 
financial community and international investors, as schemes such as the hydro-electric 
plant in Upper Austria reveal, but for those who were affected by unemployment, or 
the reduction of service provision, the chances of creating in them a belief in the 
legitimacy of the Republic were reduced. The Austrian scheme raises the question of 
who these kinds of international programme were for. Their proponents may well have 
believed them to be in the interests of wider society and the greater good, but the 
neglect of the ‘social question’ (mentioned by a member of the Financial Committee at 
the time that the programme was drawn up), points to a tendency to not consider the 
interests of ordinary people sufficiently, nor the effects of ‘stabilisation’ on their 
conditions of life. Furthermore, little consideration was made of the effect that all of 
this might have upon the political situation in Austria, with respect to its legitimacy as a 
state, and the political divisions that existed, as will be explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
The political impact of the scheme on Austria 1922 
– 1926 
 
‘Austria is accustomed to ill-treatment by the League on the pretext of 
reconstruction’  
Der Abend, 1925 
 
The scheme for Austrian reconstruction had conflicting political effects on the 
processes of Austrian state- and nation-building, and on the ideological climate of 
Austrian politics. Currency and budgetary difficulties and lack of confidence in the 
prospects for the Republic’s continued existence were the impetus for the League’s 
project, as we have seen. Through reforming the currency, public finances, and through 
the reorganisation of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, the League’s plan 
became part of an attempt at state-building in the fragile new entity.592 Implicitly, the 
programme had a nation-building element, in that consolidating the new state would 
assist in the creation of a belief in Austrian viability, and thus reduce the likelihood that 
Anschluss or any other reorganisation of Austria’s borders would occur. 
 
This chapter reveals that with respect to its political effects, the League’s programme 
was in many ways detrimental to the future prospects for political stability for Austria, 
and, thus, ultimately did not really enhance the chances of survival of an independent 
Austrian state. Political conflicts deepened between the main political parties over 
social and economic ideologies, and calls for Anschluss remained present, whilst 
opposition characterised the reactions of much of the press, and in many instances the 
public, towards the programme, in part because of an abrasive and undiplomatic 
approach from the League. The problems of interwar Austria were manifold, and the 
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League’s programme could not hope to entirely overcome them, but the country’s 
political conflicts predominantly deepened as a result of the League’s work, and the 
prospects for its long-term stability were not helped.  
 
This chapter investigates the previously overlooked significance of regional power 
within Austria on the League’s scheme’s efficaciousness and impact, and the ways in 
which the regions of Austria, particularly the City of Vienna, were able to resist and 
subvert the aims of the programme. In the work of international organisations, the 
connection between the international and the local or the regional is not often 
considered. The conflict that was caused by Vienna’s resistance to the dictates of the 
scheme fed into and exacerbated the increasingly politically polarised conditions in the 
Republic of Austria. Tensions between the central state and the regions increased, to 
the detriment of future prospects for Austrian stability, and in Vienna, two very 
different narratives of ‘reconstruction’ were articulated and were in tension and 
competition: one a product of an ‘Austro-Marxist’593 vision and the other of League-
backed economic and financial orthodoxy. 
 
Very little explicit consideration has been made of the significance of the League’s 
programme in the process of Austrian state-building. John Deak discusses the issue, but 
his treatment of it is brief.594 In his view, Chancellor Seipel’s pursuit and 
implementation of the scheme was part of the Chancellor’s contribution to the 
construction and stabilisation of new Austria, that is, its transition from Empire and 
monarchy. Becker provides some implicit support for this view in his positive account of 
the bureaucratic reforms occasioned by the League’s work, but his focus is very narrow 
and he does not attempt to consider the wider political implications of the changes, 
such as, their effects on debates about Anschluss or on the fractious relations between 
the two major political parties, the Christian Social Party and the SDAP.595 
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Most historians of the League also do not examine the effect of the programme on the 
creation of political stability within Austria.596 Nathan Marcus is an exception to this, 
and he points to instances of cooperation between the Social Democrats and Christian 
Social Party, and denies that the programme exacerbated political polarisation in the 
country.597 Deak, however, expressing a view shared by many Austrian historians, does 
regard the Geneva Protocols and the period of their implementation as a time during 
which a ‘Kulturkampf’ was unleased between, on the one side, the Christian Socials in 
general and Ignaz Seipel in particular; and, on the other, the Social Democrats and Otto 
Bauer in particular. Deak argues that Seipel moved into implacable hostility towards the 
SDAP and ultimately, democracy.598 Peter Berger disputes this, arguing that both the 
Christian Socials and the SDAP supported the work of the League.599  
 
My research supports the view that the Austrian reconstruction programme 
contributed to the deepening gulf between the two main political elements in Austria, 
and extends this interpretation through examination of the significance of regional-
national and regional-international relations to the situation in Austria, a part of the 
story that is often entirely overlooked in the scholarship. These aspects of the impact of 
the scheme were a crucial dimension in the ideological conflict between the SDAP and 
the Christian Social Party, and also an important facet of the tense dynamic between 
the central state and the provinces. 
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This chapter first investigates the effects of the programme on national politics, 
including press and public reactions; the political divisions between the SDAP and the 
Christian Social party; the efforts on state and nation formation in Austria, and 
questions of Austrian viability and sovereignty. It also investigates relations between 
the government and the Commissioner-General. It then examines the tensions that 
were exacerbated by the programme in the relations between the provinces and the 
federal government, revealing that the League had not initially given very much 
consideration to the ways in which their programme would operate at a local level, and 
how provinces could potentially work in opposition to the intentions of the 
programme. Ultimately, I argue that the League of Nation’s programme for Austrian 
financial reconstruction often acted to undermine political stability. 
 
The impact of the League’s scheme on national politics – press and public 
The responses in Austria to the Geneva Treaty and its associated reform plan were 
varied and diverse. The advent of the treaty saw a surge in short-term confidence that 
manifested in the speculative activity that took place on the Viennese Börse, and in the 
support that the programme had amongst the financial sector in Vienna – a member of 
which labelled the Geneva Protocols Seipel’s ‘heroic feat’.600 However, the programme 
was regarded with a great deal of suspicion and at times hostility by many people. 
There were ideological opponents who rejected the underlying tenets of the plan, such 
as the SDAP and the left-wing press, but also others who regarded the Geneva deal as 
representing an unacceptable foreign intrusion into Austria matters. The SDAP had this 
concern, but so did the pro-Anschluss and anti- St Germain right, and others who were 
keen to protect Austrian sovereignty.  
 
In the late summer and autumn of 1922, there was extensive press coverage in Austria 
of the negotiations and agreements relating to the scheme, of the work of the League’s 
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Provisional Delegation, and of the contentious parliamentary debates that discussed 
the project. There was also a great deal of coverage at other significant moments, 
particularly in September 1924 when revisions to the scheme were negotiated by the 
League and the Austrian government. Some newspapers, most notably the Neue Freie 
Presse (NFP), but to a lesser extent the Arbeiter-Zeitung (AZ), continued to feature 
regular stories about the project throughout the entire period. The initial press reaction 
to the League’s work was generally hostile and negative, although the centrist and 
liberal NFP adopted a more neutral tone, and the pro-government Reichspost was 
positive.601  
 
For the SDAP’s daily, Arbeiter-Zeitung, the scheme had many flaws. Upon the 
announcement of the outline of the programme, they felt that the decisions of the 
Finance Committee ‘exceed the worst expectations’. The policies relating to the central 
bank were ‘absurd’, and the newspaper worried that the requirement for the 
independence of the central bank would hinder industrial production.602 In a 
completely contrasting tone, the Reichspost reported that it was said by the Prague 
press that the work of the League was ‘the basis for the continued independent 
economic and political existence of Austria’.603 
 
The Arbeiter-Zeitung’s opposition was fused with anxiety about the erosion of Austrian 
sovereignty that they felt the League’s programme entailed. On 27 September 1922, for 
example, the newspaper expressed concern that proposals suggested that ‘the Central 
Bank should become entirely independent of the State! This would mean that we 
completely surrender our monetary policy to foreign capital’. The newspaper warned 
that ‘the proposals of the Financial Committee are, therefore, the most dangerous 
attack conceivable upon our entire economic life’.604 For the left-wing press, the issue 
of the encroachment into Austrian sovereignty was tied up with the desire to resist a 
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certain kind of control and influence. This was the control of ‘foreign’ financial interests 
represented by the transnational financial community in the shape of the League’s 
Financial Committee, its supporters such as Sir Montagu Norman, and the wider 
banking and finance community that was assisting with the raising of loans for Austria. 
It was not just in left-wing newspapers, however, that the issue was raised – other 
organs shared this fear of loss of sovereignty. Economics journal Der österreichsche 
Volkswirt, for example, published an article on September 23 1922 by its editor, 
economist Dr. Stolper, expressing opposition to the scheme because of the limits to 
Austrian sovereignty that it entailed.605 
 
These reactions to the Geneva Protocols might seem somewhat paradoxical. Although 
fears that Austria was not a viable entity were common, and many Austrians desired to 
see the country subsumed into a greater Germany, the surrender of sovereignty to 
foreign powers in the shape of the League of Nations caused a sudden surge of concern 
about Austrian sovereignty and Austrian rights. This apparent paradox can be 
accounted for by considering that pursuit of international help via the League (in order 
to preserve independent Austria) served to associate Austrian financial reconstruction 
with the League and in turn the whole post-war international settlement, and, 
specifically, the Treaty of St. Germain. The peace treaty, whose force the Geneva 
agreements strengthened,606 was widely regarded in Austria as an unjust attack on the 
right of Austria to self-determination. Indeed, such was the pitch of opposition to St. 
Germain that Bachinger and Matis describe how ‘opposition to the Peace Provision… 
degenerated into outright rejection psychosis’.607 Thus, for many people, the League’s 
programme for Austrian financial reconstruction represented not so much a welcome 
boost to the nascent Republic’s future prospects for survival, as a further attack on the 
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right of Austria to determine where its own future should lie, whether that be as an 
independent state or as part of a larger (or for that matter, smaller) state. 
 
League officials were very aware of the negative press attention that the programme 
attracted within Austria and were very active in their attempts to counter this.608 Salter, 
in particular, energetically produced articles to propagandise the scheme in a publicity 
strategy organised by the League’s Information Section, and League representatives 
communicated frequently with the press.609 The Provisional Delegation of the Financial 
Committee, who oversaw the work on the programme in the autumn of 1922, visited 
the editor of the Arbeiter-Zeitung in November 1922, to little avail, however.610 Even as 
the politicians of the SDAP adopted a somewhat more compromising stance towards 
the work of the League, at least to the extent of not obstructing the passage of the 
initial legislation, the AZ was very strident in its condemnation of the scheme.611 The 
Neue Freie Presse did grow more positive and may have been influenced by the League 
propaganda efforts, or perhaps simply by the initially positive results of the programme 
in terms of currency stabilisation and the obtaining of funds for loans. Of course, the 
NFP’s liberal standpoint also created an ideological affinity with the principles reflected 
in the League’s programme.612  
 
In general, however, the scepticism about the reform plan in the Austrian press 
remained high, despite these League efforts. Opposition to the programme did not just 
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occur in the initial days of the launch of the scheme, but remained present throughout. 
Any expression of reprove from the League about the progress made on implementing 
the reform programme generally produced a negative reaction, and the radical and left-
wing press were particularly critical of this kind of League intervention.  The Arbeiter-
Zeitung in spring 1924 objected strongly to the League’s insistence at this time on the 
continuance of the role and powers of Zimmerman, and to League criticism of the 
government for not enacting reforms more swiftly. The AZ called for control to be 
withdrawn by the end of the year and for the political parties of Austria to unite to 
‘Stop the austerity!’ and ‘Stop the throttling of economically, socially and culturally 
necessary expenditure!’ They did express doubt, however, that the bourgeois ‘lackeys’ 
in charge in Austria would be capable of following such a course.613 The following year 
in May 1925, after a resolution from the League’s Committee of Control that 
condemned the failure to reform the relationship between the federal state and the 
provinces, League official Meinoud Rost van Tonningen reported to the League that 
once again the press coverage was generally very negative with respect to this League 
intervention.614 Der Abend, a radical paper, commented that Austria was ‘accustomed 
to ill-treatment by the League on the pretext of reconstruction’.615 And a League Press 
Review of the Austrian Press covering this period noted that even the Neue Freie Presse 
commented on the Committee of Control intervention in ‘a very bitter tone’.616 
 
The left-wing press also had a negative reaction to the September 1924 agreement 
which extended League control far beyond the two-year period originally envisaged. 
Even though the government did not achieve their aim of having Zimmerman’s powers 
of control removed, the new agreement did allow for the establishment of budget 
equilibrium at a somewhat higher level than that originally planned, and gave the 
government slightly more right to be consulted by the Commissioner-General. 
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Opposition remained trenchant, despite the fact that these represented small victories 
for the Austrian government, as, by this stage, the left-wing press were completely 
opposed to any continuance of League control. For the Arbeiter-Zeitung, the measures 
were completely insufficient and they commented sarcastically on the ‘great success’ 
that the government had achieved, in that it was now given two days to read 
Zimmerman’s reports before they were transmitted to the League.617 In the view of the 
paper, the government had ‘suffered a complete and fatal defeat’,618 and they 
commented that Austria was administered by the League as a protectorate in a form 
‘that today might not anymore be possible against a Colonial people’.619 Der Abend’s 
view of the agreement was similar.620 In complete but not surprising contrast, the pro-
government Christian Social paper Reichspost portrayed the events of September 1924 
as a great victory for the government, and were also positive about the achievements 
of the reconstruction plan to date.621  
 
An absence of opinion polls or any kind of systematic attempt to assess the reaction of 
the public to the League’s work makes it tricky to judge the public mood, but some 
inferences and conclusions can be drawn. As has been seen, press reaction was 
frequently negative, and this may have reflected a similar attitude on the part of their 
readership, although we cannot assume that. Evidence from the League’s own officials 
suggests that at least at times, public feeling was negative. According to M. Krabbe of 
the Commissioner-General’s office, League criticism of the failure in Austria to resolve 
the issue of the respective powers of the central government and the provinces also 
affected Austrian public opinion very adversely: it had a ‘deplorable effect’, reducing 
support for the work of the League and generally demoralising the population.622 
League economist J. van Waldré De Bordes wrote similarly in 1925 that the Committee 
of Control resolutions had ‘a very bad effect’ on public opinion in Austria, and that ‘in 
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view of the pessimism and hopelessness with which the Austrian public regards the 
future and the chances of a recovery of the country with the help of the League of 
Nations, it is of primary importance that in the drafting of resolutions on Austria to be 
adopted by the different meetings in June due regard should be made to their 
psychological effect.’623 It is notable that de Bordes comments on the ‘psychological 
effect’, as so much of the politics around the idea of Austrian viability was affected by 
psychological mentalities. Demoralisation caused a loss of faith in the possibility of 
Austrian autonomy, and increased the attraction of the idea of Anschluss. Indeed, Rost 
suggested just this in relation to the 1925 incident, stating that the effect of the 
Committee of Control resolution had been to strengthen the level of support for union 
with Germany.624 In this regard, de Bordes and Rost’s concerns echoed those of 
Monnet during the previous year, and demonstrate a high-handed disregard on the 
part of some of those in Geneva connected with the programme for the perceptions 
and interests of the public in Austria. So certain were the Financial Committee (who 
advised the Committee of Control, some of whose members were in both Committees), 
on the correctness of their course, that it was difficult for them to even recognise an 
alternative view. Publicly, though, the League promoted the idea that mass opinion was 
favourable. In a joint report by the Financial Committee and the Commissioner-General 
Zimmerman, for example, published on 15 September 1924, they stated that there had 
been ‘a remarkable change in public opinion’, and that the Austrian public were ‘deeply 
impressed by the progress hitherto made’.625 
 
Zimmerman was very keen to create a positive impression of public opinion as this 
encouraged foreign investors, and increased the sense that the League’s scheme was a 
successful one. His first official dispatch to the Financial Committee reported that the 
League’s work had ‘inspired the Austrian public with confidence’ and his third report 
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that the loan agreements had made ‘a very good impression in Austria’.626 Whilst 
Zimmerman may have at times overstated the degree of favourable feeling on the part 
of ordinary Austrians, it was certainly the case that the initial stages of the League’s 
work produced a surge of confidence, as people anticipated the arrival of the foreign 
loans and envisaged a more positive future for their country. The increase in the 
savings rate, the level of investment in the internal loan, the extent of the purchase of 
government bonds, and to some the extent of speculative activity on the stock market, 
were all testament to this.627 Later, as the League revised their scheme in September 
1924 on terms that were a little more favourable to Austria (and in repudiation of 
Zimmerman’s wishes), Austrian public reaction was, according to a British diplomat, 
positive.628  
 
League involvement also produced manifestations of active opposition. A protest in 
Vienna held on the 24 September 1922, as details of the Protocols governing the 
scheme were being finalised, seems to reveal this. The ‘People’s Association of Vienna’ 
demonstrated against the treaties of St Germain and Versailles and in favour of 
Anschluss.629 There was a connection in the minds of many between the scheme and 
the upholding and maintenance of the widely despised St Germain, because, as we saw 
in Chapter Two, the League’s work was, in part, a project to shore up the peace treaties 
and the international system that emerged from the Paris Peace Conference. 
 
There were not many protests that directly attacked the League’s scheme itself: strikes 
at the time tended to be focussed upon what were ostensibly different issues. Strikes 
between 1923 and 1924 were commonly about wages and jobs. Agitation by railway 
workers, however, which commenced in 1923 but was particularly intense in 1924, was 
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related in part to the reforms demanded as part of the League’s programme.630 Failure 
to resolve the railway workers’ dispute contributed to Seipel’s decision to resign the 
Chancellorship in 1924, at least according to his own account.631 Additionally, protests 
about unemployment often had a link to the League programme, in that, as seen in the 
previous chapter, joblessness was a major consequence of the scheme. The Arbeiter-
Zeitung frequently reported on the issue, and on 4 March 1924 announced ‘a rally in 
sympathy for unemployed workers’, which was particularly directed in support of 
sacked bank employees.632 The assassination attempt upon Seipel in June 1924 was 
carried out by an unemployed man, and in this sense might be regarded as a 
manifestation of opposition to Seipel’s and the League’s policies.633 Other public 
protests were frequently anti-peace treaty, German nationalist and often overtly anti-
Semitic, such as the mass demonstration organised by the National Anti-Semitic 
Campaign Committee in the early months of the League’s work in Austria, which urged 
‘Ostjuden hinaus!’634 Explicitly anti-Semitic protests had a long lineage in Vienna, but 
the occasion of the League’s work seems to have intensified the frequency of pro-
Anschluss, anti-St Germain and anti-Semitic protests, and so it may be reasonable to 
infer that the protests were directed in part at the League’s work. Opinion with respect 
to the issue of Anschluss was volatile and somewhat dependent upon conditions in the 
country – in the words of Jonathan Bloomfield the idea of Anschluss often acted in this 
era in Austria as a ‘psychological parachute which avoided confronting awkward 
realities’.635 With the inclusion of the Anschlussverbot636 in the Geneva Agreement, the 
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League’s reconstruction work in Austria became associated with the Treaty of St 
Germain. The Anschlussverbot turned out to be counter-productive, in that it stirred up 
pro-Anschluss sentiments. Thus, the internationalism of the scheme had the effect of 
alienating many people from support for internationalism, and by 1925, the Anschluss 
movement was strong and rising.637 
 
At this stage, as the economic crisis continued and unemployment soared, the records 
show that the mood in Austria was generally very pessimistic. The period of confident 
speculation on the stock exchange was long over, and protests intensified. The Austrian 
archives reveal that protests in 1925 were often German-nationalist protests, such as 
the anti-St Germain one held in the Praterstern Park in Vienna in August 1925.638 In 
addition to these, there were other manifestations, including SDAP-organised marches 
urging for ‘work and bread for the unemployed’.639 One of these marches sought to 
protect the gains that the workers obtained in the early years of the First Republic, and 
called for the ‘security of the 8-hour day through international legal agreements!’ 
Similar demonstrations were held in Innsbruck.640 The increase of unemployment that 
the League’s scheme occasioned added to public hostility towards it, and to the general 
climate of unrest in the country. Furthermore, the rise of unemployment and the 
persistence of economic problems also correlated with the growth in the strength of 
right-wing and anti-Semitic movements in the country. 
 
The impact of the League’s scheme on national politics – parties and parliament 
Conflict also increased between the main political parties. In the early years of the new 
republic, the SDAP and the Christian Social Party worked together on the constitution 
and in government, although this was always an awkward partnership.641 By the time of 
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the League’s programme, this era of cooperation and compromise was long gone, 
however, and one of the effects of the scheme was to increase tension between the 
parties. Relations deteriorated further after the events of the July Revolt of 1927, 
where, following the acquittal for murder of far-right wing militia members, Viennese 
socialist supporters launched a general strike, huge protests and riots, and were then 
shot upon by police.642 By 1934, the two erstwhile coalition partners were engaged in 
an existential struggle against one another, which culminated during the ‘Austrian civil 
war’ in a pitched battle at Karl-Marx-Hof, the (to Christian Social eyes anyway) fortress-
like Socialist housing development in the Viennese suburbs.643 Ultimately the SDAP 
were outlawed as a political movement. Factors pre- and post-dating the League’s 
involvement contributed to the political divisions and political breakdown of Austria, 
but the scheme for Austrian reconstruction played its part in increasing political 
polarisation, and in this way destabilised the country. 
 
Initially, however, the government and the League were able to obtain sufficient 
support to get their programme going. Parliamentary support was crucial for the 
reconstruction programme to even commence. The Austrian constitution, enacted 1 
October 1920, and designed by Viennese legal professor Hans Kelsen at the behest of 
the then national and SDAP leader, Karl Renner (later, after the Second World War, a 
key figure in Austria’s transition to democracy as well as the Second Republic’s first 
president),644 established a bi-cameral parliamentary republic. Parliament was 
composed of two assemblies, the National and the Federal. Direct elections for the 
National Assembly (Nationalrat), were held on the basis of proportional representation, 
and representatives were sent from regional parliaments to the Federal Assembly 
(Bundesrat). The National Assembly was the primary legislative body, and also the body 
responsible for electing the Chancellor. The Chancellor was responsible for enacting 
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legislation. Both houses of Parliament elected the president, but presidential powers 
were weak at this stage.645 The Nationalrat thus had to pass the legislation that 
governed the initial phases of the scheme, such as that establishing the Bank of Issue, 
and were also called upon to grant the government the exceptional powers deemed 
necessary to give the government sufficient power and authority to proceed with the 
steps ordained by the programme. 
 
At the time that the legislation relating to the Geneva Protocols came into force, the 
conservative Catholic Christian Social Party and their allies in the Pan-German 
(Groẞdeutsche Volkspartei) party could form a majority in the Nationalrat, although 
they did not have the two-thirds majority that passing the Enabling Law (as a temporary 
deviation from the constitution) required. The Pan-German attitude towards the 
League’s work was somewhat ambiguous. It might be anticipated that the Party calling 
for German unity would oppose completely moves to ensure Austrian survival. The 
Geneva Protocols reinforced the clauses in Versailles and St Germain outlawing 
Anschluss, and the scheme explicitly linked the provision of foreign finance to the 
continued independence of Austria. Despite this, the Pan-Germans supported the 
relevant legislation in Parliament as part of the government. They appear at this stage 
to have been willing to trade their support for continued political power: to oppose 
would have entailed losing their government positions. Furthermore, according to Rolf 
Steininger, the party saw that the Geneva Protocols were the only way of keeping 
Austria intact and obtaining help for the ailing country at this point: the Pan-Germans 
were keen to merge Austria with Germany on a unified basis and, thus, they were 
supportive of the programme if it reduced the chances of any of the Länder seceding 
from the country.646 In addition, the Party may have objected strenuously to the 
Anschlussverbot, and in general to the acceptance of the treaty of St Germain that the 
League’s programme implied, but they did support elements of the reform plan. So, for 
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example, the Pan-German Vice-Chancellor Felix Frank oversaw the introduction of the 
Administrative Reform Bill of 1925 and presented the reforms to Parliament as an 
‘extraordinarily important step on the road to rehabilitation’.647 The Pan-Germans had 
not given up on the idea of Anschluss by any means, but the section of the Party that 
was in political power regarded the Protocols as temporary expedient to help reform 
Austria and keep Austria on its feet until such time as union with Germany was 
possible. In that sense at this stage, the Pan-Germans supported moves that would 
keep Austria from disintegrating, as they wished Austria to join Germany as one entity, 
and to prevent the country from being subsumed by Italy.648 
 
The tentative and contingent nature of the Pan-German support for the League’s 
scheme is revealed, however, in the actions in 1925 of Felix Frank, now out of office, 
and Dr Dinghofer, a former Pan-German president of the Austrian National Assembly, 
who travelled to meet politicians in Berlin to push their view that that the September 
1924 Geneva Agreement had ‘pressed Austria too close’.649 The two were very unhappy 
that the agreement envisaged an extension of the duration of the Commissioner-
General’s control. Furthermore, the rhetoric from Pan-German groups remained very 
hostile, and there was an increase in the intensity of pro-Anschluss anti-St Germain 
protests in 1925, as we have seen. The League’s programme seems to have contributed 
to a rise in the level of support for the Pan-Germans – many federal government 
officials were Christian Socials, and some of these defected to the Pan-German cause, 
alienated by the scale of the layoffs that resulted from the Geneva scheme. Extremist 
Pan-German sentiment was also intensified in 1925 as economic problems, such as 
stagnation and high unemployment, continued to blight the country.650 
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The Pan-Germans, whilst in government, supported the reform programme, however, 
and thus the primary source of parliamentary opposition came from the SDAP. The 
Christian Social Party, who dominated national government throughout the period of 
the League’s programme, along with all regional parliaments with the exception of 
Vienna,651 were frequently at odds with the Social Democrats, who dominated the 
regional government in Vienna, despite the cooperation between the two before 1920. 
Even though the Christian Social Party were politically pre-eminent in the First Republic, 
and the SDAP remained out of government after 1920, the SDAP were a very powerful 
force. They had won the first post-war election in 1919, gaining 41% of the vote, and 
always performed strongly in national elections, obtaining between 36% and 42% of 
the vote. The party actually topped the poll again in 1930, and they were certainly in 
contention for victory in each national election, although they did not manage to form 
a national government after 1920.652 The reconstruction programme became a site of 
political and ideological competition and tension between the two dominant political 
forces within the Austrian Republic.  
 
The response of the SDAP to the Geneva Protocols was multi-faceted. The party was 
essentially opposed to the scheme, but for various reasons did not want to completely 
obstruct it, as we saw in Chapter Two. In rhetorical terms, however, the Social 
Democrats were implacably hostile to the League’s scheme and the Geneva Protocols. 
In the Nationalrat, during a stormy debate on Geneva, Otto Bauer denounced the 
Protocols as a ‘crime!’ and ‘treason!’653 Bauer, on the left of the Party, might be 
expected to adopt this line.654 However, even SDAP moderate Karl Renner was 
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condemnatory. The Geneva Protocols had he said ‘sacrificed the independence of the 
country’. It had ‘with the burden of the reconstruction, made victims of the wide 
masses of the working class and wage earners’, and, indeed, the scheme had ‘delivered 
the financial interests of the land into the hands of international financial capitalism’.655 
Renner even embarked upon an overseas tour to attempt to rouse foreign opposition 
to the Treaty, but met with little success.656  
 
Despite the SDAP’s strong opposition and condemnation, and despite the significant 
press campaign opposing the Geneva Protocols, in autumn 1922 the Austrian 
Parliament voted through the legislation required. The SDAP ultimately agreed to 
abstain on the critical issue of the Ermächtigungsgesetz, or Enabling Law. Rhetoric from 
the SDAP – the Geneva Protocols were routinely labelled by them as the ‘Geneva 
Bondage Treaty’ – was not matched by determined resistance at this stage. A general 
strike could have been called, for example, but it was not. The SDAP could have used 
their armed Arbeiterwehr to express overt opposition,657 but they did not. The question 
arises as to why the SDAP did not mount more determined resistance. For one thing, 
the full implications of the programme in terms of budgetary cuts were not yet clear, as 
Seipel had taken care to ensure that they were not publicised.658 Furthermore, the 
involvement of the League had finally produced conditions of stability with respects to 
the Austrian currency, thus making it more difficult for the SDAP to resist. The party 
also did not want to provoke the kind of political (and potentially financial) crisis that 
complete obstruction would have produced.659 And, as seen in Chapter Two, the SDAP 
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were subject to a determined campaign by the League’s delegation to Vienna to obtain 
their acquiescence and persuade them that the Financial Committee did not only act in 
the interests of capital. The League recognised that even in opposition, the SDAP had a 
large and important body of support, in Vienna, in Linz, amongst railway workers and 
within the army.660 By late 1922, Avenol was able to report with satisfaction to 
Niemeyer that ‘the intransigent early opposition of the Socialists has been 
abandoned’.661 
 
The apparently compromising stance of the SDAP on the issue of the Enabling Law did 
not continue, however, and certainly never represented acceptance of this measure. 
According to Nathan Marcus, the actions of the SDAP reveal the success of the 
Provisional Delegation’s efforts to facilitate cooperation between the Party and the 
Christian Social government, and the polemical public objections of leading party 
members were often rhetorical flourishes, and not necessarily a representation of their 
actual position.662 Finance Minister Victor Kienböck provided partial support for this 
view: the SDAP did not want to bear any responsibility if the scheme failed, he wrote.663 
The situation was in fact more complex than this. Social Democratic opposition was not 
merely rhetorical, but their strong association with the new state meant that, even for 
those like Bauer who advocated Anschluss, the Geneva Protocols provided them with a 
difficulty. To resist implementation of the scheme ran the risk of undermining the state 
yet further, as a new inflationary spiral and renewed desertion of the Krone would 
likely occur, but to support the scheme also posed, in their view, a threat to the 
interests of the working class and a threat to the legitimacy and sovereignty of the 
country in itself.664 
                                                          
660 See Sir Arthur Salter to Loewes Dickinson, Kings College, LNA London, 4 December 1922 on SDAP opposition 
and League efforts to overcome it, LNA, S100, Mr Nixon Box No. 4 Austria, 79/5/1 League of Nations’ Financial 
Delegation to Vienna.  
661 Joseph Avenol to Sir Otto Niemeyer, LNA S100, Mr Nixon, Box No. 4 Austria, 79/5/1, League of Nations’ 
Financial Delegation to Vienna. The letter is undated but its position in the file reveals its approximate date as 
late 1922. Similarly, in a letter from late 1922 sent from Eric Drummond to Wallenburg (which appears to have 
been drafted by Nixon), Drummond wrote that ‘we are extremely satisfied… The Chancellor has shown himself 
strong enough… to come to an agreement with the Socialists’, LNA S107, Sir A Salter, No. 4 Austria. 
662 Nathan Marcus, Credibility, Confidence and Capital.  
663 Victor Kienböck, Das österreichische Sanierungswerk (Stuttgart, 1925), 24.  
664 See Berger, Im Schatten, 20.  
188 
 
 
Thus, the SDAP opted to oppose without completely destroying the Geneva treaty, and 
attempted to ameliorate the effects of the treaty and the reform plan where they 
could, and continually campaign against it. Their lack of acceptance of the Enabling Act 
is revealed in their challenge to it. In 1922, the Party launched a case in the Supreme 
Court on the constitutionality of the measure, and the Supreme Court found in favour 
of the SDAP.665  Through this the party succeeded in achieving a very important 
amendment to the terms of the Enabling Act and a revised mechanism was established, 
within which the government was placed under far greater parliamentary scrutiny. An 
Extraordinary Cabinet Council (auẞerordentlichen Kabinetsrat) of the National 
Assembly was set up to oversee the work of the government under the Enabling Act. 
The Council was comprised of the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor and government 
ministers, and also twenty-six state councillors who were elected by the Assembly in 
proportion to the level of each party’s support.666 Whilst it could not block the 
government and the League’s programme, the Extraordinary Council subjected the 
government to a higher level of scrutiny, and through it the SDAP did manage to 
prevent some measures. The Extraordinary Council made it difficult for aspects of the 
League’s programme to be implemented, particularly in the areas of cuts to the 
pensions of ex-state employees, major amendments to the terms of redundancy 
arrangements, the implementation of certain cuts to social spending, and the 
permanent cessation of the indexing of civil servants’ wages.667 
 
The establishment of the Extraordinary Council posed problems for the implementation 
of the scheme in the League officials’ eyes, and in early February 1923, the League 
Council appealed for the cooperation of the Extraordinary Council.668 In his report on 
this period, Zimmerman also manifested concern, writing in his Second Report that ‘the 
discussion of this Cabinet Council’ (by which he meant the Extraordinary Cabinet 
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Council) ‘tend to assume the passionate and stormy character of Parliamentary 
debates. The Opposition has already made use of obstructive tactics’. The passions that 
could be aroused by the government’s reform scheme are illustrated, if Zimmerman is 
to be believed, in his report of events during one particularly fraught meeting where 
SDAP members had apparently ‘not even shrunk from acts of violence against the 
temporary head of Government when he was presiding at a meeting’.669 The 
Extraordinary Council itself rejected the notion that it was obstructive, and pointed out 
in a report that ‘the Extraordinary Cabinet Council has up til now disposed of seven 
matters in thirteen sittings… it cannot, therefore, be said… that the intention of the 
Council is to delay the measures proposed by the government.’670 Even if the actions of 
the Council did not constitute a completely obstructive approach, their work inevitably 
slowed. The creation of the Council to some extent impeded the implementation of the 
programme, and represented an SDAP victory against the government, and the 
establishment of Austrian parliamentary influence over the reform desired by the 
League.  
 
The Extraordinary Cabinet Council’s powers were, however, limited to a short delay, 
and not a veto, of the government’s work.671 Despite the formation of the Council, the 
Enabling Act still left the government in a fairly strong position with respect to 
Parliament, and in this sense, the work of the League was an early move which 
undermined the sovereignty of the Austrian Parliament – which stopped meeting after 
1933. Charles Gulick may be correct that the League programme gave Seipel the excuse 
that he wanted to be able to create stronger government at the expense of 
Parliament.672 Even if this was not his motive, the Enabling Act, a measure which the 
League considered necessary in order to ensure that the government could implement 
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the reform programme, was a part of the Austrian reconstruction scheme that worked 
to, in some respects, reduce the prospects for a creating a durable and stable Austrian 
state. Eroding the role and status of the democratic parliamentary body served to 
exacerbate political tensions between the Christian Social Party and the SDAP, as well 
as creating a regrettable precedent for by-passing this body. Thus, the League’s project 
involved a step that undermined the new democratic institutions of the Republic. The 
League’s desire for the government to be able to take decisive action in implementing 
the reconstruction programme was understandable, but, as with some of the other 
aspects of the programme, the political implications of the policies it involved in it were 
overlooked. 
 
In addition to the concession that they achieved through the establishment of the 
Extraordinary Council, the SDAP campaigned against the measures entailed by the 
project for Austrian financial reconstruction. The importance that the party placed 
upon the League’s scheme is shown in the fact that at the Party Conference of 1923 
they ‘busied themselves nearly exclusively with the Geneva Convention’. The SDAP 
provided constant critique, and a report on the conference stated that ‘the Party has 
led the struggle against their effects on political and economic areas with all force and 
emphasis’.673 They propagandised and publicised their opposition to the treaty, 
ensuring, for example, the wide distribution of an anti-Geneva speech by Robert 
Danneberg in the National Assembly on 6 November 1922, in which Danneberg said 
that the finance plan of Seipel’s government was an attack on industry and a 
‘murderous attack on’ (‘Attentat’) the working classes. This speech was reproduced as a 
cheaply available pamphlet and distributed throughout Austria.674 Seipel, according to 
John Deak, never forgave the SDAP for their determined resistance in late 1922 and 
early 1923 to his programme.675 
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The SDAP made continual attempts to try to reduce the effects of the treaty and 
encourage government in this regard, without causing the whole process to collapse 
altogether. In this, their attitude was not one of complete intransigent opposition, but 
more one of continued scepticism and critique. In 1924, for example, Socialist leader 
Otto Bauer wrote to the Chancellor questioning some of the principles that underlay 
the Protocols, whilst also demonstrating that he understood the need for Seipel to 
compromise pragmatically with Austria’s international supporters. He argued that the 
idea ‘that surpluses must be used primarily to repay debt is English dogma. On the 
other hand, the idea that productive investment in the Austrian economy will 
guarantee permanent reconstruction is plausible… if one at the same time makes 
concessions to English dogma’.676 The Austrian archives reveal that, although the SDAP 
were determinedly opposed to many aspects of government policy, and considered the 
Christian Socials to represent a reactionary and pro-capitalist clerical tendency, they 
would provide information to the government if they thought that it would help their 
position vis-à-vis Geneva: Bauer seems to have had informants at Geneva who assisted 
with this.677 The SDAP were also able to extract concessions in return for their support 
for key aspects of government policy with respect to the Reform Plan, as illustrated on 
the occasion of the passage of the Schilling Bill and a temporary budget, when the SDAP 
supported these measures in the National Assembly in return for concessions relating 
to workers’ insurance and army recruitment.678 
 
After 1924, and as the Commissioner-General’s control continued far beyond the 
envisaged two years, the SDAP and the Pan-Germans united in their opposition. The 
SDAP, like the Pan-Germans, were concerned about this extension to the role of the 
League and the encroachment upon Austrian sovereignty that it represented. Despite 
this, however, neither Party actually took great steps to obstruct the passage through 
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Parliament of the relevant report on this matter in 1924, revealing again an 
unwillingness to engage in complete obstructionism. At local level, where, in some 
areas, most notably Vienna, they were the dominant party, the SDAP were able to 
resist the strictures of the programme to a quite remarkable level, as we will see later 
in this chapter. However, at national level, they had to choose between resistance, 
obstruction and compromise, and ultimately used a combination of these strategies. 
The Social Democrats pursued a policy attempting to ameliorate the effects of the 
treaty at a national level, and where they had the power to do so – at regional level in 
Vienna itself – they followed their own path, and enacted measures in taxation and 
social welfare in opposition to the principles of the Geneva Protocols.  
 
Overall, the effect of the financial reconstruction programme was to increase the sense 
of an irreconcilable division between the Christian Social Party, who moved in the mid-
1920s towards a position of ever greater scepticism regarding democracy, and the 
Socialists, who, (as we shall see, particularly via their work in Vienna) increasingly 
advanced an alternative economic and social vision of ‘reconstruction’. Despite this, 
however, the story is not just straightforwardly one of a pro-Geneva government and 
an anti-Geneva opposition, as an examination of the reactions of Christian Social 
politicians to the work of Zimmerman and the League reveals. The reaction of the 
Austrian government to the League’s scheme between 1922 and 1926 was shifting and 
sometimes ambiguous. The government and particularly Chancellor Seipel had so 
desperately desired the League’s assistance, but at times the government sought to 
reduce the impacts of the scheme first envisaged in Geneva, and in this they came into 
conflict with the League’s representative and overseer, Commissioner-General 
Zimmerman. The sources of tension were to do with both the government’s resistance 
to implementing the full letter of some aspects of the League agreements, and 
Zimmerman’s intransigent and at times high-handed approach.  
 
Seipel was very publicly positive, in an address to the Assembly of the League of 
Nations, in his assessment of the initial period of the scheme: ‘a financially broken 
down state in its last hour was supported in a hitherto unprecedented manner’ and 
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thus, ‘its independence and viability’ would be saved. At this point, at least in public, 
Seipel spoke favourably of Zimmerman stating that he was ‘sincerely pleased, that the 
Commissioner-General in the person of … Dr Zimmerman has been found’ and praising 
his ‘seriousness and conscientiousness’.679 This harmony, expressed perhaps partly for 
the benefit of the foreign investors to Austria at a time when the loan arrangements 
were not yet finalised, did not last. 
 
At first, however, the Christian Social government were very supportive of the 
programme, and in some respects, as the authors of the legislation that enacted it in 
Austria, the scheme’s co-creators. It was access to foreign loans that the Austrian 
government primarily sought from the League’s programme, but even if this was the 
focus, they were not opposed to the austerity and currency measures that the scheme 
entailed. An Enabling Act was something that was attractive for the government,680 
whilst an eventual return to the gold standard was regarded as a key method of 
demonstrating their administrative competence. According to Peter Berger, key 
members of the government were very supportive of the programme and its values, 
and he regards the League’s programme as a ‘conservative national government’s 
strategy’.681 For the capitalist wing of the Christian Socials, League functionaries were 
allies against ‘Marxism’, and the outside imposition of control strengthened their hand 
in taking measures to reduce social provision, cut spending and increase their power. 
As Berger points out, finance minister Kienböck was the same man who, as President of 
the Austrian National Bank, stuck with deflationary policies in Austria in the early 1930s 
at which time ‘he still advocated co-operation with Geneva, more or less along the lines 
of the past’.682 
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The governing part of the Christian Social party were not opposed to the financial and 
administrative reforms laid down by the League, far from it. As Seipel and the Christian 
Socials were hardly upholders of democracy in later years in Austria, one possible way 
of interpreting the Christian Social’s attitude to the League’s work is that it helped them 
reduce the strength of federal democracy and weaken the forces of the left in Austria. 
The Christian Social government did not generally seek to portray the League 
programme as in any sense an imposition from outside, but associated themselves fully 
with it, perhaps partly to allay fears about external foreign control. So the government 
drew up the necessary legislation on financial and economic reforms and changes to 
the civil service and presented them to Parliament as their own scheme. Although 
some of the rhetoric in Austria against the terms of the Geneva Agreement portrayed it 
as very much a foreign (or at least French and British) programme, the reforms were 
also widely associated with the government and very personally with Seipel. The SDAP 
portrayed government policy as both part of the ‘Geneva Bondage Treaty’, and also as 
‘Seipel’s plan’.683 
 
The Christian Social-led governments that were in charge between the commencement 
of the League’s programme in October 1922 and the withdrawal of Commissioner-
General Zimmerman in mid-1926 resisted fully implementing the scheme and at times 
resented Zimmerman, however.684 One of the sources of resentment was in the role of 
the Commissioner-General himself and the whole idea of ‘control’. In his survey of 
events published in 1926, Sir Arthur Salter wholeheartedly rejected the idea that the 
League’s scheme in Austria represented a repudiation of that country’s sovereignty. He 
stated that it had sometimes been said that the League ‘have seized the occasion of a 
country in need to institute a foreign tyranny, to destroy the sovereignty of the assisted 
State, to replace a native by an external government’. However, ‘nothing could be 
                                                          
683 See, for example, pamphlet ‘Der Finanzplan der Regierung Seipel – Rede des Abgeordneten Robert 
Danneberg im Nationalrat am 6. November 1922’ (Wien 1922), in VGA, Karton 49, Mappe 2, and in the ÖOLA, 
Landesausschuss, K V 5 261-270, Sch. 1574, 268, Volkerbundanleihe.  
684 Ignaz Seipel led a Christian-Social / Pan-German coalition government from 31 May 1922 until 20 November 
1924. Rudolf Ramek led a government of the same complexion from 20 November 1924 until 20 October 1926. 
Seipel remained a powerful force behind the scenes and retook the Chancellorship after Ramek.  
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further from the facts’, Salter asserted.685 Even though the idea that a ‘foreign tyranny’ 
ran Austria was hyperbole, Salter was overstating his case – the Commissioner-General 
did have extensive powers, both in terms of his direct control in certain areas, such as 
on the spending of the monies in loan accounts, and in terms of his entitlement to 
oversee and monitor the work of the government on the reform plan and the budget. 
He could also enforce his wishes by creating negative publicity about government 
action or inaction in his reports, through frequent press briefings, and via appeals to 
the League. Furthermore, even though it was initially envisaged that the Commissioner-
General would remain in place with his full powers in force for approximately two 
years, in the event League control was in force for almost four years.686 With his official 
powers, Zimmerman was, according to Karl Bachinger and Herbert Matis, ‘the most 
powerful figure in his host-country’, and, although this may be to exaggerate the extent 
of his actual leverage, the perception that Zimmerman was such a figure led to growing 
resentment about his role, even from the government.687 
 
It was not just the powers granted to Zimmerman as part of the League agreements 
that the government resented, for Zimmerman’s rather abrasive personality also 
caused tension. League official Adrianus Pelt had praised Zimmerman on his 
appointment as ‘an able administrator and a very energetic man, who speaks German 
fluently and is thoroughly familiar with conditions in Central Europe’, but these positive 
words were not often reiterated elsewhere.688 There is a great deal of evidence of 
tensions between the government and the Commissioner-General over his powers, his 
                                                          
685 Sir Arthur Salter, The Financial Reconstruction of Austria – General Survey and Principal Documents, 
(Geneva, 1926), 82. Salter said further that ‘the greatest care has been taken to create a system at once 
elastic, and so far as possible invisible; a system which gives just so much control, at any moment, is essential 
to secure the desired object and no more’, 84.  
686 The terms of the Geneva Protocols included provision for the role of Commissioner-General to be 
reinstated at any time up to 1936. League-directed control was in place from October 1922 in the shape of the 
Financial Committee delegation, before Zimmerman became Commissioner-General in December 1922. His 
control terminated in June 1926. 
687 Karl Bachinger and Herbert Matis cited by Peter Berger in ‘The League’, 77. (From Der oesterreichische 
Schilling – Geschichte einer Waehrung (Graz, 1974)). For this kind of representation of Zimmerman and his 
powers, see AZ, 25 September 1924, 1.  
688 Pelt Reports, LNA S100 Mr. Nixon, Box No. 4. 
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demands and his approach.689 The Austrian archives contain frequent references to 
these strains, such as those discussed by Ambassador Franckenstein and foreign 
minister Grünberger in March 1924.690 Even early on in his time in Austria, Zimmerman 
described conflict between himself and the government in a private letter to Sir Arthur 
Salter in 1923, in which he wrote that the government was trying to avoid the 
publication of his first report, ‘because of what is said… about the necessity of 
administrative reforms’.691 In 1924, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs found 
Zimmerman’s attitude and interference ‘intolerable’.692 The British Ambassador also 
reported to Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald upon the continuing difficulties 
between the two parties in 1925.693 
 
The problems between the two sides are often attributed to Zimmerman’s 
undiplomatic approach,694 but they were also to a significant degree a result of his 
steadfast commitment to the original principles that underlay the League’s programme, 
the principles outlined in Chapter Three. It was no accident that such a strong 
supporter of these policies should be appointed. Although Zimmerman was not the first 
choice for the job,695 he was nevertheless a popular candidate with influential figures 
                                                          
689 Adrianus Pelt, ‘Draft Article for ‘Monthly Summary’ Financial Reconstruction of Austria’, LNA S100, Mr 
Nixon, Box No. 4, 79/5/1, League of Nation’s Financial Delegation in Vienna.  
690 ÖSA, AdR, AA, NPA 235, Ambassador Franckenstein to Dr. Grünberger, 12 March 1924. See also ÖSA, AdR, 
AA, NPA 236, for example, the Austrian Ambassador to Amsterdam wrote to the foreign ministry on 28 May 
1924 that ‘for about half a year the reports of the Commissioner-General Hr. Zimmerman spoke of the non-
compliance of the Austrian Government’. On 6 November 1925, Ambassador Franckenstein wrote to Otto 
Niemeyer that ‘unfortunately relations between the government and Mr Zimmerman have again become 
difficult’, ÖSA, AdR, AA, Handelspolitik 336. See also A Akers Douglas to Ramsay MacDonald, 29 August 1924, 
TNA T160/60, F2073/17, as previously reported, ‘there has been considerable tension in the relations between 
the Commissioner-General and the Austrian Government, and this feeling became very acute in the period 
immediately preceding the arrival of the Delegation’. Dr Zimmerman published ‘the essential portions of his 
19th Report in the press before informing the Austrian government or even showing them…. Its publication has 
raised a storm here’. 
691 Zimmerman to Sir Arthur Salter, 12 February 1923, LNA S97, Mr. Nixon’s Files, 79/24/1, Correspondence 
with the Commissioner-General’s Office in Vienna.  
692 LNA S97 Mr. Nixon’s Files. In addition, there was particular controversy over Zimmerman’s nineteenth 
report: The Nineteenth Report of the Commissioner-General, 15 July – 15 August 1924 (Geneva, 1924). 
693 Also see TNA T160/60, A. Akers Douglas to Ramsay MacDonald, 29 August 1925.  
694 See, for example, Louis W. Pauly, Who Elected the Bankers – Surveillance and Control in the World Economy 
(Ithaca and London, 1997), 55. 
695 American Roland Boyden was first choice. See Jean Monnet to Sir Maurice Hankey, 2 November 1922, 
R519. According to Zoltán Peteresz, Zimmerman was Montagu Norman’s first choice, but the French 
government would have preferred Boyden, as they sought to increase American involvement in Europe at this 
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like Montagu Norman, precisely because of his ideological stance. In the view of an 
informant to the Bank of England, writing shortly before Zimmerman’s appointment, 
‘international economic interests would be strongly served’ if Zimmerman were given 
the job.696And other international banking figures with connections to the League 
agreed: Montagu Norman told Salter mid-October 1922 that Dutch banker ‘ter Meulen 
is here to-day and wishes you to know first that he considers Z [Zimmerman] suitable 
and excellent in all respects’.697 
 
As Zimmerman was an acceptable candidate precisely because of his commitment to 
budgetary retrenchment, it is not surprising that a consistent source exasperation for 
the Commissioner-General was the failure of the Austrian government to entirely fulfil 
the League’s plan of cuts to the number of civil servants and to expenditure. As has 
been noted previously, budget equilibrium was achieved much sooner than anticipated 
because of the higher than expected tax revenues that were collected, and the 
reduction in the level of expenditure did not proceed at the pace nor to the extent that 
Zimmerman hoped. So in his fifth report, for example, Zimmerman wrote that, ‘I much 
regret to note that once again the numbers of dismissals between April 7th and May 5th 
was entirely inadequate’.698 The monthly reports that the Commissioner-General 
produced were publicly available and distributed to the press, and before September 
1924, not always shown to the government prior to publication. Indeed, Zimmerman 
seemed to use his reports as leverage against the government, which created further 
conflict. Following the advanced publication of Zimmerman’s Nineteenth Report, the 
President of Austrian National Bank offered to resign, and the Foreign Minister 
complained to the British Ambassador that ‘Austria had no option but to bow before 
the commands of the League’, and ‘that Dr Zimmerman now had every party and every 
                                                          
time, Jeremiah Smith, Jr., and Hungary 1924-1926: The United States, the League of Nations and the Financial 
Reconstruction of Hungary (Verlag Versita, 2013), 71. 
696 Opinion received from GENERAL, 14 October 1922, BOE, OV28/53 Austria (Rehabilitation). The informant 
was code-named GENERAL and was based in Holland. He used the code name ‘Carpenter’ to refer to 
Zimmerman (the name Zimmermann means ‘carpenter’ in German), ‘I know that the international economic 
interests would be strongly served if a personality like Carpenter should be placed in a position as alluded to by 
you’. 
697 Montagu Norman to Arthur Salter, 18 October 1922, BOE, OV28/53 Austria (Rehabilitation). 
698 Fifth Report of the Commissioner-General, 15 April 1923 – 15 May 1923 (Geneva, 1923), 3. 
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person in Austria against him’.699 On another occasion, the source of tension was the 
disgruntlement of Zimmerman and others with the appointment of an Austrian head of 
the Bank of Issue.700 
 
Disagreements also existed over the deployment of the funds in the loans and the 
overall size of budget permitted by the League’s programme. Throughout 1923 and into 
1924, the Financial Committee and the Council of the League (acting always on the 
advice of the Financial Committee) were steadfast in their support for Zimmerman. 
Early in that year, much to the disgust of large sections of the Austrian press, the 
Council reminded the Austrian government of Zimmerman’s powers and stressed, in a 
tone that mixed an appeal to honour with a veiled threat, that ‘the original programme 
adopted by the Austrian government constitutes a solemn undertaking, the execution 
of which remains obligatory’.701  They stated that under the terms of the Geneva 
Protocols, it was only if permanent budgetary equilibrium was established that control 
could be withdrawn. As it was widely believed in League circles that the level of 
taxation in Austria at this time was excessively and unsustainably high, it was clear that 
at this stage, the Financial Committee and the Council were backing Zimmerman. 
 
In March 1924, however, the Austrian government decided to attempt to challenge the 
Commissioner-General more vigorously, and made a direct appeal to the League. 
According to the Arbeiter-Zeitung on 9 March 1924, the Finance Minister at Geneva 
‘launched a public polemic against Commissioner-General Zimmerman’.702 In his speech 
the Minister revealed his opposition to not just Zimmerman’s interference and control, 
but also to a central aspect of the League’s whole programme, saying that the 
‘throttling government expenditure to the extent envisaged in the reform and 
                                                          
699 See A. Akers Douglas to Ramsay MacDonald, 29 August 1924. 
700 First Report of the Commissioner-General, 15 December 1922 –15 January 1923 (Geneva, 1923) which 
contains a letter from Seipel to Zimmerman on this subject, 16-17. On Norman’s outrage see Otto Niemeyer to 
Arthur Salter, 27 December 1922, LNA S107, Sir A Salter, No. 4 Austria. 
701 Resolution of the League of Nations’ Council, 12 March 1924, in Annex IX of The Fifteenth Report of the 
Commissioner-General, 15 March 1924 – 15 April 1924 (Geneva, 1924), 23, emphasis in the original. See also 
ÖSA, NPA 235.  
702 On the appeal by the government to the League of Nations in March 1924, see ÖSA, NPA 236 and also the 
Arbeiter-Zeitung, 9 March 1924. 
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reconstruction plan is simply impossible’.703 Eventually, in September 1924, the 
government had to concede to an extension in the period of Zimmerman’s control far 
beyond the originally envisaged two years. The desire to prevent this control being 
indefinitely prolonged led the League to make concessions to the Austrian position, and 
a higher budget than anticipated in the League’s programme was permitted. 
Zimmerman was also defeated in his attempt to heavily limit the use of the loans for 
productive investments, although the amounts allowed for this purpose were 
modest.704 
 
The Austrian government scored at least a partial victory in this case. They did not get 
the removal of Zimmerman’s control nor the budget level that they had requested, but 
Zimmerman’s desire to keep to the letter of the original agreement was overridden. 
Nathan Marcus argues that the reason that the League’s scheme for Austria did not 
produce more positive results was that it was not continued for long enough and nor 
was it propagated with sufficient vigour.705 Extending control further than 1926 was 
simply something that was unacceptable to both Austria and the League, however. 
1926 already represented a two-year extension, and it was not politically feasible 
within Austria to prolong control: the League was very concerned about the increase in 
the Anschluss movement that their presence seemed to be causing, as Marcus 
acknowledges.706 Nor was continued control at this stage something that the League 
would have welcomed. They wished to be able to prove Salter’s point that the League 
was completely opposed to any measures that sought ‘to destroy the sovereignty of 
the assisted State’.707 As Endres and Fleming say, ‘national autonomy was considered 
paramount prior to 1939’. 708 The principle of the sovereignty of member states was 
still, at least theoretically, of central importance as a principle within the League. Whilst 
                                                          
703 AZ, ibid.  
704 See Financial Reconstruction of Austria – Agreements Approved by the Council on September 16th 1924 
(Geneva, 1924). This agreement modified the scheme. The Draft Report of the Financial Committee of the 
League of Nations, 15 September 1926, LNA R519, details of how a part of the loan was used for productive 
investment: by this date, 230.6 million gold krone out of 568.7 million gold krone. 
705 Marcus, Credibility, Confidence and Capital. 
706 See Berger, ‘The League of Nations’, 81, and Marcus, Credibility, Confidence and Capital, 241.  
707 Salter, ‘General Survey’, 82.  
708 Anthony Endres and Grant Fleming, International Organizations and the Analysis of Economic Policy 1919-
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the League loan programmes, at least temporarily, did encroach upon sovereignty (and 
probably needed to do so in order to obtain the requisite foreign support to stabilise 
the currency and stimulate lending once again), after this had occurred, the League 
were very keen to restore Austrian sovereignty. Respected economists Walter Layton, 
the British editor of The Economist, and Charles Rist, a French economist who had 
previously produced a report on Austria, were, therefore, deployed to Austria to report 
favourably upon conditions and prospects for the country, as a way of facilitating and 
justifying the withdrawal of the League, and creating a sense that the programme was 
successful.709 
 
The impact of the League’s scheme on national politics – viability and autonomy 
If the reconstruction programme made little contribution to political stability between 
the various political groupings in Austria, it had a rather mixed impact upon the 
prospects for the future independent survival of the country – even though, as seen in 
Chapter Two, this was the rationale that underlay the whole scheme. Much of the 
opposition to the Geneva Protocols, as we have seen, focussed around concerns about 
Austrian sovereignty and foreign control, and in this regard, the Protocols represented 
in some respects a paradox.  In attempting to ensure Austrian lebensfähigkeit and 
prevent Austria being absorbed by other powers, Austria’s sovereignty was severely 
encroached upon. In order to access the funds that it seemed to need to be able to 
survive and obtain the support of the international financial and diplomatic community, 
Austria had to bind itself to certain currency, budgetary and administrative measures, 
and to acquiesce to the external oversight of the Commissioner-General. Thus, the 
survival of independent Austria was dependent upon its submission to external 
influence and partial control – a strange kind of Selbstandigkeit that did little to create 
a durable sense of the possibilities of Austrian autonomy within the country itself.   
 
Seipel, not a supporter of Anschluss, wished to see independent Austria survive and 
thrive, and regarded the League’s programme as key to stabilising the country, and 
                                                          
709 Their report: Walter Layton and Charles Rist, The Economic Situation of Austria (Geneva, 1925). 
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then building legitimacy for the state, both within and without Austria. Seipel 
acknowledged in a speech to the League assembly in early 1923 that the Austrian 
people were apprehensive about the presence of a League controller in Vienna, but 
asserted that the Austrians ‘love their independence and freedom’, and that in order to 
secure these ‘they want their economy reformed’.710 Seipel, who knew that this speech 
would be widely reported in the Austria press, sought to present the international 
control and encroachment upon Austrian sovereignty in terms of economic 
imperatives: for him the League scheme was necessary for future Austrian viability. 
 
Seipel expressed his hopes in this regard elsewhere. In private correspondence with the 
Christian Social Landeshauptman (Provincial Governor) of Salzburg Province, Dr. Franz 
Rehrl, for example, who was also a supporter of an independent Austria,711 Seipel was 
hopeful about the positive impact that the loan issue would have.712 He wrote to Rehrl 
that the success of the loan issue ‘will form a benchmark for our reputation abroad, and 
[create] the degree of self-respect that we owe our young State and ourselves’.713  For 
Seipel, the League programme was key to the process of state and nation formation 
that he was at that time engaged in. In his letter, Seipel urged Rehrl to do what he 
could to promote the programme for these very reasons. Seipel’s efforts were 
supported by promotional material produced by the finance ministry, which attempted 
to create optimism about the viability and possibilities for the future of the new 
country. A poster relating to the internal bond issue of 30 December 1922 that was sent 
to the Landesregierung (regional government) of Upper Austria, for example, depicted 
a young dynamic looking man exhorting a down-cast and weary older man ‘Don’t think 
about the past! Gaze into our future!714 
                                                          
710 Rede vom Bundeskanzler Seipel vor dem Völkerbundrat in Paris am 1. Februar 1923, ADÖ, Band 5 – Unter 
der Finanzkontrolle des Völkerbundes, doc. 733, 71-75. 
711 And later, unlike many Christian Social politicians, a defender of the democratic ideals of the First Republic 
as well as an opponent of the Nazis. 
712 Dr Rehrl was detained by the Nazis following the failure of Operation Valkyrie in 1944, of which he was 
aware, until the end of the Second World War. The conditions of his imprisonment wrecked his health and he 
died in Salzburg in 1947.  
713 Dr Ignaz Seipel to Dr. Franz Rehrl, Landeshauptmann von Salzburgerland, 9 June 1923, Salzburg 
Landesarchiv, Salzburg (SLA), Rehrl-Brief.  
714 Plaket: Nicht an Vergangenes Denken! In die Zukunft Unser Blick! 8% Goldanleihe, 30 December 1922, 
OÖLA.  
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Figure 2. ‘Nicht an Vergangenes Denken!’ 
 
 
In the event, the future that was partially created by the Geneva programme and loan 
issue was not in fact the Elysium implied by this poster. The reform programme 
contributed in some respects to creating stability and an autonomous future for the 
Republic, and reduced the chances of Anschluss or any other move to amalgamate 
Austria or parts of Austria with other states, but it also added to processes that worked 
to undermine the stability of the new state, to the detriment of nation- and state 
building. Additionally, the tension caused by having a foreign controller overseeing the 
reform programme and government activities added not only to suspicions from the 
press and public about Geneva, but ultimately led the Christian Social government 
itself, who had sought the League’s assistance, to attempt to reduce the impact of 
Commissioner-General Zimmerman’s powers, and ultimately to encourage his 
withdrawal. 
 
For John Deak, Seipel’s work with the League was part of a process of reform and 
restructure in post-imperial Austria which saw Seipel first take an instrumental role in 
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stabilising the political situation immediately post-war, in cooperation with Otto Bauer 
and the SDAP, and then working for financial stability and the reform and 
rationalisation of the state.715 Peter Becker gives partial support for this view in his 
examination of administrative reform in Austria.716 However, the effects of the 
programme worked both constructively and destructively upon the prospects for 
successful state-building in Austria. On the one side, the reform programme produced a 
rationalisation of the Habsburg-era bureaucracy through the reduction in the numbers 
of civil servants and government ministers, amendments to some aspects of the 
responsibilities of provinces and central government, and the introduction of a 
streamlined and more efficient administrative structure.717  So, as Deak describes, 
Seipel’s policies dismantled the ‘administrative vestiges of the Habsburg Monarchy’, 
and ‘(forged) a new, decentralised republic’.718 However, as Deak acknowledges, the 
rationalisation process had a doubled-edged effect, and in some respects undermined 
support for the Republic and attempts at political consolidation. One issue was that, 
making large numbers of the civil servants, who provided continuity with the old 
regime and who were often Christian Social supporters, redundant, was not a recipe 
that generated support for the new order. Socialist leader Karl Renner thought that it 
would have been best to maintain the imperial bureaucracy and reform it more 
gradually, in order to maintain stability and generate legitimacy for the new state, but 
this is not what occurred.719 
 
Examination of the position of war veterans in this kind of process is illuminating. Ke-
Chin Hsia reveals that the moves to integrate war veterans into the new society 
through the provision of war pensions, medical facilities and the work of organisations 
such as the Zentralverband der österreichischen Kreigsbeschädigten (roughly – the 
Central Association of the Austrian War-Damaged) were critical in creating stability in 
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717 Ibid.  
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the new state at its inception and in providing a modicum of legitimacy for it.720 
Zentralverband members, who were associated with the wider SDAP movement, 
identified with the new state. The reform programme, however, undermined the 
position of war veterans through cuts to pensions and service provision. The work of 
the League can hardly have helped to promote veteran support, and this in turn was 
detrimental to attempts to consolidate the new state.  
 
As part of the expansion in the role of the state in social provision that had occurred 
after the First World War, the predicament of war victims was recognised in 
Invalidenentschädigungsgesetz721 of April 1919. This law, the first to be enacted 
amongst the combatant states, was pushed through by the Social Democrats, who at 
this time shared office with the Christian Social Party. The SDAP hoped the scheme 
would lay the foundations for a more comprehensive social security system. It was also 
a means of engendering in veterans and other war victims a sense of identification 
with, and support for, the new state. Veterans had not been disarmed, and were often 
psychologically troubled.722 Their reintegration into society and their acceptance of the 
new state was important if republican Austria was to survive. The new law provided the 
wounded with a pension entitlement calculated upon the degree of loss of earnings 
that their disability had produced, and widows in certain circumstances were entitled 
to a pension of up to 50% of the maximum of their husband’s pension.723 The 
bureaucratic apparatus governing the system never functioned very effectively, but it 
was undermined at the time of the introduction of the League programme, when its 
provisions were reduced in the case of many war victims to a payment so small that in 
the words of Pawlowsky and Wendelin, a ‘compensation law was transformed into a 
provision law’.724 Subsistence was all that was now offered for war wounded and for 
war widows and their dependents, who were only entitled to half of the amount of 
                                                          
720 Ke-Chin Hsia, ‘A Partnership of the Weak: War Victims and the State in the Early First Austrian Republic’, 
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721 War Disability Compensation Law.  
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others, or not even that. Pawlowsky and Wendelin argue that at a time of constrained 
budgets, war victims were increasingly regarded as a burden.  The association of the 
Zentralverband with the SDAP may have also meant that the Christian Socials, in power 
without SDAP support by the time of the League scheme and the budget cuts, may 
have felt less inclined to maintain payments to war victims. Their interests could not be 
entirely over-looked, however, as the main organisation representing them, the 
Zentralverband, was a powerful nation-wide mass-membership organisation with, by 
1922, 200,000 members, a third of whom were war widows. Thus, some degree of 
pension provision for war victims did remain, albeit in much reduced form from that 
originally conceived.725 In taking steps that undermined the provision for war wounded, 
however, the government reduced any loyalty that war victims and veterans might 
have felt with the new state.  
 
The extent to which the Zentralverband was opposed to the reductions in provision for 
veterans, and the potential danger that this created for the state was revealed when 
health services for veterans were suppressed on 23 February 1923. Special military 
hospitals were abolished, as were some care homes for veterans, and cuts were also 
made to the provision for disabled soldiers’ education. These were moves to which the 
Zentralverband objected strongly. The organisation wrote angrily to Secretary General 
Eric Drummond warning that veterans who ‘have faced death on every front for four 
years, are not afraid to brave the armed forces of order in defence of their elementary 
rights’ and asking if ‘the League of Nations… for the sake of saving a few gold Kronen, 
really intends to rob us of our hospitals and homes for our soldiers?’726 This letter 
reveals the resentment of veterans about the cuts to their services, and that the 
veterans’ organisation was prepared to threaten violence and insurrection if the 
interests of its members were threatened, something that they did not actually do, but 
which pointed to the inadvisability of reducing expenditure associated with veterans, 
when many were armed, and potentially volatile. 
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The issue of the war veterans is just one part of the story of variegated responses to 
and effects of the programme for Austrian reconstruction, and whilst cuts to provisions 
for war veterans fed into the hostility that the SDAP movement generally had for the 
scheme, by the time of Commissioner-General Zimmerman’s withdrawal from Austria 
in mid-1926, it might have appeared that through reforms to the state and with the 
restoration of a greater degree sovereignty to the Austrian government, the work of 
the League had contributed to the long term prospects for stability in Austria, despite 
the tensions that had existed between the Commissioner-General and the government, 
and between the SDAP and the Christian Socials. However, examination of responses to 
and effects of the programme at provincial level creates quite a different picture. 
 
The impact of the scheme on the politics of the provinces 
A significant and overlooked aspect of the League’s project for Austrian reconstruction 
is its effects on Austria’s federal political system, and in turn the constraints that this 
system placed on the scheme. Austria’s federal regions, the Länder, had a long tradition 
of autonomous identity and local administration, and the 1920 constitution awarded 
them considerable autonomous powers over tax raising and service provision. Elected 
parliamentary assemblies headed by Landeshauptmänner (Governors) for each of the 
nine regions were established.727 In the uncertain conditions of immediately post-war 
and post-imperial Austria, not all regions were definitely committed joining the new 
Austrian national entity. Just as a supra-state identity in the shape of pan-Germanism 
was attractive to many in the post-war years, so localism in these regions, the old 
Habsburg Crownlands, also had a powerful appeal.728 The rhetoric of ‘self-
determination’ was applied by some regional politicians to their own lands, and 
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Voralberg and the Tyrol even gave serious consideration to full independence.729 The 
old Crownlands had to be invited and coaxed to accede to new Austria, and thus their 
concerns about Viennese domination had to be addressed. Between 1918 and 1920, 
the worry of the regions, who were almost exclusively politically Christian Social,730 was 
that they would be subjugated by Socialists in central government in Vienna. They 
feared being ‘held hostage by an alien, unsympathetic government in Vienna that had 
the potential to violate their prerogatives and rights of self-determination’.731 But as we 
shall see, the scheme for Austrian reconstruction, and the actions of the 
Landesregierung of Vienna, altered the terms of this conflict significantly. The City of 
Vienna itself had been awarded the status of a Land and not just that of a municipality 
in the 1920 constitution, in a compromise that was worked out between the Christian 
Social Party and the SDAP. This left the Land of Lower Austria, which had contained 
Vienna, securely under Christian Social control, whilst urban Vienna was a strongly 
SDAP city. The city merged its municipal and regional assemblies and governments, and 
having failed, after 1920, to secure national power, set about exploiting their regional 
powers to attempt to create in Vienna their model society: this was ‘Red Vienna’.732  
 
With respect to the League’s programme, the federated structure of Austria made a 
significant difference to the impact that the programme had on Austria. In consequence 
of this, tensions were exacerbated between the regions and central government. This 
caused relations to be strained within different factions of the Christian Social Party 
itself, and between the government and one Land in particular –  Vienna –, thus 
increasing the divisions between the SDAP and the Christian Socials. The devolved 
powers that the Austrian Länder possessed limited the government and the League’s 
ability to fully implement their programme. Ultimately, the conflict between central 
government and the City of Vienna was to end in 1934 with the suppression of Austrian 
                                                          
729 In 1919, the Tyrol had declared independence from Austria, although it did not then implement this. In April 
1921, a plebiscite was held in the region in which 98.6% of the population voted for Anschluss. See Barbara 
Jelavich, Modern Austria – Empire and Republic 1800-1980 (Cambridge, 1987), 159-160. 
730 Municipalities had some of their own powers within the regions, and some of these urban areas, such as 
Wiener Neustadt, Graz and Linz, were strongly SDAP. 
731 Boyer, ‘Silent War’, 33.  
732 See Helmut Gruber, Red Vienna – Experiment in Working-Class Culture 1919-1934, (Oxford, 1991) and Jill 
Lewis, ‘Red Vienna – Socialism in One City, 1918-27’, European History Quarterly 13/3 (1983), 335-355. 
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social democracy during the Austrian ‘civil war’, but the attempt to implement the 
League’s strictures revealed the ideological differences the two main parties in stark 
relief, and in this way contributed to the polarisation of Austrian politics at this time.  
 
In deciding upon a federal structure, the new constitution continued with aspects of 
Habsburg constitutional arrangements. The states had a certain degree of autonomy 
over social, housing and educational policy, and had the powers to raise their own 
taxes. They were also entitled to part of national tax revenue as laid down by the 
Ertragsanteile – the system that determined the allocation taxes. All of this gave the 
Federal States considerable powers to pursue policies contrary to the letter and the 
spirit of the League’s scheme, and was a major hindrance to Zimmerman’s attempts to 
ensure his own control and oversight. The extent to which the Länder possessed 
autonomous powers and were not bound by the terms of the Geneva Protocols did not 
seem to immediately occur to the members of the Financial Committee, as their 
discussions as they formulated the scheme did not touch upon this point.733 
 
The constitutionally-determined powers of the Länder gave the League and 
Commissioner-General Zimmerman a number of headaches. As we saw in Chapter Two, 
a key part of the League’s programme was the insistence on a lower level of 
expenditure by the state. A combination of the powers that the regions possessed, and 
pre-ordained proportion of national taxation that the Ertragsanteile granted them, 
gave the Länder considerable room for manoeuvre. The higher than expected overall 
tax-take post-1922 meant that by 1924, Länder were receiving much greater sums from 
central government than had been anticipated. Zimmerman felt that all extra tax raised 
should go towards national debt reduction, but neither he nor the government had the 
power to force the regions to relinquish their share of tax revenue for this purpose. An 
early attempt by the Federal government to take complete control of one part of the 
revenue, the Customs Decree of 11 December 1922, was struck down by the 
                                                          
733 See LNA S107, Sir A Salter, No. 4 Austria, for the Financial Committee deliberations.  
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Constitutional Court, having been contested by the City of Vienna.734 Indeed it was 
from the SDAP-dominated government of the City of Vienna that the work of the 
League received its largest challenge: the powers of the regions were such that the City 
of Vienna had scope for autonomous action which was fully exploited.735  
 
The finances of Vienna give an indication of the impact that higher taxes and higher tax 
revenues had. Despite the City’s huge investment in housing, education, public services 
and cultural projects, Vienna actually ran a budgetary surplus of 600 milliards Kronen in 
1923.736 Through maintaining a high level of taxation, and investment in local services 
and cultural activities, the SDAP were able at a local level to oppose the strictures of 
the ‘Geneva Bondage Treaty’ and implement a local socialist agenda that challenged 
both the liberal economic and financial orthodoxies of the League, and the 
conservatism of the Christian Socials. Indeed, by 1925, the Viennese government was 
widely regarded as ‘the best organised and most powerful Socialist body in the 
world’.737 And all occurred this right under the nose of the Commissioner-General, in 
the city in which he lived, and at a time when Austria was supposed to be 
demonstrating to the world its financial rectitude and prudence. 
 
After the first year of the implementation of the League’s programme, the issue of the 
powers and level of taxation and spending in the Länder gradually came to the fore. 
Otto Bauer seems to have realised early on that the reform plan had implications for 
the powers of the provinces, interrupting Finance Minister Kienböck in the course of 
speech to the Bundesrat in November 1922 to accuse him of having ‘taken the tax 
sovereignty of Länder away!’738 Kienbock denied this, and to a large extent he was at 
this stage correct, as constitutional arrangements made it hard to reform the 
                                                          
734 The Fourth Report of the Commissioner-General, 15 March 1923 – 15 April 1923, (Geneva, 1923), Annex VI, 
Extract from the ‘Neue Freie Presse’, 23 March 1923 (translation from the German), 19-20. 
735 See LNA D.V./P.V./1-8 on Vienna taxes. 
736 The figure of 600 milliards Kronen from a document: Communicated by the Austrian Minister enclosed to O. 
Niemeyer from the Foreign Office, 17 November 1924, TNA T160/60, 2073/17.  
737 According to Alan Leeper: letter from Leeper to Chamberlain, Vienna, 6 March 1925, TNA T160/60, 
2073/20.  
738 Stenographisches Protokoll 149, Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republic Österreich, Freitag, den 24 
November 1922, VGA Karton 49, Mappe 2. 
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Ertragsanteile or restrict the powers of the regions. However, the government did 
attempt to reduce the tax receipts that local authorities obtained where they could, but 
in the case of the Customs duties, were ultimately unsuccessful. 
 
The issue of the powers of the regions was not tackled in the initial phase of 
programme, and indeed, as Zimmerman and others pointed out, it had been an 
overlooked aspect in the Geneva Protocols, something that Zimmerman called the 
‘main defect’ of the agreement.739 By 1924, as various key elements of the Protocols 
were in place (the Bank of Issue, tighter control of the money supply, cuts in national 
expenditure and in the numbers of civil servants), attention turned towards persuading 
the regions to agree to reforms to their powers and reductions in the amount of 
national taxation that they received. It was not just Zimmerman and the League who 
sought this: the Austrian government wished for greater powers in relations to the 
regional governments. As foreign minister Dr. Grünberger reported to British diplomat 
Edward Keeling: ‘it had long been obvious that the financial relations established by the 
Constitution were eminently unsatisfactory, and the Government who would have 
hesitated to bring up the matter of their own accord were delighted to have their hand 
forced’.740 There is support here for Deak’s contention that Seipel sought to use the 
League’s financial reconstruction plan as a means of completing the process of 
transition from the Habsburg system, and thus as a means of State building.741 This also 
served to increase the power of central government, something that Seipel sought in 
order to enhance his own power, according to Gulick.742 The desire to clip the wings of 
the regions was also likely motivated by a desire to restrict the autonomy of specifically 
the socialist Viennese municipality. The government attempted to negotiate a 
reduction on taxation and powers with the Länder, but to no avail. The Länder were 
resistant to attempts to reduce their share of the Ertragsanteile and reluctant to submit 
their budgets to oversight by the national government and the Commissioner-General, 
                                                          
739 See Alexander Loveday to Sir Arthur Salter, 29 May 1924, LNA S110, 2/19/2 Austria. See also in the same file 
Per Jacobson’s Memorandum on the taxable capacity of Austria, 9 June 1924. He concluded that some taxes in 
Austria should be reduced or abolished.  
740 Reported by E. Keeling to Ramsay MacDonald, 26 September 1924, TNA T160/60, F 2073/17.  
741 See Deak, ‘Dismantling Empire’. 
742 Gulick, From Habsburg to Hitler, 166-167. 
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or grant the government a veto over their budgets.743 According to Zimmerman, the 
problem was that the ‘spirit of conciliation shown by the Government has not been 
sufficiently appreciated by certain provinces and communes’.744 His judgement, 
however, failed to take account of the history of autonomy of the regions, and how 
fragile the ties uniting Republican Austria could be. 
 
By 1924, no general agreement on reforms of centre-provincial relations had been 
agreed, and a wider group of ‘experts’ and their supporters, associated with the 
Financial Committee and the British treasury, were alarmed by the failure to reach a 
settlement with the Länder on this issue. Ambassador Franckenstein reported to 
Austrian Foreign Minister Grünberger in 1924, upon the occasion of a visit by 
Zimmerman to Britain, for example, that the Treasury shared his view that the overall 
level of taxation in Austria was too high, and that it was the intransigence of local 
authorities that was primarily responsible. For Finance Committee member and 
treasury official Sir Otto Niemeyer, savings and reforms should be carried out in Austria 
‘as long as the sun shines’ and the stance of the provinces inhibited this.745 By 1924, the 
issue was of primary importance to the Financial Committee, who said in their report in 
September, on the occasion of the announcement of the revised terms of the Geneva 
agreement, that ‘the financial stability of Austria cannot be considered to have been 
attained until the financial relations between the State and the Provinces have been 
thoroughly reformed’.746 Dr. Grünberger reported to a British diplomat following a trip 
to Geneva that it was his belief as well as Seipel’s that such a reform ‘would do more 
than anything else to restore confidence in Austria’s financial and economic future’.747 
The government, backed by Zimmerman and the League, took action wherever they 
were able to reduce the monies received by the Länder by, for example, reducing and 
then abolishing subsidies centrally granted for local services and the payment of 
                                                          
743 See A. Loveday to Arthur Salter, 8 September 1924, LNA S110 2/19/3. 
744 The Thirteenth Report of the Commissioner-General, 15 December 1923 – 15 January 1924 (Geneva, 1924), 
3-4, contains details regarding the government’s attempts to reform the Ertragsanteile. 
745 Dr. Franckenstein to Dr. Grünberger, 12 March 1924, ÖSA NPA 235. 
746 Joint League of Nations Report by the Financial Committee and the Commissioner-General, 15 September 
1924, LNA S110, 2/19/3. 
747 E. Keeling to Ramsay MacDonald, 26 September 1924, TNA T160/60, F2073/17.  
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officials.748 They also switched some of the civil servants based in the regions from 
federal to provincial employees. Until 1925, all the Länder resisted any even temporary 
measures to reduce their powers, and the administration of Vienna was particularly 
opposed.  
Figure 3. Map showing the Austrian Provinces. 
 
 
But was not just in Vienna that the government and the League encountered resistance 
to their policies, and the government continued to struggle to achieve their aims. The 
autonomous powers of the Länder were a relic of the Habsburg system, and the 
provinces were proud of their powers.749 Following the negotiations that preceded the 
announcement of the revised terms of the Protocols in September 1924, 
Landeshauptmann Rehrl of Salzberg province was particularly agitated at the failure of 
the League to consult the regional governments about their views. He had previously 
been sufficiently positive about the League programme to arrange a visit of 
Commissioner-General Zimmerman to Salzburg,750 but now he wrote to all other 
provincial governors, with the exception of the SDAP Bürgermeister of Vienna (who had 
an equivalent role to that of the Landeshauptmänner elsewhere), objecting strongly to 
the fact that the Financial Committee had, on their visit to Vienna, neglected to consult 
the provinces. He pointed out that various ‘chambers, organisations and associations’ 
had been consulted but not the ‘representatives of the autonomous entities’. Rehrl was 
particularly concerned about the way that the Länder had been overlooked, as he felt 
                                                          
748 See The Final Report of the Work of the Provisional Delegation in Vienna, January 1923, LNA S101, 79/4/4. 
749 See Akers Douglas to Chamberlain, 21 Nov 1924, NA, T160/60 2073/18.  
750 On Zimmerman’s official visit to Salzburg in autumn 1923, during which he was accompanied by League 
official and economist J. van Waldré de Bordes, see SLA, Rehrl-Brief, 1923/5097/5098/0607/0615. 
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that ‘as the result of such negotiations’ the tax policy of Austria would be taken in a 
‘decisive direction… in favour of the federal government’. Rehrl proposed that the 
Landeshauptmänner tell the Federal government that ‘when it makes commitments 
elsewhere on the initiative of foreign experts, the representatives of States should be 
given the opportunity to offer their opinion’.751 Rehrl’s correspondents, who were all 
Christian Socials (or their Tyrolean equivalents), all supported his call, albeit with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm. The Landeshauptmänner of the Tyrol and Upper Austria 
expressed their ‘complete agreement’ and ‘full endorsement’. The governor of 
Burgenland agreed with Rehrl ‘with joy’ and worried that the League wished to ‘destroy 
Länder autonomy’. The governor of Lower Austria (who was based at that time in 
Vienna) offered to discuss the issue with Seipel, although the governor of Voralberg 
was less concerned, regarding the issue as ‘not so tragic’.752 This exchange of letters 
reflects the conflict over states’ rights that had rumbled on since the early days of the 
League’s programme.  
 
The tone of at least some of Rehrl’s correspondents, such as those from the Tyrol and 
Upper Austria, reflects how seriously these regional leaders took the issue of provincial 
power. It had, after all, only been a few short years before that the Tyrol had sought to 
form an independent government – for a time after the war the Tyrol’s ambitions for 
autonomy had been sufficiently pronounced for it to maintain an independent embassy 
in Bern.753 By the time that Rehrl initiated his exchange of letters with other 
Landeshauptmänner, the issue of reform to the powers and finances of Länder in 
relation to the central Austrian state was considered to be of upmost priority by 
Zimmerman and the League, as we have seen.  
 
The regions were dominated by the Christian Social Party, and the dispute over 
provincial power was to cause divisions within the Party. Seipel negotiated intensely in 
                                                          
751 Schriftwechsel mit den Landhauptleuten, 5 September 1924, SLA, Rehrl-Brief, 1924/0813.  
752 Schriftwechsel mit den Landhauptleuten, reply from Tirol, 12 September 1924; reply from Oberösterreich 
13 September 1924; reply from Burgenland, 13 September 1924, reply from Nieder-Österreich, 18 September 
1924, reply from Voralberg, 17 September 1924.  
753 Gulick, From Habsburg to Hitler, 88. 
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autumn 1924 with regional leaders, such as Rehrl, to attempt to get the regions to 
accept lower budgets and less powers. In November 1924, Seipel attempted to force 
agreement. He resigned and made his return to the Chancellorship conditional on 
agreement on the issue of federal-provincial relations. He summoned provincial leaders 
to Vienna and sought agreement on the issues of tax distribution, constitutional reform 
of the regions’ partial fiscal autonomy and further reforms of areas where there was 
duplication of central and local bodies.754 His gambit failed, and the Seipel government 
was then replaced by another Christian Social – Pan-German coalition, but this time 
one that represented much more strongly the rural and regional elements of the 
Christian Social Party.  
 
Zimmerman mourned the loss of Seipel, Kienböck and Grünberger, writing that ‘they 
will go down to posterity as the patriots who in 1922 saved Austria on the brink of 
disaster, who determined that she should live, and who devoted the best of their 
energies to her salvation’.755 Seipel, who was a Vienna-based Christian Social, was 
replaced by Rudolph Ramek, a parliamentary representative from Salzburg. The 
Christian Socials in the regions at this point had won out against Seipel and the 
attempts by the League to reduce their autonomy and jurisdiction. Thus the tensions 
between the central Austrian State and the regions, occasioned to a significant extent 
by the League’s programme, contributed to divisions within the Christian Social Party 
and served to increase conflict between Austria’s central power, based in Vienna, and 
its regions. 
 
In this sense the League’s programme did nothing to further the chances of creating a 
unified Austrian state. One problem that the ‘experts’ on the Financial Committee had 
not explored in much depth at the time of the Geneva Protocols in October 1922 was 
the political implications of their programme with regards to the federated structure of 
                                                          
754 See The Twenty-Third Report of the Commissioner-General, 15 October 1924 – 15 November 1924 (Geneva, 
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Austria. The financial and economic principles that the Financial Committee and their 
supporters, such as Montagu Norman, promoted, were essentially considered by these 
figures to trump any other realities or political principles. Although it was considered 
necessary that regional power be curtailed in order to successfully implement the 
programme, the assumption at first was that this could, and would, be achieved.756 
 
Furthermore, the League’s insistence on the centrality of bringing the provinces more 
fully under the control of the central government brought moderate Christian Socials 
who had been enthusiastic about the League’s programme, such as Landeshauptmann 
Rehrl, into conflict with the League and into opposition with its diktats. As we have 
seen, Rehrl had been involved in promoting the programme, and yet in September 
1924, he orchestrated opposition to those from the League or central government who 
would ignore the Austrian states’ rights. The conflict also, temporarily at least, 
strengthened the hand of the rural element of the Christian Social Party, and saw Seipel 
replaced with one of these figures as Chancellor from November 1924.  
 
Seipel, the major political figure, along with Finance Minister Victor Kienböck, 
associated with the League’s project, was out of power. His attempts to bring the 
regions to heel could be interpreted as being part of the process of attempted state 
construction that Deak identifies.757 For the League, however, the issue was not so 
much about where political power lay in Austria, as about the implementation of 
policies that they regarded to be critical elements of the plan. In the previous chapter 
we saw how in the Tyrol, for example, there was support for job creation measures to 
deal with unemployment, and not just from the SDAP.758 In Styria, the provincial 
assembly had voted for extra expenditure for relief for the unemployed.759 These were 
                                                          
756 See the Geneva Protocols: League of Nations, ‘Protocols Containing the Scheme for the Financial 
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757 See Deak, ‘Dismantling Empire’. 
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measures that were completely inimical to the aims and beliefs of Zimmerman and the 
Financial Committee. Furthermore, these League representatives wished the provinces 
to receive a lower tax take. As we shall see, they also objected particularly strongly to 
the local taxes raised in particular in Vienna. Thus, the League sought to reform the 
powers and status of the Länder less because they were concerned per se about the 
distribution of power within the Austrian state and more because they were keen to 
ensure that the principles underlying the League’s programme would be properly 
enacted. Finally, under the Ramek administration in early 1925, the provinces outside 
of Vienna agreed to crucial reforms, including that they submit their finances to the 
oversight of a national audit office, cut some overlapping administrations, and that for 
a period of two years they accede to a government veto over fiscal measures, but the 
SDAP only allowed the measure to pass in return for the preservation of greater 
autonomy for the City of Vienna administration.760 
 
In Vienna, the SDAP administration had been alarmed from the start about the 
potential effect that the reform programme could have on their powers and their 
projects. SDAP finance chief Hugo Breitner as early as 1922 expressed the worry in the 
regional assembly that the programme might hinder the ability of the city government 
to enact the ‘large social and cultural tasks’ that were necessary in the city.761 
Ultimately, the primary focus of concern for the government and the League became 
the powers and the policies of the City of Vienna. 
 
The main worry that Zimmerman, the Financial Committee and their allies consistently 
expressed was that the tax level in Austria was too high. The head economist at the 
League’s intelligence section, Alexander Loveday, stated in a memo that in his view the 
level of taxation should work out at no more than 14%, or 105 gold Krone per capita. 
                                                          
760 See The Twenty-Sixth Report of the Commissioner-General, 15 January 1925 – 15 February 1925 (Geneva, 
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For 1924, the projected level was 116 gold Krone.762 Loveday’s view was typical of the 
League’s attitude. In a report by the Austria Committee in 1925,763 for example, grave 
concern was expressed about the level of taxation in Austria, which the Committee 
linked to the ‘financial relations between Bund764 and local authorities’. They 
commented on ‘the harmful effects of a system which may involve the local authorities 
receiving more than they have counted upon, and thus practically inviting them to 
increase their expenditure’.765 In this, the Committee was clearly united with the 
Financial Committee (who commented in early 1925 on the ‘strain’ taxation in Austria 
placed ‘on the economic life of the country’)766 in their belief in the need for small state 
with limited functions and limited taxation. The League Committees were not just 
concerned that too high a proportion of national taxes was going to the regions 
(although they were undoubtedly concerned about this), but they also objected to the 
extra taxation that was levied at a local level by the City of Vienna. The League was 
preoccupied with the City of Vienna, in particular, as the main source of difficulties. The 
Austria Committee stated that ‘the problem of local taxation is eminently a problem of 
Viennese taxation’ and that, they were ‘distinctly of the opinion that taxation in Vienna 
is too high and that it has serious repercussions on economic development’.767 It was 
thus the perception of the Finance Committee and the others at the League who were 
advised by them, such as the Austria Committee, that the level of taxation in Vienna 
was excessive. Lack of support for state provision of the kind of social, welfare, housing 
and educational services that Vienna City Council provided partly motivated their 
opposition. 
 
It is ironic that the positive developments that Zimmerman and the other League 
visitors to Vienna reported (as seen in the previous chapter in Salter’s glowing account 
                                                          
762 Memorandum by Alexander Loveday, 1924, LNA S110, 2/19/2, Austria. 
763 The Austrian Committee was a sub-committee of the Council of the League. They tended to always act on 
the advice of the Financial Committee, as we have seen.  
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of conditions in mid-1924, when he commented upon ‘the standard of comfort, the 
health and happiness of her people’), actually partly resulted from the schemes of the 
municipal authorities of Vienna, to which they objected. Whilst, of course, currency 
stability had in some respects assisted with this situation, a contributor to the comfort, 
health and happiness of the people of Vienna by 1924 was not the Zimmerman, the 
League scheme nor central government, but the work of the City government, who had 
resisted League calls to reduce tax and invested at the very point that, according to the 
Financial Committee, they should have been cutting.768 Indeed, the Financial 
Committee and Zimmerman frequently deplored the policies of Vienna and its tax level 
whilst also reporting upon the positive conditions in that City. Without the work of the 
City government, the effects of the deflationary aspects introduced by the League’s 
scheme would likely have been worse, as the extent of the construction and investment 
programmes introduced by the City government had a stimulating effect, on, for 
example, the construction industry.   
 
The most significant and most visible part of the SDAP’s schemes for the City of Vienna 
were their mass housing programmes. Vienna’s housing problems predated the war – 
in 1910, for example, overcrowding was already rife and the average dwelling 
accommodated 1.24 people per room.769  The influx of people from other parts of the 
old Empire occasioned by defeat and the end of the monarchy increased the strain. The 
photographs of Bruno Frei focussed specifically on one group’s experiences, Galician 
Jews who had fled to Vienna during or at the end of the war. According to Erika 
Weinzierl, a large number of such migrants arrived in Vienna at this time.770 Poverty-
stricken and discriminated against, these refugees in what had been their own land, 
often resided in overcrowded and inadequate dwellings, as his scene ‘The family of 
Cantor Josef Schruber, who fled from Galicia, in Vienna, 1920’ shows: 
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Figure 4. Bruno Frei, Die aus Galizien geflüchtete Familie des Kantors Josef Schruber in Wien, 
1920.771 
 
 
Along with influxes of such immigrants, problems with housing were exacerbated by 
the reduction in real incomes that had occurred during the First World War, which 
made rent payments difficult.772 The rent control introduced by Imperial Decree in 1917 
had the effect of halting the construction of private residential developments, 
contributing to the severe housing shortage after the war. Temporary dwellings sprang 
up on the edge of the city.773 
 
With housing conditions and the affordability of housing a major concern in Vienna, the 
local authorities focussed particular attention on provision in this area. The housing 
developments of Vienna reflected a vision not only for humane and decent housing but 
also a wider utopian idea of a model socialist society. Housing schemes included 
medical facilities, crèches, social and cultural facilities and sometimes schools. These 
developments reflected the socialists’ Bildungsvereine ideal of a high-minded cultural 
socialism that transcended the merely material, and created a new working class of 
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dignity, culture and moral rectitude.774 Their vision was to unite communities around 
communal services and cultural improvement, as well as to restore the family unit that 
had been so undermined by the war. In this respect they were conservative in their 
approach: they were not seeking to overturn, or even greatly modify, the family as the 
basic unit of society. Flats were designed for individual family units, which would then 
form the wider communal society. In the words of Gruber ‘decent housing became the 
cornerstone of the SDAP’s project to create “ordentliche Arbeiterfamilie”, a phrase 
connoting not only orderliness but also decency and respectability’.775 
 
Despite the somewhat overlapping aims of the Christian Socials and the SDAP with 
respect to the need for the restoration of the family post-war, the SDAP’s methods for 
achieving this through raising taxation to provide funds for socialised housing and 
services, conflicted with the ideology of those in charge of national government in 
Austria, and specifically, conflicted with the aims and methods of the League’s 
programme for Austrian reconstruction. Hugo Breitner, the Finance chief for the City of 
Vienna, designed a sharply progressive system of taxes on expensive properties and on 
luxuries, in which, for example, approximately the most expensive 0.5% of rental 
properties in Vienna provided 45% of the revenue from residential taxation.776 Hotels, 
restaurants, patisseries, concert venues and other leisure spots were also hit. There 
was also an 8.5% tax levied on banking transactions.777 The proceeds of these taxes, 
together labelled the ‘Construction tax’, were directed to pay for the erection of 
housing developments and their associated services, such as health centres, 
kindergarten, and, in keeping the SDAP cultural vision, cultural and social facilities, such 
as theatres.778 In taxing luxuries in this manner, ‘purtitanical’ Breitner also, as Wolfgang 
Maderthaner points out, created a kind of moral economy of taxation, in which his 
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1983), 7. 
775 Gruber, Red Vienna, 46. 
776 Maderthaner, ‘Von der Zeit’, 343. 
777 See Report of the Sub-Committee on the fiscal system, and especially on the relations between Bund and 
Local Authorities, LNA D.V./P.V./1-8, D.V.32. The levy was known as the Fürsorgeabgabe – welfare levy.  
778 For Breitner’s policies see Maderthaner, ‘Von der Zeit’, 350-358 and also Siegfried Mattl, Wien im 20. 
Jahrhundert (Wien, 2000). For Breitner’s account of his own policies see, Hugo Breitner ‘Finanz- und 
Steuerpolitik der Stadtverwaltung’, in Das Neue Wien – Städtwerk herausgegeben unter offizieller Mirwirkung 
der Gemeinde Wien, Band I (Wien, 1926), 179-190.  
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targets were clearly the undeserved wealth of those ‘speculators and war profiteers’ 
whose expenditure, according to Otto Bauer, so offended the masses of Vienna in this 
post-war period.779 The first major housing developments began in early 1922, just at 
the same moment that the League’s programme began to come into effect.  
Figure 5. Vienna housing development on Possingergasse, Auf der Schmelz, Vienna, built 1922-
1923. 
 
 
The housing of Vienna stood as a tangible physical repudiation of, and challenge to, the 
policies of the government and the League. Constructed from money collected from 
taxation that the government, their allies and League considered to be excessive and 
even ‘Steuersadismus’ (tax sadism) inflicted on the people of Vienna, the buildings were 
all adorned prominently with the slogan ‘Erbaut von der Gemeinde Wien’ (‘built by the 
Community of Vienna’). Later, in a move that deployed the housing developments as 
propaganda for the City of Vienna’s work, the source of funds for the construction was 
appended to the buildings, as can be seen on a development on Pilgramgasse, Vienna 
whose slogan reads ‘built by the Community of Vienna in the years 1925 and 1926 from 
the proceeds of the Construction Tax’.780 Breitner’s taxation policies were innovative, 
and well publicised. Indeed, such was the level of visceral vitriol that they provoked 
from the SDAP’s opponents, that to promote them was probably a necessity for the 
party. Breitner gave speeches on his work and taxation policies, such as in 1926, 
                                                          
779 Maderthaner, ‘Von der Zeit’, 343. Otto Bauer cited by Maderthaner, 351.  
780 The Wohnbausteuer covered about 40% of the costs of construction.  
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‘Kapitalistische oder Sozialistische Steuerpolitik’ (‘Capitalist or Socialist Tax Policy’), 
which were then publicised by the SDAP via pamphlets.781 
Figures 6 and 7. Housing development on Pilgramgasse in Vienna. 
 
 
 
Hugo Breitner, labelled by the Neue Freie Presse as a ‘Finanzpolitischer Savonarola’, is a 
very interesting figure in the story of post-Imperial Austria. He was a former banker, 
who had moved in the highest levels amongst the kinds of financial elites who were 
very supportive of the League’s work, and he now directed his energies towards putting 
the creation of a socialist utopia on a sound financial footing. He worked from 1900-
1909 at the Austrian Länderbank, where from 1909-1918 he was managing director. 
Austrian banks, as discussed in the previous chapters, had very direct control over 
                                                          
781 Eine Rede von Stadtrat Hugo Breitner (Wien, 1926), in VGA, Lade 19, Mappe 62, B, Breitner, Hugo, 
Politische Material. 
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many Austrian industrial enterprises, and Breitner worked particularly to reorganise 
and reconstruct the firms attached to his bank.782 From 1918-1932 he was Comptroller 
and Housing Commissioner of the City of Vienna and Secretary of the Treasury of the 
Region of Vienna, and from 1932-1934, President of the Savings Bank of the City of 
Vienna.783 Breitner, who was of Jewish origin, as were many senior bankers and many 
senior members of the SDAP, was a rare example of someone who crossed both the 
worlds of banking and radical socialism. As was so often the case with both bankers and 
SDAP leaders, anti-Semitism sometimes characterised the attacks he suffered at the 
hands of his opponents. Most notoriously, Christian Social leader of the far right 
paramilitaries, the Heimwehr, Prince Ernst von Starhemberg, told a gathering of his 
followers in Heldenplatz, the main central public space in Vienna in 1930, that ‘the 
head of this Asiatic [Breitner] must roll in the dust!’.784 Ultimately, Breitner, his wife and 
two daughters fled Austria at the time of the 1938 Anschluss to Florence, Paris, New 
York and then ultimately to Clairemont, San Diego, where Breitner died in March 1946.   
 
The housing developments that Breitner’s tax arrangements helped to pay for 
represented, then, a physical rejection of the central government and League’s plans 
for low taxation and reduced powers for the Länder. As we have seen, Breitner realised 
from the start that the government’s reform plan might come into conflict with the 
aims of the SDAP administration in Vienna.785 The scheme at Pilgramgasse was 
constructed immediately following the period when the pressure from the League for 
Austria to reform its federal structure to reduce the powers of the Länder (and 
specifically Vienna), was most intense. One of the most architecturally and culturally 
                                                          
782 On the links between Austrian banks and Austrian industry see Peter Eigner, ‘Banking-Industry Networks: 
The Austrian Experience, 1895-1940, in Philip L. Cottrell (ed.), Rebuilding the Financial System in Central and 
Eastern Europe, 1918-1994 (Aldershot, 1997), 91-114.  
783 NFP, 24 November 1932, cited by Maderthaner, ‘Von der Zeit’, 353. See Breitner’s personal statement 
attached to a leaflet about a series of lectures that he gave in 4 October – 1 November 1938 in New York City 
for the American National Public Housing Conference on the subject of ‘How the City of Vienna Built 80,000 
Houses in the Post-War Decade’, VGA, Lade 19, Mappe 62, B, Breitner, Hugo, Politische Material.  
784 See, ‘‘Breitner Steuern’, finanzierten das ‘rote Wien’’, in Unsere Generation, February 1996, in VGA, Lade 
19, Mappe 62, B, Breitner, Hugo, Politische Material. 
785 Hugo Breitner speaking at a meeting of the Gemeinderat der Stadt Wien als Landtag, Landtag, 
Stenographischer Bericht 1922, Protokoll der öffentlichen Sitzung vom 14 November 1922, VStLA, Landtag, 
B3/2. Ex-wörtliches Protokoll.  
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significant developments, Rabenhof (see figures 8, 9 and 10 below), was commenced 
during 1926, the final year of Zimmerman’s reign as Commissioner-General. The 
construction of the most famous and iconic of all of Vienna’s public housing 
developments, the Karl-Marx-Hof, the scene of the 1934 ‘civil war’, was only 
commenced in 1927, after the end of the Zimmerman period, but many further 
examples of the construction of these developments prior to the end of Zimmerman’s 
work as Commissioner-General can be found in a glossy book produced by the 
Viennese local authorities to celebrate, explain and also propagandise their work, Das 
Neue Wien (1926). This work, along with the prominent position of the slogans 
attached to buildings announcing their construction date and the means by which they 
were paid for, seem to be not just an attempt by Vienna City authorities to celebrate 
their own work, but an attempt also to repudiate the policies of their government, and 
also of those from Geneva. Ultimately, the housing developments of Vienna, and the 
means by which they were paid for, represented an articulation of an alternative mode 
of reconstruction to the League’s more orthodox prescriptions, and in 1920s Vienna, 
the two ‘reconstruction’ narratives were in competition, and in conflict.  
Figures 8, 9 and 10. Rabenhof, Vienna, including a health centre.  
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Conclusions 
An examination of the political impacts of the scheme for Austrian financial 
reconstruction reveals the extent to which this financial and economic programme had 
political consequences in terms of the processes of nation- and state-building, and in 
terms of the ideological conflicts and disputes over federal powers. The financial 
committee had not given very much consideration to the impact of their proposals, but 
as they specialised in finance, and not in politics or state (or nation) building, this is 
hardly surprising. The oversight does perhaps point to the fact that the Austrian 
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Committee and the Council ought not to have delegated so much of the programme 
design to the Financial Committee’s technical ‘experts’, but recognised that there were 
wider political implications of the scheme that needed serious consideration. Despite 
the general aims of Austrian stability and independence, the ‘political’ aspects of the 
programme were considered in the rather limited terms of negotiating the release of 
liens, negotiating with Seipel and persuading the SDAP to at least acquiesce to the 
scheme. It may have been assumed by the League that the desired state building 
elements of the programme would follow from the successful implementation of the 
financial, fiscal and administrative reforms contained in the programme, and in-depth 
analysis of the effects that these would have on the wider political situation was not 
made. Some political aspects of the programme for Austrian reconstruction, such as the 
use of an Enabling Act, set an unhelpful precedent in the new Republic, one that was 
not helpful for future stability or the entrenchment of Austrian democracy. The on-
going conflict and tensions between the federal government and the provinces about 
the provincial powers served to increase centre-regional tensions, increase disputes 
within the Christian Social Party, and create hostile feeling towards the League and its 
work. 
 
Ultimately, the reforms created forces that helped to delegitimise and destabilise the 
new state at the same time as reforming and rationalising the remnants of unwieldy 
Habsburg structures, such as the civil service or the relations between regions and the 
federal state. These processes were not separate: what might work to rationalise and 
stabilise in one sense might undermine and unsettle in another, as this chapter reveals. 
The question of the process of nation-building in the embryonic state also arises: that 
is, the impact of the programme upon the question of Austrian independence and the 
possibility of Anschluss. Ultimately, independent Austria did not remain in existence but 
was incorporated into the Third Reich in 1938. The disagreements and conflict that the 
adoption and implementation of the programme for Austrian reconstruction produced, 
deepened the tensions and ideological polarisation between the SDAP and the Christian 
Socialist party. The League’s scheme was not by any means the only factor in this 
development, but by setting out a path for Austria that was in such clear opposition to 
227 
 
the desired direction of the SDAP, the programme did increase conflict. Furthermore, 
the contrast between the strictures of the League’s programme and the completely 
different agenda pursued by the SDAP administration in the City of Vienna created an 
alternative model of reconstruction that challenged and was in opposition to the work 
of the League.  
 
As with the economic effects of the Geneva Protocols, the political impact of the 
League’s scheme had complex effects. The programme was intended to help Austria to 
survive as an independent country, and although, by creating a degree of confidence 
and stabilising the currency, in some respects the League’s work assisted in the 
continued survival of the country, it also exacerbated some of the tensions and conflicts 
in Austrian politics and society which over the longer term reduced the chances that 
Austria would develop along harmonious or stable lines. Thus, the programme worked 
to simultaneously enhance and reduce the possibilities of a durable future for Austria. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion: Austrian Financial Reconstruction – 
Afterlife and Post-Mortem 
‘There is a radical instability in our world order’786 
‘If even the Credit-Anstalt cannot be relied on, everything in Austria must 
be rotten’ 
Sir Eric Phipps, a British Diplomat in Austria in 1931787 
 
The Austrian Financial Reconstruction scheme was seen by many of those who 
supported it, as we saw in Chapter Two, as a means of supporting the post-First World 
War peace settlement and promoting European stability. As a method of financial 
restructuring, it became a template for further reconstruction in Europe, as this chapter 
explores. The programme had a questionable effect on Austrian stability, however, and 
by 1931, Austria was at the centre of a banking crisis which had very detrimental effects 
on the global financial and economic position. This chapter explores the aftermath of 
the League’s programme and its longer term effects, and the consequences of this for 
Austrian and European stability. I argue that many of the developments of the 1920s 
occasioned by the scheme for Austrian financial reconstruction produced longer-term 
effects that contributed negatively to the political and economic problems of 1930s. 
 
In the spring of 1931, Zoltan Hajdu, a director of the Viennese bank Creditanstalt (CA), 
refused to sign off the bank’s accounts and demanded that the CA properly assess the 
value of its assets. The bank, an august institution with a grand neo-classical 
headquarters on the Ring in Vienna, was founded in 1855 by Anselm von Rothschild in 
order to finance the expansion of the railway network of Austro-Hungary. It had come 
to hold a dominant and integral position in Austria banking and thus in Austrian 
industry, which was closely intertwined with, and heavily dependent upon, the banking 
sector.  By 1931, the directors of Creditanstalt had known for some time that the 
                                                          
786 Says the character of Father Rothschild in Evelyn Waugh’s strangely prophetic 1930 novel, Vile Bodies, 
written in 1929, published in 1930. 
787 Cited by Aurel Schubert, The Credit-Anstalt Crisis of 1931 (Cambridge, 1991), 11.  
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balance sheets that they were submitting were false, and that the value of the bank’s 
losses were far greater than they had acknowledged.788 Hajdu, apparently influenced 
by his recent religious conversion, was no longer prepared to maintain the 
deception.789 When a new balance sheet was established, it revealed that the Bank was 
carrying 140 million Schillings worth of losses. Despite the fact that this was still a vast 
underestimation of the true extent of Creditanstalt’s liabilities, the bank was, according 
to these figures, insolvent.790  
 
After the First World War, various problems beset this giant ‘superbank’791, by far the 
largest financial institution in Austria since it had absorbed the failing 
Bodenkreditanstalt Bank in 1929.792 Now the losses of the bank that was in the words 
Aurel Schubert ‘too big to fail but too big to save’,793 threatened to topple the Austrian 
and ultimately European banking systems, with potentially immensely destructive 
consequences for the European and world economy.794 On 8 May 1931, CA directors 
approached the Austrian government and the National Bank and revealed the bank’s 
position.795 Despite a general preference against direct government intervention, the 
central importance of CA to Austrian banking and Austrian industry left the government 
little choice but to attempt to help.  On 11 May, CA’s position and the government’s 
                                                          
788 See Iago Gil Aguado, ‘The Creditanstalt Crisis of 1931 and the Failure of the Austro-German Customs Union 
Project’, The Historical Journal 44/1 (2000), 206. 
789 See Harold James, The Creation and Destruction of Value – The Globalization Cycle (Cambridge, Mass. and 
London, 2009), 77.  
790 Ibid, 76. Creditanstalt had 52 million Schillings of losses on credits: 28 million on industrial participations 
and 60 million relating to the takeover of Bodencreditanstalt that CA had essentially been forced by the 
government to undertake. The losses, bad enough though they were, did not actually represent anything like 
the true position of CA, who, it is now calculated, was in actual fact carrying losses of 900 million Schillings: see 
Gil Aguado, ‘The Creditanstalt Crisis’, 211.  
791 Aurel Schubert, The Credit-Anstalt Crisis, 8.  
792 Bodencreditanstalt (BCA) was the second largest bank in Austria. If CA had not taken on BCA in 1929, BCA 
would have gone bankrupt. Taking on BCA increased the size of CA by 50%: see Dieter Stiefel, ‘‘The Bankers’ 
View’: Austria’s Economic and Political Development and the Role of the Banks’, in Gerald D. Feldman and 
Peter Hertner (eds.), Finance and Modernization – A Transnational and Transcontinental Perspective for the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Farnham, Surrey, 2008), 12.  
793 Aurel Schubert cited by Peter Coy, ‘Lessons from the Credit-Anstalt collapse’, 11 April 2011, accessed 26 
August 2015 at http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/11_18/b4226012481756.htm#p1 
794 For a summary of the events in Austria, see Schubert, The Credit-Anstalt, 7-18.  
795 The latter two can hardly have been entirely surprised by CA difficulties, as they were aware of the 
bankrupt position of the Bodencreditanstalt before it merged with CA, and complicit with covert financial 
transfers of dubious legality undertaken to attempt to maintain the solvency of CA post-1929. See Gil Aguado, 
‘The Credit-Anstalt’, 199-221.  
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plan to support the Bank were announced publicly.796 The measures that the 
government could take were completely insufficient, however, and rapidly ‘vanished 
into thin air’: CA’s acknowledged losses alone exceeded the entire Austrian national 
budget.797 Panic spread as CA’s estimates of the scale of its losses increased week by 
week.  In Austria there was a run on the CA and other Viennese banks, and then a run 
on the Schilling and capital flight. The Bank of International Settlement and the Bank of 
England stepped as lenders of last resort, and ultimately the government turned once 
again to the League for assistance in obtaining another loan.798 All of these measures 
failed to halt the banking crisis until 1934, by which time Austrian democracy had 
ceased, and the level of unemployment was entrenched at the ‘catastrophically high’ 
level that it was to remain until 1937.799  
 
The situation in Austria in May 1931 triggered banking runs and banking collapses 
across central Europe. In June and July there was a disastrous run on the German 
banks, followed in early autumn by banking crises in London (which in consequence 
came off the gold standard at this point) and in the United States.800 It turned out that 
the weakness at the heart of the Austrian financial and economic system – that is, the 
black hole that was its banking sector – posed a great threat to global economic and 
political stability. The unravelling of Austrian banking and financial stability in the early 
1930s exacerbated and prolonged the worldwide depression, and deepened the 
European political crisis that was to culminate in world war and genocide. In this sense, 
it is the view of some historians that the 1931 banking crisis is of greater importance in 
explaining the collapse of European order at the end of the 1930s than the events of 
1929.801  
                                                          
796 Schubert says that ‘about 69 percent of all Austrian limited companies did their business through the 
Credit-Anstalt, and about 14 percent were very deeply in debt to the company’, The Credit-Anstalt, 10. For 
more on the importance of CA to Austria, 10-11.  
797 Stiefel, ‘‘The Bankers’ View’, 12.  
798 For an account of the League’s return to Austria, see Peter Berger, Im Schatten der Diktatur: die 
FInanzdiplomatie des Vetreters des Völkerbundes in Österreich, Meinoud Rost van Tonningen 1931-1936 
(Vienna, 2000).  
799 Felix Butschek, ‘Präkeynesianismus in Österreich’, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 19/2 (1993), 172.  
800 See Schubert, The Credit-Anstalt, 4.  
801 See, for example, James, The Creation and Destruction, and Patricia Clavin, The Failure of Economic 
Diplomacy – Britain, France and the United States, 1931-36 (Basingstoke and London, 1996).  
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In what way were the events of 1931 connected with the League programme of 1922 – 
1926, and what do they suggest about the effectiveness and efficacy of the programme 
and the principles that underlay it, and the role of the ‘experts’ who had designed it? 
Did the measures taken to alleviate the problems of the early 1920s create the 
conditions that caused the later crisis? This chapter draws together conclusions on 
these questions, reflects upon the nature and effects of the project for Austrian 
reconstruction, and argues that the programme was intrinsically connected to Austria’s 
later woes. Although the problems with Austrian banking ran deep and were various, 
the solutions offered to Austria in 1922 operated counter to the chances of Austrian or 
European peace and stability.  
 
This chapter first examines the afterlife that the programme had in the 1920s, as its 
apparent success bred other similar League programmes and strengthened and 
institutionalised the EFO within the League. In many ways the Austrian programme was 
a template for much of the international financial diplomacy that followed, and thus 
the non-League schemes to which its principles were applied, such as the Dawes Plan 
and the loan made by J. P. Morgan to France of 1924, are also examined. These 
programmes had considerable success in dealing in the short-term with the currency 
and fiscal problems of post-First World War Europe. This chapter argues that the very 
measures that appeared to be successful in many ways at first were, however, creating 
or exacerbating trends and developments that undermined long-term stability. This 
chapter then explores the links between the programme of 1922-1926 and the 
problems faced by the Austrian economy and its industrial/ banking sector in the late 
1920s and early 1930s, before examining the difficulties experienced by the European 
and world economy more generally. The effects on Austria’s political scene, its social 
and political divisions, and the ways in which the League in some respects exacerbated 
these are then considered. I also examine the ramifications of all of this for Europe and 
the world at large. This chapter shows the links between economic and financial 
matters and politics, and also the connections between regional, national and 
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international situations, and concludes by drawing together the main themes of this 
thesis around ideology, experts and internationalism. 
 
Developments in international financial diplomacy – League programmes 
The programme for Austrian financial reconstruction was supposed to rehabilitate the 
Austrian financial position and currency. As we have seen, by 1931, these were both 
once again fragile. In the initial aftermath of the launch of the programme in Austria, 
however, it appeared to be a resounding success, as the currency stabilised, short- and 
long-terms loans were successfully floated, and budget equilibrium was achieved. Given 
that, as revealed in Chapter Two, it was widely believed that without the scheme, 
Austria would have disintegrated in some way and thereby destabilised the new Europe 
and the post-war order, this appeared to be not just a victory for financial recovery 
from the war for Austria, but also an important step on the path to European peace and 
prosperity. The programme seemed to be a vindication of the work and potential of the 
League and of international financial diplomacy. In Austria, the pro-government 
Reichspost reported in 1924 that ‘the first great practical success of the League of 
Nations will be inextricably linked with the Austrian restoration work’.802 It was in this 
context that the EFO was institutionalised as a permanent part of the League structure 
in 1924,803 and the organisation and its financial committee commenced upon further 
work in the area of financial reconstruction: the Austrian project ‘reflected great 
prestige on the financial committee’.804 For Maurice Fanshawe, who in 1925 wrote a 
very favourable account of the early activities of the League, Austria was a ‘test case’ of 
the EFO’s work.805 And it was not just the work of the League that appeared vindicated: 
it was also the specific set of economic and financial values that underlay the Austrian 
programme, the principles explored in Chapter Three of this thesis. According to 
Fanshawe, the experience of Austria demonstrated the efficacy of the principles 
                                                          
802 Reichspost, 26 September 1924, 3.  
803 See Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy – The Reinvention of the League of Nations (Oxford, 2013), 
33. 
804 Robert Boyce, British Capitalism at the Crossroads 1919-1932 – A study in politics, economics, and 
international relations (Cambridge, 1987), 42. 
805 Maurice Fanshawe, Reconstruction: Five Years of Work by the League of Nations (London 1925), 135.  
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expounded at the Brussels conference in 1920.806 Arthur Salter concurred: the Austrian 
scheme ‘tested and proved…. The principles laid down at… Brussels in 1920 and Genoa 
in 1922.’ It occupied, ‘therefore, a position of great importance both in the theory and 
the practice of financial restoration’.807 
 
Following this apparent resounding success, the EFO and its financial committee 
embarked upon further projects. Arthur Salter was to have a central role in what 
followed, and, as a member of the secretariat rather than a part of the Financial 
Committee, his key role in designing the project represented something of a shift from 
the Austrian programme.808 Events in Austria acted as an inducement to Hungary to 
approach the League. Salter recounts how, after the start of the League’s work in 
Vienna and in ‘the sure promise it gave of a successful result’, an appeal for assistance 
arrived from Hungarian Prime Minister Count Bethlan for a similar scheme for 
Hungary.809 The Hungarian move was also partly at the instigation of Montagu Norman, 
whom the Hungarians had approached with respect to the prospects of a loan.810 Salter 
was despatched to Budapest by the Financial Committee and a programme (designed 
by Salter) was adopted to provide currency stability, a balanced budget and loans for 
Hungary. There were some modifications in comparison with the Austrian programme 
in that, ‘after the success and the great reputation (the Austrian scheme) had… won’, 
guarantees were no longer required to create the requisite confidence in investors.811 
Furthermore, Salter innovated somewhat and produced a new mechanism whereby 
Hungary’s repayments would be adjusted depending upon the condition of world 
                                                          
806 Ibid., 124: to wit: ‘there is clear evidence that, in so far as European States have recovered, financially or 
economically, their recovery has been due, to no small extent, to the fact that they have put into practice the 
principles laid down at the Brussels Conference’.  
807 Arthur Salter, ‘General Survey’ in League of Nations, The Financial Reconstruction of Austria – General 
Survey and Principal Documents (Geneva, 1926), 85. 
808 Given the close co-operation of the committee with its secretariat in the Financial Section, however, it 
should come as no surprise that Salter acted in this capacity. 
809 Arthur Salter, Slave of the Lamp, 100. For details of the League programme in Hungary see Principles and 
Methods of the League of Nations, 29-32. Also, Arthur Salter, ‘The Reconstruction of Hungary’, address 
delivered at Chatham House, 22 May 1924, cited by Clavin, Securing the World Economy, 30. 
810 Robert Boyce, Crossroads, 43. According to Boyce, Norman ‘insisted’ that the Hungarians approach the 
League.  
811 Ibid., 101. 
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prices: this was a measure designed to assist with currency stability.812 The 
Commissioner-General was this time an American, fulfilling an ambition of the French 
government that they had failed to realise in the case of the Austrian programme.813 In 
addition, the powers of the Commissioner- General were much less than in the Austrian 
case.814 This was, according to Robert Boyce, the result of Montagu Norman’s 
influence,815 but it may have also reflected the fact that, whilst Hungary was irredentist 
on the matter of post-First World War borders, there existed no equivalent concern 
about Hungary to the fears about the possibility of Anschluss that influenced the shape 
of the Austrian programme.816 Moreover, the League may have wished to prevent the 
kind of trenchant opposition that had occurred in Austria partly as a result of the 
perception that the country was treated as a League ‘protectorate’, with Zimmerman a 
‘dictator’.817 
 
In the Hungarian case, although there were modifications on control and sovereignty 
and the loan repayments, the fundamental economic and financial principles and 
prescriptions – the centrality of the gold standard, the importance of balanced budgets 
– did not alter. Even without guarantees, the loans for Hungary were successfully 
floated and the League’s programme adopted, producing, compared with Austria, 
‘more rapid success.’818 Hungary was stable and solvent by 1924. Subsequently, in the 
light of the apparently positive results in Austria and Hungary, Salter and the Financial 
Committee conducted work assisting in obtaining loans and providing financial and 
currency advice to Bulgaria (from where Salter received the summons of King Boris and 
use of his royal train in 1926), as well as Estonia and Danzig.819 
                                                          
812 Ibid., 101; and Arthur Salter, Memoirs of a Public Servant (London, 1961), 181. A ‘transfer committee’ 
oversaw the level of repayments from Hungary. 
813 The Commissioner-General was Jeremiah Smith Jr. See Zoltán Peterecz, Jeremiah Smith, Jr., and Hungary 
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The work of the EFO now seemed firmly entrenched, but the confidence that League 
involvement had initially engendered became counter-productive, perhaps partly of the 
rather humiliating loss of control that Austria had experienced in return for League 
assistance. League loans were now associated, Salter said, with ‘countries who were 
down and out’.820 Poland, Serbia and Romania ‘whilst profiting from the technical 
expertise gained in the League experience’ all negotiated loans independently in the 
late 1920s, and instituted their own reforms.821  
 
In Austria, however, the dire circumstances that followed the announcement in May 
1931 of Creditanstalt’s position resulted ultimately in a need to return to the League for 
further assistance. In July 1932 a similar programme was launched as part of the 
Lausanne Protocols. These were, says Berger ‘nothing more than a reprint of the many 
formatted Geneva Protocol disc of 4 October 1922’.822 The formula laid down by the 
original League programme in the early 1920s was still the one to which the League’s 
Financial Committee turned. This might be thought to reveal the efficacy of the 
principles and programme laid down in the 1922 protocols, but in fact, as we shall see, 
it might be better viewed as unimaginative adherence to ineffective solutions.   
 
Developments in international financial diplomacy – non-League programmes 
The principles of budget equilibrium and budget cuts established in the Austrian case 
were also applied to financial schemes outside of the League’s remit. Following the 
speculative attack on their currency, for example, (mentioned in Chapter Four) the 
                                                          
820 Salter, Memoirs, 182.  
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French government sought a loan from J. P. Morgan in 1924. Despite being a League 
member, France had neither need nor desire to seek a loan via League auspices, but the 
loan from Morgans was only forthcoming when Poincaré agreed to tax and spending 
cuts.823 France did not have to resort to the international assistance offered by the 
League to raise this loan, but its agreement to these terms reflected its ‘vulnerability 
and dependence upon foreign capital’.824 Despite this, France had much more flexibility 
to manoeuvre than Austria, and kept off the gold standard at this stage, and when it did 
go back on gold in 1928, set its currency at such as value in relation to gold as to 
encourage gold flows into the country.825 
 
As we saw in Chapter Two, the League’s work in Austria was partly supported by some 
international bankers as they hoped it would be a prelude to a plan for German 
financial reconstruction. In the case of the financial and monetary problems of 
Germany, however, the League could, of course, offer no direct assistance. Germany, 
whose inflationary difficulties became profound in 1923 in the context of the Ruhr 
crisis, was not yet a member of the League.826 Despite this, continuities existed 
between the League’s financial work, as inaugurated by the League’s scheme for 
Austria, and the international financial work carried out under the auspices of the 
Reparations Committee in Germany from late 1923. The Committee asked Charles 
Dawes, an ‘ebullient Chicago banker’827 to head a Sachverständigenausschuss (Expert 
Committee) to draw up a plan to provide currency and price stability and a loan and 
reparations settlement for Germany. In terms of the principles and mechanisms 
instituted as part of the Dawes Plan, and (at least behind the scenes) some of the 
personnel, there were continuities. Sir Arthur Salter once again had a key role (along 
with Josiah Stamp)828 in the design of the programme. Salter’s contribution was not 
acknowledged even in his memoirs, as it was supposed to be secret, given that the 
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League should not have been involved.829 His role, closely associated with the Financial 
Committee as he was, reveals how the EFO was considered, post the Austrian 
programme, to be a repository of ‘expert’ knowledge. It also demonstrates the way 
that the Financial Committee’s secretariat, here in the person of Salter, was trusted as 
much as the actual members of the Committee to deliver the correct economic and 
financial prescriptions.  
 
There were both differences and similarities between the Dawes Plan and the Austrian 
programme. Along with the fact that the League could not officially be involved in a 
loan and reconstruction plan for Germany, another difference with the Austrian (and 
Hungarian) situation was that claims for reparations for Austria had been postponed.830 
In Germany, the issue of the level and timing of the repayment of reparations was a 
central element in the events that had led to the French and Belgian invasion of the 
Ruhr and to hyperinflation.831 This was a complicating factor for Charles Dawes and his 
experts. Interestingly, as German currency commissioner (and later President of the 
Reichsbank and Nazi Economics Minister),832 Hjalmar Schacht, pointed out, as in the 
Austrian case, the German currency was restored to stability through the introduction 
of the Rentenmark currency before the work of the Dawes Committee commenced, 
perhaps demonstrating once again the role that a sense of confidence could have in 
creating a climate of external currency stability that then helped to produce internal 
price stability.833 Schacht, perhaps not the most reliable of witnesses, even went so far 
as to suggest that a substantial part of the work of the Dawes Committee ‘had already 
been accomplished’ before they arrived in Germany.834 In the event, however, the 
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Rentenmark was only a short-lived legal tender, as the Dawes Committee (with 
Schacht’s full support) worked on the creation of a gold-backed currency. The Dawes 
Committee also proposed the by now familiar measure of the creation of an 
independent bank of issue: that is, a central bank, with considerable gold and foreign 
currency reserves, the funds for which were to be provided by international loans.835 
The budgetary principles expounded were low taxation and minimal state expenditure 
domestically, although there was less rhetoric around austerity than in the case of the 
Austrian programme.836 This may have reflected Salter’s role in drafting the plan, or 
Germany’s greater standing in the negotiations than Austria’s, or the fact that the issue 
of reparations (and in turn war debts owed to the United States),837 complicated the 
situation with respect to Germany.  
 
Various measures of control were instituted as part of the Dawes Plan, such as a 
structure in the new bank which ensured that there was a balance of management and 
executive control between German and foreign representatives, and the appointment 
of a Commissioner of Controlled Revenue.838 The form of control created was not as 
extensive as that seen in Austria. Whilst the Dawes Plan did see the German 
government acquiesce to reparations repayments, it also marked a restoration of 
Germany’s diplomatic position. The powers of foreign representatives did not override 
those of German executives, but matched them, and at the London Conference at 
which the Plan was formally agreed by the various powers involved, the German 
government had equal status to other powers for the first time since the war.839 
Overall, there was continuity between the Austrian and German projects in terms of 
the overarching principle of international financial cooperation in the service of the 
peace settlement, the attempt to make the post-war order more workable and 
enduring, as well as in the ideas and ideologies that underpinned the projects (gold 
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standard, balanced budget and so on), and some of the ‘expert’ input from those who 
were considered to have the technical knowledge to enact such programmes.  
 
The Dawes Plan did not provide the kind of comprehensive solution to the reparations 
problem – which would have been to postpone or cancel their repayment entirely – 
that some, Montagu Norman for example, hoped for. This was not yet politically 
acceptable, particularly to the French government. Whilst Dawes represented in many 
ways a defeat for Poincaré’s aggressive strategy for the curtailment of German power, 
and the era of ‘French predominance’ might have been over, French power was not an 
entirely spent force, as would be seen in its actions in relation to Austria in 1931, 
described later in this chapter.840 However, reparations commitments were scaled back 
as part of Dawes. According to Peter Jackson, the Dawes Plan was a ‘far-reaching 
revision of the entire reparations regime’.841 And, as in the Hungarian scheme, a 
transfer mechanism was created to attempt to ensure that the reparations payments 
did not become unmanageable for Germany.842 Even without a comprehensive 
reparations settlement, the Dawes Plan appeared successful, as in the Austrian case. 
Indeed, the scale of funds that flowed to Germany helped minimise post-stabilisation 
recessionary conditions, although, as in Austria, unemployment was a persistent 
problem.843 A loan of 800,000,000 gold marks was floated in August 1924, and the 
Reichsmark was made convertible into gold and stabilised at the same rate to the dollar 
(4.2 Reichsmarks) that it had had before the war.844 The new independent central bank 
was established, and by the end of October 1924, Owen D. Young, agent to the Dawes 
Committee, informed the Committee that they could announce that ‘all the conditions 
contained in the Experts’ Report have been fulfilled’.845 There was a very positive 
reaction to Dawes at the time – Dawes graced the cover of Time Magazine and was 
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awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1925 for his work.846 As Robert Boyce writes, the 
Dawes programme was regarded as ‘a tremendous victory for the internationalist 
cause’.847 
 
The praise that greeted the Dawes Plan was mirrored in the positive evaluation of the 
Austrian programme that persisted even after the collapse of European economic and 
political order in the 1930s. The principles, design and effects of the Austrian 
programme, and thus, by extension, the other similar schemes that followed, were not 
held to be responsible or even linked to what followed. W. M. Hill, writing in 1946 in 
the context of post-Second World War reconstruction, regarded the Austrian scheme as 
a ‘milestone in the post-war process of economic recovery and political consolidation in 
Europe’, and stated that ‘no one could… predict that it would all collapse in 1931.’848 
For Hill and Alexander Loveday, head of the Financial Section of the EFO from 1931,849 
‘international work’ conducted by ‘international officials’ had offered a real prospect of 
peace and stability in the interwar period. Things had gone wrong when, regrettably, 
this promising financial and economic internationalism had been abandoned in favour 
of narrow and destructive nationalistic forces.850 For these internationalists, the 
connections between the reconstruction work of the 1920s and the autarky and 
destruction that followed was not at all evident. However, the internationalist schemes 
promoted by the League in the 1920s, and those non-League programmes such as the 
Dawes Plan whose design reflected the principles seemingly vindicated in the League’s 
work in Austria, in some respects created the conditions that resulted in the 
devastating crises of the 1930s. Both the Austrian reconstruction programme and the 
Dawes Plan contained elements that were actually undermining European stability 
whilst they appeared to be saving it, in terms of adherence to gold standard ideas that 
restricted policy responses, and the encouragement of credit flows from America. The 
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latter was a more evident feature of the Dawes Regime, partly because of the need to 
find some way to finance reparations payments, but it was also a feature of the 
Austrian landscape after its stabilisation, and post-Dawes.851 The credit flows to Austria 
turned out to be very problematic, something that M. Dubois, Chairman of the 
Financial Committee in 1925, realised.852 One issue was that the loans were short-term. 
All of this was part of the climate whereby, in Robert Boyce’s view, European 
instabilities did not reduce but actually increased during the 1920s, despite the 
apparent improvements in conditions created by international financial cooperative 
efforts such as Dawes and the Austrian scheme. By 1927, the European situation and 
the interwar order was destabilised, even if it did not outwardly appear to be so.853 
 
Destabilising financial and economic developments: Austria 
Austria had particular difficulties in the interwar period which made them both more 
vulnerable to inter-war problems, and a source of them. They had long-standing debt 
issues, which were worsened by the conditions that followed the implementation of 
the financial reconstruction scheme. One difficulty was the extent to which the 
interests of industry and the interests of banking were synonymous. As outlined in 
Chapter Four, banks had extensive industrial interests and very close ties with the 
industrial sector, often on a very personal level, as bank directors also sat on the boards 
of the companies which their banks partially owned.854 These connections originated in 
nineteenth century Austro-Hungarian industrialisation, but the inflation and then the 
deflation that followed after the introduction of the League’s programme acted both to 
strengthen these links and to increase the banks’ industrial interests, as until 1925 they 
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invested even more substantially in industrial concerns.855 The banks engaged heavily in 
the phase of stock market speculation immediately after the commencement of the 
League’s programme, speculation seeming to be, according to Stiefel ‘the only lucrative 
business’ in Austria post-war.856 Furthermore, banks were directly involved in 
supporting some of the new investment concerns that developed in the wake of the 
League programme. So, for example, the backers of the hydroelectric scheme 
developed in the Tyrol were predominantly Austrian bankers.857 Having embarked upon 
this policy, the banks became embroiled in attempts to support the industrial concerns 
that they owned or had invested in. The Austrian industrial sector stagnated during the 
interwar period and performed less well than other sectors of the economy, and in the 
context of the post-stabilisation situation, a wave of industrial and banking mergers 
occurred, as in the example of the Steirer Bank seen in Chapter Four.858 Banks absorbed 
essentially bankrupt entities, and much of the post-war expansion in the banking sector 
was eradicated. The poor economic performance of the some of the large Austrian 
industrial concerns in the 1920s, and their level of indebtedness, generated instability 
in the banking sector that was so closely aligned to it. The debts of the largest car 
producer in Austria, the Steyrwerk, contributed to a significant extent to undermining 
the position of the Bodencreditanstalt, who were very involved in the company.859 The 
ultimate result of this process was Creditanstalt’s incorporation of the massive, and 
massively indebted Bodencreditanstalt, a merger CA was essentially compelled to 
undertake by Chancellor Schober, with, according to his own account, a ‘machine gun 
rather than a pistol’ in hand.860 
 
These problems were papered over with an unsustainable credit expansion between 
1927-1929, which produced in 1929 an illusion of recovery. GDP reached 105.1% of its 
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level in 1913 (1913 being 100).861 1929, the same year that Creditanstalt fatefully 
absorbed Bodencreditanstalt’s 60 million Schilling losses, was to record the best 
economic performance of the First Republic. By 1933, GDP was at 81.5% of the 1913 
level.862 One problem was that much of the lending did not go into productive 
investment but went to try to help with balance sheets and maintaining the gold 
standard. Peter Berger makes the point that the original long-term loan arranged via 
the League in 1923 corresponded almost exactly with the amount of gold and foreign 
currency that was removed from the Austrian National Bank by the Nazis in 1938.863 
But a fundamental problem for Austria was the lack of sufficient markets. As seen in 
Chapter Four, the Austrian balance of trade situation remained dire throughout this 
period. Trade with the former Empire did not recover to anything like its former levels. 
Trade barriers remained. And the United States, massively in surplus during the 1920s, 
was prepared to lend money in vast quantities to Europe, but not to open up its 
markets sufficiently to provide the export markets that European economies so 
desperately needed for economic growth and for obtaining foreign currency. 
 
Following the BCA-CA merger, the unsustainable indebtedness of Austrian banks 
increased, and even the position of the National Bank was undermined, as it covertly 
sought to prop up CA with a complex system of cross-deposits. By May 1931, The 
National Bank was much weaker than it outwardly appeared, something that its 
directors were well aware of.864 Ultimately, the Bank was not able to manage the CA 
crisis, and the government was compelled to take over the full liabilities of CA. At this 
point, the old issue of Austrian Lebensunfähigkeit came to the fore once again. The 
black hole at the heart of Austrian banking was taken on by the Austrian republican 
state, a fragile entity whose viability had always appeared questionable.865  
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Austria’s position was worsened by the end of the inflow of funds prior to the Wall 
Street Crash, followed by the collapse of US demand and the withdrawal of foreign 
money that followed.866 In early 1931, Austria sought to solve its overseas export 
problem through a proposal for an Austro-German customs union, reviving once again 
the prospect of Anschluss. This move was completely opposed by Pierre Laval’s 
government in France, who, along with the Czech and Italian governments, protested 
that the customs union proposal was a breach of the 1922 Geneva Protocols that 
governed the original scheme to financially reconstruct Austria.867 British foreign 
secretary Arthur Henderson, whilst not participating in this joint protest, referred the 
matter to the Council of the League of Nations, who in turn sent the matter to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in The Hague. The court ruled in September 
1931 that the customs union scheme was indeed not permitted by the Geneva 
Protocols.868 Diplomatic pressures and the fear caused by rumours of possible military 
intervention by France and Czechoslovakia in spring 1931 did not cause the Austrians to 
abandon the project.869 It was the banking, financial and monetary crisis triggered by 
the announcement of the CA position that gave the French government, in particular, 
the means that they required to force Austria to drop the idea of Austro-German 
customs union. Whilst historians in the main no longer accept that the French 
deliberately engineered the crisis in Austria,870 Aguado shows how they did consciously 
exacerbate the flight on the Schilling by withholding and withdrawing funds from 
Austria. The Austrian-based but French controlled Länderbank withdrew between two 
and three million Schillings per day. Furthermore, French support was important in 
obtaining the 150 million Schillings worth of Bonds that the Austrian government had 
obtained permission to place from the Committee of Control of the original League 
programme, but on 16 June, the French demanded a halt to the customs union project 
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and that Austria once again accept League of Nations’ control.871 The Austrian 
government had little choice but to acquiesce. Once again, as had occurred as part of 
the Geneva Protocols in October 1922, the financial difficulties of Austria were used as 
leverage to prevent Anschluss via the mechanism of the League’s financial 
reconstruction work. In Austria, and partly as a result of the League’s earlier work, 
France was (with allies such as Czechoslovakia) still able to maintain the post-First 
World War settlement.  And with the Lausanne Protocol of 15 July 1932, Austria’s full 
return to the auspices of the League was confirmed.872 
 
 A further and related difficulty for Austria was the effect that attempting to adhere to 
the gold standard regime had. The Austrian scheme 1922 can be regarded as the first 
significant move towards re-establishing the gold standard after the First World War 
(see Chapters Three and Four). This entailed maintaining fixed currency values, backed 
up by gold (and / or reserves of a foreign currency that was tied to gold), central bank 
independence, and prioritising monetary stability above all else in financial and 
economic matters. In Austria, as elsewhere, the ‘gold standard mentality’ played a very 
detrimental part in causing, then amplifying, the crisis, and in restricting the options to 
respond.873 In the case of the crisis of Austrian banking presaged by the insolvency of 
CA, the Austrian national bank responded by attempting to ensure monetary stability. 
They were concerned about the run on the Schilling which made its gold-parity value no 
longer credible. Thus, they stemmed the desertion of the Schilling and lured gold back 
to Austria ‘at the request of… its foreign advisor and foreign creditors’, and raised the 
discount rate (bank rate) to ten per cent.874 As Charles Kindleberger memorably put it, 
this was a bank rate that was sufficient to ‘draw gold from the moon’.875 Counter-
productively, the value of the Schilling held until 1933. At this stage, a problem with the 
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doctrine of central bank independence was clear. The high bank rate, which 
encouraged saving and had a deflationary effect on the economy, was opposed by the 
Minister of Finance as well as the Chamber of Labour in Austria, but they were 
powerless to prevent it.876 
 
Destabilising developments in the wider world – debt, credits and markets 
These problematic developments were a factor not just in Austria, but also elsewhere. 
Amongst the issues were a lack of markets, and the way in which the solutions of the 
1920s – the gold standard regime, the expansion of credit – contributed to the creation 
of the subsequent crisis. The Dawes Plan, designed in the wake of the apparent success 
of the Austrian and Hungarian programmes, and whose elements reflected the 
principles established by the Austrian scheme, was to ultimately prove a destabilising 
force. The confidence engendered by the enactment of the plan, and the large quantity 
of surplus funds in the United States, created a torrent of lending into Germany. 
Hjalmar Schacht described this phenomenon, recounting how ‘it was impossible to pass 
the Adlon Hotel, Unter den Linden, without being buttonholed by some financial 
representative who would enquire whether there were no business or municipal 
concern to whom he could offer a loan’.877 As Zara Steiner points out, the German 
economy and the efficacy of the whole structure created by Dawes came to rely on the 
‘continuing flow of American money’.878 Montagu Norman reflected this when he 
spoke of ‘The Dawes Machine which dominates German life’.879 In 1924, 2.9 billion 
Reichsmark flowed into Germany, whilst in total by 1930, the post-Dawes Plan (and 
Dawes’s successor in 1929, the Young Plan) foreign lending into Germany totalled 17.4 
billion Reichsmarks.880 Arthur Salter, like Hjalmar Schacht, blamed reckless and 
excessive lending post-Dawes for the problems that later resulted in German 
dependence and unsustainable indebtedness, rather than the agreement per se, 
                                                          
876 Schubert, ibid. 
877 Schacht, The Old Wizard, 204. 
878 Zara Steiner, the Lights that Failed – European International History, 1919-1933 (Oxford, 1995), 241. 
879 Boyce, British Capitalism at the Crossroads, 59.  
880 See Niall Ferguson, Paper and Iron – Hamburg Business and German Politics in the Era of Inflation, 1897-
1927 (Cambridge, 1995), 451-453.  
247 
 
writing that the Dawes Plan ‘brought prosperity and the prospect of peace to the whole 
of Western Europe for five years from 1924 to 1929’, and that the banking collapse was 
caused by inter-governmental debts and ‘reckless and irresponsible loans by American 
banks’, without connecting these two things.881 Albrecht Ritschel, in contrast, has 
shown the difficulties that the reparations and transfer regime caused for Germany, 
and how the Dawes Plan, despite its apparent success, increased the financial problems  
that Germany had: the credit flows into Germany were unsustainable and ultimately 
destabilising.882  
 
One issue specific to Germany that did not apply to Austria was the issue of 
reparations. Even though steps were taken in the Dawes mechanism to try to reduce 
the extent to which reparations payments, which were required to be in hard currency, 
created a drain on the German economy (by stipulating that a large proportion of sums 
paid should then be reinvested in Germany), a situation still resulted where, in effect, 
reparations were being paid for via foreign loans.883 In Austria, where reparations 
payments were suspended, the issue of the indebtedness of corporations and banks 
was just as critical, as we have seen,884 and hyperinflation had reduced available 
capital. This points to the fundamental problem in both Germany and Austria: the 
disruptions to trade caused by the war and the absence of markets post-war. Thus, the 
loans that followed financial reconstruction into these countries and others in Europe 
were only concealing for a time the underlying economic problems, whilst also 
increasing the fundamental instability in the system. In a situation of American 
surpluses in the 1920s, it made sense for US money to be lent to Europe, as occurred in 
the period of rapid credit expansion in Austria between 1927 and 1929.885 But this 
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move only made sense if measures were taken to provide markets that would enable 
European economies to grow sustainably. Instead, the financial flows were often 
directed to unproductive sources (balance sheets; maintaining reserves to support a 
credible gold standard; the concealment of other debt, as in the case of BCA-CA), and 
even where there were productive investments, without sufficient markets, 
indebtedness just grew. US tariffs, already unhelpful to European exporters, were 
raised in May 1929 following the election of Herbert Hoover, a step that rendered the 
European dependence upon US capital even more unsustainable.886 
 
We have seen how the move towards financial reconstruction in Europe in the 1920s 
inaugurated by the League’s programme for Austria helped with some immediate 
problems, such as currency stability, but sowed the seeds for later problems of 
excessive indebtedness, unstable cash flows, and deflationary policies, whilst failing to 
resolve other problems, such as the absence of sufficient markets, and the destabilising 
effect very large corporations could have. In Austria, the League’s programme 
produced in some respects recessionary conditions, whilst not providing a solution to 
underlying distributional conflicts and absence of markets. As we saw in Chapter Five, 
the League’s programme in Austria also generated some sources of political instability 
even as it reduced others, and it is to the longer term significance of these 
developments that we now turn.   
 
Political problems – Austria and the wider world 
The League’s Austrian programme, by assisting in the creation of a stable currency and 
the end of hyperinflation, helped to restore Austrian credit-worthiness and create an 
increased sense of Austrian viability. However, the implementation of the programme 
also increased destabilising political developments in Austria, as tensions between the 
centre and the regions were exacerbated, most notably between central government 
(supported by the League) and the socialist administration of Vienna increased. As seen 
                                                          
charges, in an attempt by the Viennese banks to ‘pass on the low returns and losses of the bad clients’ (23). In 
defence of the bankers, they were attempting to keep the Austrian industrial sector afloat. 
886 See Boyce, Before the Last Great Depression, 6. 
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in Chapter Five, the SDAP adopted a very different approach in tackling the problems of 
the post-First World War Austria. Theirs was a high tax, high spending regime, which 
focussed upon the development of infrastructure and services. As Eichengreen points 
out, an underlying source of inflationary problems in post-war Europe could be 
regarded as being a distributional conflict whereby the central government did not 
want to impose, or found it too politically difficult to impose, sufficiently high taxes to 
deal with their indebtedness and budgetary requirements.887 The policies of Breitner 
(described in Chapter Five), had the advantage of not just attempting to reduce social 
conflict via service provision (which as we saw in Chapter Four, was a move that could 
have helped to increase the legitimacy and stability of the new Republic), but also of 
meeting expenditure requirements via luxury taxes. Thus, to a significant extent, those 
who profited from the speculative period in Austria were compelled to pay for the 
development of the new society envisaged by the SDAP. The League’s programme 
stood in many respects in opposition to the work of the SDAP in Vienna, and despite 
the SDAP’s cooperation to some extent with the work of the League – for they did not 
want to be the ‘gravediggers’ of the Republic888 – the path that the SDAP followed 
provided a possible alternative model of reconstruction to that of the League. 
Furthermore, the League’s programme, by reducing services and implementing Abbau, 
or austerity, undermined support for the fragile Republic, already lacking in legitimacy, 
as shown in Chapter Four. In this respect, the League programme, by adding to social 
and political conflicts in Austria, reduced the stability of Austria and the wider European 
settlement. 
 
The formal ending of the League’s programme in Austria occurred in mid-1926, 
although a low level of oversight remained through the continued presence of the 
League’s agent Rost von Tonningen. The scheme, through exacerbating the conflict 
between central government and the SDAP in Vienna, had contributed to the 
deepening of political tensions in Austria. The programme of austerity and the high 
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888 Berger, Im Schatten, 20. 
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level of unemployment also increased the divisions within Austria. The Anschluss 
movement had shown renewed vigour, and so did the Heimwehr – the paramilitary 
fascist organisation that sought to end democracy in Austria and defeat the left, once 
and for all –, and the Schutzbund, the SDAP’s paramilitary force, which was established 
in 1923.889 Increasingly in 1926-1927 the Heimwehr came into direct confrontation with 
the SDAP, the Schutzbund and the working class left-wing in general. The events of 
1927, where the Palace of Justice in Vienna was set on fire by SDAP supporters, 
provoking a brutal police response, was a grim turning point on the path towards the 
end democracy in Austria. Following this time, Seipel, in power as Chancellor once 
again from October 1926 until May 1929, was increasingly anti-democratic in his 
rhetoric. He spoke of ‘true democracy’, by which he meant right-wing 
authoritarianism.890 Seipel was increasingly supportive of the Heimwehr, speaking out 
on their behalf, and facilitating links between them and economic interests in 
Austria.891 He also engaged in moves to undermine the position of parliament, and 
centralise power.892 Ultimately, political violence rose, parliament was suspended, and 
the SDAP smashed during the ‘civil war’ in February 1934.893 Austrian democracy was 
destroyed by many factors, and its foundations were perhaps never very strong. Its 
main supporter, the SDAP, were bitterly opposed by a large part of the country – and 
the SDAP anyway did not develop a broad enough base of support to ultimately be able 
to defend themselves.894 Many of its inhabitants felt that the country lacked legitimacy 
and identity, and some were prepared to use violence to promote the Republic’s 
destruction. Its economy had been massively disrupted by the war, and the defeat and 
loss of empire were traumatic, along with episodes like hyperinflation. Developments in 
                                                          
889 Elements of the Christian Social party were increasingly semi-fascist in their outlook, if fascism is taken to 
mean anti-democratic beliefs, a desire to see the left violently smashed, and support for an authoritarian, anti-
Semitic and militaristic society. See Tim Kirk on definitions of fascism in the Austrian context, ‘Fascism and 
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(New Brunswick and London, 2003) 10-31.  
890 John Deak, ‘Ignaz Seipel (1876-1932) Founding Father of the Austrian Republic’, in Gunter Bischof, Fritz 
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891 See Charles A. Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, 801, for example. 
892 Berger, Im Schatten, 18. 
893 The National Socialist Party of Austria were not really an influential political force in Austria until after the 
Nazis’ accession to power in Germany. In 1928 they had only 4,400 members in Austria. By 1933 they had 
43,000 members. See Jelavich, Modern Austria, 197. 
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Austria were multifaceted and complex, but the League programme, in not sufficiently 
considering the political and social effects of its work, did very little to assist in the long 
term survival of the Republic.  
 
Ideology, the experts and internationalism 
The consequences and afterlives of the League of Nation’s scheme for Austrian financial 
reconstruction were multifarious. As we have seen, the ‘success’ of the programme was 
questionable, or at least mixed, but the appearance of success in terms of currency and 
price stabilisation and the floatation of loans saw the model of Austrian reconstruction 
used in further ‘League loans’, such as that to Hungary. The League was now regarded 
as a repository of financial and economic expertise and was called upon to advise on 
these matters, as in Estonia. In this sense, the Austrian project appeared to be a victory 
for economic and financial internationalism and institutionally, the EFO’s prestige grew, 
as it appeared to have proved its worth. In this context, the EFO was made a 
permanent part of the League’s apparatus. However, it was the orthodox economic and 
financial principles that under-pinned the programme and not just the internationalist 
structure of the League that appeared vindicated, and its principles manifested in 
programmes outside of the League’s remit, such as in the Dawes Plan of 1924, and in 
the terms of the loan granted by J. P. Morgan to France in the same year. Whilst 
resolving some of the short-term problems that recipients faced, many of these 
programmes created or entrenched the policies and developments that were to 
underlie the coming crisis: the Great Depression. The Austrian scheme generated 
overseas capital for the country, as notoriously did the Dawes Plan for Germany. The 
influx of capital mainly served to conceal the huge problems of war debt, an absence of 
markets, and weak and overstretched banks, however. Indeed, by borrowing American 
money whilst the Americans did not open up to European markets, both Austria and 
Germany left their industrial sectors exposed and vulnerable, and particularly in the 
case of Austria, further weakened the already chronically overextended banking sector, 
which crashed with disastrous consequences in 1931.  
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Furthermore, by entrenching the gold standard orthodox values, the reconstruction 
and loan schemes of the 1920s severely hampered room for manoeuvre when it came 
to dealing with economic and financial problems from 1928, both ideologically, and 
practically, in that (for example), League of Nations’ strictures limited Austria after the 
Lausanne loan of 1932.895 The idea behind central bank independence (seen as 
important for monetary credibility and the gold standard), as expounded by its 
proponents, such as Montagu Norman, was that it prevented meddlesome and 
detrimental ‘political’ interference in monetary matters. It is the contention of this 
thesis that economic, financial and social acts are always political, however, and this 
can clearly be seen in the example of Austria in the early 1930s. As Harcourt puts it in 
relation to the City of London in 1925, the return to the gold standard in Britain was 
supported strongly by the City which ‘as ever, deluded itself that what was optimum for 
it was also in the national interest’.896 Central bank independence gave one sector of 
the economic, financial and social system the power to attempt to impose its solutions, 
its ideology and its conception of its own interests.897 The opposition of key figures and 
organisations within Austria to the Austrian National Bank’s policy, along with the ‘pre-
Keynesian’ discussions that Butschek uncovers in Austria at this time, and the very 
different strategies of the City of Vienna administration and at times other regional 
administrations in Austria, show that alternatives were not just conceivable, but fairly 
widely held.898 The point was that those in the position to determine these key policies 
had not shifted their viewpoint from their ‘back to 1914’ mentality.899 
 
                                                          
895 Although the principles of the League’s programme of 1932 in Austria were breached at times in practice, 
see Berger, ‘The League of Nations’. 
896 G. C. Harcourt, On Skidelsky’s Keynes and Other Essays (Basingstoke, 2012), 26. In the words of Patricia 
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regime best suited their interest is in some respects a moot point. They believed that it did (despite the social 
and political unrest that resulted, which it might be argued could be in no one’s interests). 
898 In Innsbruck, for example, job creation measures were taken in 1925: see Chapter Four. Some involved in 
Geneva-based international organisations also had an alternative perspective such as Albert Thomas and 
Ludwik Rajchman: Clavin, Securing the World Economy, 75. 
899 Felix Butschek, ‘Präkeynesianismus’. See also Beth A. Simmons, Who Adjusts? – Domestic Sources of Foreign 
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The related, but not always connected doctrine of austerity – the prioritisation of 
balanced budgets, deficit reduction, ‘cuts’ and so on, was also a feature of the Austrian 
programme: indeed, as Chapter Three showed, rhetoric about this seemed to 
predominate in discussions on the scheme for Austrian reconstruction. It was this path 
that J. P. Morgan insisted France follow when they granted their loan, and it was 
contained within the Dawes Plan, although the flow of money into Germany post-
Dawes off-set the effects of this. The Austrian programme involved a reduction in the 
role of the state in Austria, and a reduction in the level of service provision by the 
central state. This was something that the political right in Austria, along with the 
banking community and industrial sector, wished to see, and the League’s programme 
helped to advance this agenda. All of this increased social and political divisions in 
Austria, and in many respects worked to undermine the very chance for peace, stability 
and independence for Austria that it was supposed to help secure.  
 
Furthermore, neither the League programmes, nor the Dawes Plan, resolved the 
fundamental economic problems of Europe. Indeed, the whole edifice created by these 
programmes made Europe more dependent upon US lending, and upon a continuing 
flow of US lending, something that created deep instability in the system. To get Europe 
going again via capital flows in many ways made sense, but with the failure to resolve 
the question of war debts, the consequent absence of an effective resolution to the 
issue of reparations payments due from Germany, and the lack of markets caused by 
protectionism from the US and also between the former countries of the Habsburg 
Empire, the capital flows just promoted long-term instability. In the case of Austria, 
failure to get on top of inflation might be regarded as a distributional conflict, and the 
League programme, whilst it did ultimately allow somewhat higher expenditure than 
that envisaged, helped to reinforce the notion that the sensible, ‘technical’, non-
political, expert choice was to go for a reduction in the role of the state, and that social 
costs, such as unemployment, were an unavoidable, if regrettable, consequence of this. 
In the circumstances of the 1920s, as Teichova and Matis argue, higher taxation and 
greater state intervention might have provided a more effective response to some of 
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these problems than strategies of inflation, followed by strategies of austerity and gold 
standard doctrines.900 
 
The renewed League programme for Austria in 1932 did not provide any shift in 
perspective, perhaps surprisingly.901 In the case of Germany, Karl Borchadt has argued 
that Heinrich Brüning, the ‘hunger Chancellor’ so often criticised for his deflationary 
policies 1930-1932, had very little room for manoeuvre: thus his policies were the only 
option and in that sense inevitable.902 Ritschel has provided support for this view in 
that the reparations regime imposed in connection with the Young Plan of 1929 
constricted Brüning’s options.903 In the case of Austria, those imposing the decisions 
were the Austrian National Bank, backed up by the Financial Committee of the League 
of Nations. The policy responses were the choice of the governor and these external 
‘internationalist’ agents.904 Indeed, the judgement that Harcourt makes about the 
delusions of the City of London could also be applied internationally to the 
transnational financial group represented in the Austrian (and other similar) examples. 
In some respects, the thinking in the EFO in the face of the Depression had shifted by 
the early 1930s, with less orthodox and more flexible ideas emanating from Henry 
Strakosch and even Basil Blackett.905 Arthur Salter talked at this time of the ‘intolerable 
waste and intolerable injustice of laissez-faire, laissez-aller’.906 In 1932, however, there 
was not yet much evidence of these kinds of ideas in connection with Austria, despite 
some growing awareness within the League that economic doctrines must consider 
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their effect on ordinary people.907 As Berger writes, at this point Austria’s ‘economic 
policy made a full turn back to the League of Nations strategy’.908 The League imposed 
in their new programme for Austria the same policies, which helped to entrench 
Austria’s difficulties. In the sense that these policies were promoted by League 
representatives, they, like the requirements of the Young Plan, could be regarded as 
external impositions that drastically reduced Austria’s room for manoeuvre. However, 
it was the National Bank who, before the League’s renewed involvement, insisted upon 
following a deflationary course in 1931. Here once again, we see how a transnational 
group of financiers and bankers (including those in Austria) shared a set of values 
around monetary matters.  
 
In the 1920s, these values were often promoted through the EFO’s financial committee 
and its secretariat and in other similar circumstances, such as during the Dawes Plan, by 
‘experts’. Experts often are regarded as impartial and apolitical providers of technical 
knowledge. Experts also often believe this characterisation of themselves, as Montagu 
Norman, a deeply political figure, appears to have.909 As Clavin points out, EFO 
bureaucrats held on to the notion that they were broadly apolitical until the mid-
1930s.910 Economic and financial policies have a political basis, however, and often 
involve political choices. They also often reflect someone’s interests, or at least, their 
perception of their interests. The notion of expertise can sometimes mask the 
promotion of a certain ideology. In the case of the EFO’s work in Austria, the policies 
promoted reflected the beliefs of a transnational group of bankers and financiers about 
the proper operation of finance, fiscal policy and economics. The sense that experts 
have special, privileged, complex, technical knowledge helps to create a mystique 
around their work that gives it a certain saliency and power.  
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The EFO’s work in Austria can also be characterised as reflecting internationalist 
developments in the era after the First World War. It was an international effort, 
involving international cooperation between various countries, with transnational 
officials and delegates working through an international organisation to promote 
internationalist values. And, certainly, the financial committee and the EFO worked in 
the post-war period to promote an open and liberal international economy, and 
attempted to assist in the restoration of these conditions in the very difficult 
circumstances of post-war Europe – the Austrian project was part of this programme. 
Through promoting international cooperation, and an open, liberal economy, this kind 
of economic internationalism might seem progressive. However, as with the strain of 
internationalist economic thinking that Robert Boyce identifies in Britain in the interwar 
period,911 this was internationalism that was not necessarily progressive in that the 
interests and beliefs of the finance sector predominated. Furthermore, this form of 
economic internationalism failed to recognise some of the post-war developments that 
made its desire to ‘return to 1914’ less efficacious, developments such as the growth of 
democracy and democratic sentiment, the greater power of labour, the disruptions to 
the mechanisms that had allowed the gold standard to work effectively in the pre-war 
period, and protectionism.912 It also failed to address some of the specific challenges in 
Austria, such as how to deal with regional power. Perhaps it is too much to expect all of 
this to have been taken into account, or even for those responsible at the time, in what 
were undeniably very difficult and unique circumstances, to have been aware of all of 
these developments. It is legitimate, however, to point out that what occurred did not 
effectively respond to some of the post-war realities and difficulties in Austria, and in 
the world’s economic and financial system. 
 
In addition to arguing for the importance of the scheme for Austrian financial 
reconstruction for Austrian and wider European history, this thesis makes a 
contribution to the histories of the League of Nations, financial and economic 
internationalism, and also economic and financial ideas and notions of ‘expertise’. I add 
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more depth to the analysis of the circumstances in which the League came to launch 
the programme for Austrian reconstruction (Chapter Two), by exploring the 
motivations for the involvement of the British and French states, and by examining the 
reasons why financial interests such as the Bank of England and J. P. Morgan and Co. 
were supportive of the programme. This analysis elucidates the complex circumstances 
and motives that led to the adoption of the scheme, deploying material from a wide 
range of archival sources from London, Paris and Geneva. My research adds to histories 
of post-First World War internationalism by demonstrating that the ‘internationalism’ 
that motivated the adoption of the programme in Austria party operated in the service 
of the diplomatic interests of certain powers. These interests included a desire to 
uphold post-war borders and prevent Austro-German Anschluss. The governments, 
diplomats and officials of particularly France but also Britain (whose support was critical 
if the project was to be successfully launched) perceived the maintenance of 
independent Austria be in their interests. They were also motivated to some extent, I 
argue, by notions of the desirability of the continued existence of Austrian ‘civilisation’. 
Furthermore, the support of a transnational financial elite was crucial to launch the 
scheme, and this group were motivated in part, as explored in Chapters Two and Three, 
by a wish to restore the pre-war economic and financial values that they regarded as 
crucial to prosperity: this was their form of internationalism. 
 
In these chapters, I identify the Financial Committee of the League of Nations as having 
the most critical input into the nature of the programme, and demonstrate that the 
experts were not neutral: they represented certain interests, who had certain 
ideologies, and these were promoted through the League of Nations’ programme. The 
technocrats may have sometimes regarded themselves as politically neutral, but 
financial and economic programmes always involve political choices. In Chapter Four 
and Five, I analyse the impact of the programme on Austria and thus the consequences 
of these choices. The archives of the recipients of international work are sometimes 
overlooked when analysing this work, but in these chapters I draw upon a diverse range 
of archival and other material. There were some positive developments in terms of 
ending hyperinflation and obtaining foreign loans. A major contribution of my thesis is 
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to show the some of the effects upon regional politics in Austria, and material from 
regional archives is deployed. I also show how the League’s programme was in many 
respects detrimental to the process of state- and nation formation in Austria, and in 
this sense, did not assist with the promotion of longer-term European stability. 
 
In order to fully understand the effects of international financial and economic 
programmes, the social and political impacts must be considered, and the effects on 
the populace of Austria taken into account. The League was not often very concerned 
about these matters, but I argue that they are of central importance in assessing the 
effectiveness (or otherwise) of the programme. My research in Chapters Four and Five 
demonstrates widespread problems with unemployment, and some of the negative 
effects politically and socially that cuts to services could have. I reveal effects of this 
and reactions to it in the regions, and how tensions between the centre and regions 
were exacerbated. I also demonstrate how the SDAP in Vienna created a completely 
alternative model of reconstruction to that of the League and demonstrate the 
overlooked interaction between the League’s work and that of the administration in 
Vienna. 
 
This thesis demonstrates the complex factors that underlay the genesis of the scheme 
for Austrian reconstruction, and refutes any simplistic claims about the operation of 
idealistic motivations in international affairs in the 1920s. It also shows that whilst the 
role of the some of the leading powers, such as France and Britain, was important in 
supporting and launching the scheme successfully, the role of transnational financiers 
and bankers was also critical, and central to the design of the programme. This thesis 
makes the case that in investigating the nature and effects of such international 
programmes, a broad view of the impacts much be considered, taking into account the 
political and social effect of outcomes such as unemployment. Regional and local 
situations must also be assessed, along with national situations. In the Austrian case, 
this thesis reveals that regional reactions and centre-provincial tensions were a central 
part of the story. In the complex and fragile situation in which Austria found itself in the 
1920s, the implementation of a programme of financial reconstruction that it was 
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hoped would assist in the prospects for Austrian viability and durability created a 
situation whereby the very measures that were regarded as promoting stability, such as 
administrative reform and the encouragement of foreign lending, sowed the seeds of 
later problems. Ultimately, a programme necessitated by the effects of the First World 
War, that was partly a product of the peace settlement and that was motivated in part 
by a desire to regain some of what had been lost in Europe as a result of the war, 
worked in some respects to exacerbate the difficulties that would lead to crisis in 
Austria and in Europe in the 1930s. The attainment of durable state and nation building 
in Austria would have to wait for another time, after another war.  
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